Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of similarly-situated participants and beneficiaries of the Keycorp 401(k) Savings Plan, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1109, 1132, alleging that defendants breached their duties by failing to prudently manage the Plan’s investment in KeyCorp securities; that defendants failed to adequately inform participants about the true risk of investing in KeyCorp stock; that certain defendants breached fiduciary duties by failing to adequately monitor the management and administration of Plan assets; that certain defendants failed to avoid impermissible conflicts of interest; and that certain defendants are liable for the breaches of fiduciary duty committed by their co-fiduciaries. The district court dismissed one plaintiff because she had benefited from the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, which allowed her to sell the majority of her holdings at an inflated price. The court denied a motion to allow another to intervene as named plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

In 1978, 70-year-old Keegan was found dead on the floor of his store. Witnesses saw blood on Strouth’s hands and clothes; the medical examiner testified that the spots were consistent with his having cut Keegan’s throat; Strouth’s girlfriend testified he had confessed; and Keegan’s wound could have been inflicted by Strouth’s knife. The police found items from Keegan’s store in Strouth’s possession and Strouth’s friend testified that Strouth had confessed. Convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and felony murder, Strouth was sentenced to death on findings that the murder was “heinous, atrocious or cruel” and occurred during a robbery. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. His state habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied. In 1988, Strouth filed a federal habeas petition, which was dismissed when the Tennessee Supreme Court held the state may not use the underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance in felony murder convictions. The state court deemed the error harmless, reasoning that the jury would have imposed the same death sentence based on the other aggravating circumstance. Strouth filed a new federal habeas petition in 2000. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

Plaintiffs sought damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Hartmann counterclaimed for breach of contract. The parties unsuccessfully exchanged multiple settlement offers. Three days before an agreed-upon discovery deadline, Hartmann notified plaintiffs that it intended to exercise its right to arbitrate as provided by their contract. When plaintiffs failed to respond, Hartmann filed a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs served discovery responses on Hartmann in accordance with the agreed deadline and continued to seek discovery from Hartmann while the motion was pending. When Hartmann served discovery responses, it stipulated that it was not waiving its right to arbitrate. The court held that Hartmann had waived its right to compel arbitration by obtaining an extension of time within which to file an answer; asserting 10 affirmative defenses and a counterclaim; engaging in a judicial settlement conference and informal efforts to resolve the case; requesting adjustments of the Case Management Order; and serving discovery requests and that those actions prejudiced plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Hartmann’s actions were completely inconsistent with any reliance on its right to arbitration and belated assertion of that right caused plaintiffs actual prejudice in the form of unnecessary delay and expense.

An inmate with the Michigan Department of Corrections sued several MDOC employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights when they transferred him from a Level II security facility to a Level III facility in 2000. He claimed that the increased security level and corresponding transfer were retaliation for his participation in a state-court class action regarding inmate property, as well as for his assistance to other inmates in filing grievances. Following two appeals, the district court held that participation in the class action and assistance to other inmates in filing grievances are protected activities and that the increase in security level, though not the transfer itself, was an adverse action, but entered judgment for defendants for lack of proof of causation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to two defendants and reversed with respect to others, who produced no evidence that they would have taken the challenged actions absent the inmate’s protected conduct.

Petitioner was living with her uncle and his wife, when the uncle died. No autopsy was performed. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was heart attack and the body was cremated. The death certificate was amended to list asphyxia by smothering as the cause of death, with acute alcohol intoxication as a contributing factor, based on photographs showing scrapes around the nose consistent with impressions of a woven pillow. Petitioner’s paramour informed police that petitioner told him that the wife paid to be rid of uncle and that petitioner and wife found uncle passed out and poured vodka down his throat. Petitioner apparently left and wife smothered uncle. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter and testify against wife, but withdrew her plea. Convicted of second-degree murder, she was sentenced to 20-to-40 years, rather than seven-to-15 for manslaughter. At sentencing, petitioner stated that she would have testified, "had I not been persuaded to withdraw my plea … because an attorney promised me he would represent me." The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Petitioner established an ineffective-assistance claim. The Michigan court’s conclusion that her second attorney was not deficient in advising her to withdraw the agreement was unreasonable because the attorney failed to investigate before making the recommendation.

