Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wife serves in the U.S. Air Force and executed a military power of attorney designating husband as her attorney-in-fact during her deployment overseas. Husband presented a photocopy of this instrument to the Fayette County Clerk to recording an original deed and mortgage in the real property index records. The clerk’s office rejected the copy as inauthentic and refused to record the documents. The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which claimed that rejection of the power of attorney violated 10 U.S.C. 1044b. That statute sets the minimal requirements for executing a military power of attorney and prohibits states from imposing additional requirements. During the pendency of appeal, the couple submitted an original military power of attorney and the documents were recorded. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The unnotarized copy of the power of attorney lacked an essential element of a military power of attorney and did not qualify for 1044b(a) protections.

OneBeacon and AMICO were insurers of the B.F. Goodrich and, among others, were liable for environmental cleanup at the Goodrich plant in Calvert City, Kentucky. AMICO settled with Goodrich, but OneBeacon’s predecessor went to trial. A state court jury found for Goodrich, and OneBeacon was ordered to pay $42 million in compensatory damages and $12 million in attorney fees. The state court also denied OneBeacon's request for settlement credits to reflect amounts paid by other insurers, such as AMICO, through settlements with Goodrich. OneBeacon sought equitable contribution; AMICO removed to federal court. The district court granted AMICO summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ohio policy favoring settlements provides that a settled policy is exhausted for purposes of equitable contribution; the court declined to address whether Ohio law permits interclass contribution actions or whether the jury finding of bad faith bars equitable relief.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and appealed denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. After the officer radioed for a license plate check and discovered a mismatch, he stopped the car, noticed a brake light not working, and noticed that the occupants had a boost phone and were nervous. They could not produce a rental agreement for the car. Learning that one occupant had been investigated by the DEA, the officer called for backup. A canine unit responded and the dog alerted to drugs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress and exclusion of defendant’s expert from testifying at the suppression hearing, but reversed imposition of the special condition of supervised release that defendant obtain and maintain employment outside the field of boxing. Although the officer unreasonably prolonged the initial stop, the circumstances created independent reasonable suspicion to support the canine search.

Herrera was hired by defendant, a construction company in 2003 and worked as a laborer until he was fired in 2008. The termination letter, referred to unsatisfactory attendance and incarceration following conviction. Herrera filed a complaint with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission, claiming that defendant garnished his wages improperly and fired him on account of his race and national origin. Herrera is a Cuban of African ancestry. An investigator with HRC, told Herrera that she found insufficient evidence to support his allegations. The agency dismissed. About 10 months later, Herrera sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KY. Rev. Stat. 344.450.1. The district court dismissed the KCRA claim as barred by an election-of-remedies provision and dismissed the federal claim because HRC had already rejected Herrera’s administrative complaint, which was based on essentially the same claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of state-law claims and the federal-law discrimination claim. Because the county agency did not adjudicate Herrera's federal retaliation claim, the court reversed as to the federal retaliation claim.

The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7, listing no student loan debts. Notice of filing was sent to listed creditors. Weeks later, Debtor filed an amended Schedule F which listing a creditor holding a student loan in the amount of $76,654.86. One week later, the bankruptcy court issued a general Chapter 7 discharge. No adversary proceedings were commenced during the case and no determination of undue hardship was requested or made. About six months later, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a no asset report, and the bankruptcy court entered a final decree and closed the case. Seven years later, the Debtor sought to pursue sanctions and damages against the holder of her student loans for an alleged violation of the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy court denied a motion to reopen. The Sixth Circuit. Student loans are not discharged in bankruptcy absent determination of undue hardship in an adversary proceeding, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8).

Plaintiffs, former city employees terminated after the city determined that they had tampered with their water meters, claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when city officials came to their homes to inspect their water meters, that their consents to inspection were involuntary, and that they were terminated in retaliation for asserting those rights. One plaintiff claimed that he was discharged in violation of his First Amendment right to association. The district court dismissed Fourth Amendment claims against individual officials on qualified immunity grounds and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the retaliation, right to association, and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent was not sufficient to put defendants on notice that their progressive series of questions and orders, with no attendant threat of termination, rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs were terminated for reasons related to water usage and meter inspection, not for asserting Fourth Amendment rights.

Aleo pled guilty to production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and transporting and shipping child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). The offenses involved his five-year-old granddaughter. His guidelines range was 235–293 months. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum for all three counts, 720 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Aleo’s trial attorney was sanctioned $2,000 for filing a motion to compel the government to make a formal motion regarding any victim who wanted to speak at trial pursuant to the Crime Victim Rights Act, naming the victim, and providing a preview of the victim's statement. The Seventh Circuit reversed the sanction and remanded the sentence as substantively unreasonable. The court stated that it could find no justification within the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) for the sentencing variance and that the attorney did not act in bad-faith to intimidate a victim who wished to speak during sentencing, pursuant to her rights under the Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771.

Decedent died when a 28-ton beam struck an overpass, fell off of the trailer transporting it, and crushed the cab of his truck, which was on the highway behind the trailer. The district court granted motions for summary judgment in favor of companies responsible for loading the beam on the trailer, hiring the trucking company, and obtaining permits. The court construed Michigan Compiled Laws 257.719(1) as forbidding recovery from anyone other than the owner of a vehicle that collides with a lawfully established bridge. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The estate did not bring suit directly under the statute. In a common-law negligence case, all principles concerning common-law liability and defenses apply. The statute may imply that others who pay may be able to shift their liability to an owner, not that they can have no liability in the first instance. The fact that liability for all damages and injury is fixed on the owner of the vehicle even where concurrent or intervening acts of negligence precipitate the accident, does not imply that tortfeasors responsible for those concurrent or intervening acts cannot also be liable.

Mosholder, a corrections school officer since 2001, patrolled the school and, as necessary, disciplined inmates. In 2005, the facility began housing youthful offenders. Mosholder believed that these offenders were coddled. She claimed that during a 2008 rap competition they referred to gangs and flashed signs. Defendants claim otherwise. Mosholder sent a letter to Michigan state legislators, expressing concerns that the competition created a volatile situation, with promotion of gangs, and that loss of control over youthful offenders increased incidents at the facility. She urged legislators to attend a rap event. The warden responded to inquiries, explaining the purposes of the events. In the meantime, Mosholder had multiple run-ins with the school's new administrator, who viewed Mosholder as too strict. Inmates complained about Mosholder. Mosholder was transferred to a general corrections position, where she would come into contact with more prisoners, and no longer have weekends and holidays off. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Whatever her personal motivation, Mosholder wrote primarily on a matter of public concern; there is no indication that the letter would materially disrupt her work environment or performance of her duties.

In 2005 Regan began working for Faurecia, 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. She drove 24 miles to work until 2008, when she moved, because of her husband’s new job, to a home, 79 miles from the plant. Regan is being treated for narcolepsy. She no longer falls asleep without warning and has not fallen asleep when driving since 1997. When Faurencia decided to change the work schedule to 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., for efficiency, Regan informed supervisors that commuting in heavier traffic would be difficult with her narcolepsy. She requested to continue working from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. or to work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. without a lunch break. Regan claims to have showed supervisors a note from her doctor, but they claim they never saw it. Regan did not complete Family and Medical Leave Act paperwork she was given, but resigned and sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Disabilities Civil Rights Act, with gender discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. The district court ruled in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Regan did not suffer an adverse employment action.