In 2004, plaintiff had arthroscopic surgery to treat pain and instability in his shoulder joint. The doctor implanted a pain-pump catheter and, over the next two days, a Stryker pain pump delivered a regular dose of a local anesthetic, bupivicaine, to the joint. Plaintiff’s condition improved after surgery but worsened over time, and in 2008 he learned he no longer had any cartilage remaining in his shoulder, a condition called chondrolysis. He sued, alleging strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. The district court concluded that Stryker could not reasonably have known about the risk of chondrolysis in 2004 and thus had no duty to warn of the risk and held that Plaintiff failed as a matter of law to prove causation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not present any evidence that Stryker knew or should have known that the use was dangerous or that a warning on Stryker's pain pump would have caused the doctor not to use the device in his joint space.

In 2010 defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and without a license. He admitted that he had reentered the U.S. without permission in 2007, having been removed to Mexico in 2003. The 2003 removal followed a conviction in New Mexico for aggravated assault involving a deadly weapon. He pled guilty to reentering the U.S. after being removed following a conviction for an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). The presentence report utilized U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, which provides for a 16-level enhancement if the defendant previously was deported after conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence. The PSR subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The recommended guidelines range was 57-71 months of imprisonment. The court departed downward one criminal history level, which reduced the range to 46-57, and, reasoning that the offense was a relatively minor crime of violence and that defendant would not be able to take advantage of certain rehabilitative programs while confined, the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Aggravated assault under New Mexico law is not categorically a crime of violence and available documents do not reveal what version of the offense defendant committed.

Investigating a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy, officers conducted two controlled purchases of methamphetamine at defendant’s property. Within three days, they executed a search warrant on the property, which contained a house, a recreational vehicle, and a garage. They found a revolver between the bed and wall of the RV, near drug paraphernalia, including electrical tape similar to that used on methamphetamine in controlled purchases. A handgun was found in the garage laundry room; an unloaded rifle and ammunition were in a tool room. Near the garage, officers found a canister of methamphetamine buried in the ground. A smaller package of methamphetamine was wrapped in electrical tape outside the RV. Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine or at least five hundred grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and (b)(1)(A). The district court applied a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon during a drug offense, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1), increasing the advisory range from 70 to 87 months to 87 to 108 months in prison, and sentenced him to 87 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the enhancement violated defendant's Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

In 2001, the Conservancy sold a 100.10 acre farm in Garrard County, Kentucky to the Sims for $60,084, in addition to a $244,939 charitable pledge from the Sims to the Conservancy. The property appraised at $260,400 without the easement at issue, which requires that the land "be retained forever substantially undisturbed in its natural condition and to prevent any use . . . that will significantly impair or interfere with the Conservation Values of the Protected Property." The Conservancy received an annual right to enter and inspect the property. In January 2005, the Conservancy inspected and documented several violations that concerned excavating and filling a sinkhole. The Sims corrected several other violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the Conservancy, concluding that, although the easement allowed some changes to the topography in conjunction with authorized activities, like plowing for commercial agriculture, the easement specifically prohibited the substantial alteration of filling in a sinkhole with an estimated 6,269 cubic yards of fill. The court awarded the Conservancy $99,796.41 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Because he had prior convictions, two for aggravated burglary and one for robbery committed at age 17, he was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 180 months' imprisonment, because of enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C 924(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an Eighth Amendment argument. Defendant, 33 years old at the time of his felon-in-possession offense, remained fully culpable as an adult for his violation and fully capable of appreciating that his earlier criminal history could enhance his punishment.