Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AT&T hired Kalich as a store manager, supervised by Rich, the area sales manager. Rich visited the store about 10 times per month and made comments that Kalich found offensive. These comments involved calling Kalich by a woman’s name, references to his "girlish" appearance and his dog, and calling him a necrophiliac in the presence of employees. Rather than pursue AT&T's internal options, Kalich retained an attorney, who wrote to Rich's supervisor. AT&T began investigation and informed Kalich that Rich would no longer oversee Kalich’s store. Rich was given final written warning and was required to take classes on promoting a professional environment. Kalich resigned, stating that he was uncomfortable with the prospect of encountering Rich and sought damages under Michigan's Civil Rights Act, alleging hostile work environment. The district court granted AT&T summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Harassment or discrimination because of actual or perceived sexual orientation is not prohibited conduct under the Act. The necrophilia comment, the only comment that could conceivably constitute sexual harassment, is not an extremely traumatic experience that Michigan courts recognize as creating a hostile work environment by a single occurrence. AT&T made adequate efforts to remedy the situation when it received notice.

Federal tax assessments against husband arose out of his failure to file returns, report income, or pay tax, 1986 through 1993. Unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest totaled $901,052.17 as of January 2010. Wife paid $40,227.30 in full satisfaction of a separate assessment based on an audit of her 2000 return, resulting in dismissal of claims against her personally. The district court granted summary judgment to the government with respect to the assessment against husband and reduced the tax liability to judgment. The government moved for foreclosure of the lien and sale of the entire property. Since the property was held by the couple as tenants by the entirety, husband’s individual tax lien attached to his partial contingent survivorship interest in the property, which would have minimal value if sold separately. The court found that the property would bring $160,000 at a foreclosure sale and was subject to a mortgage of $14,572.36. Wife, age 60, testified to her limited income and sentimental attachment to the home where she had lived for 29 years. The court declined to force a sale (26 U.S.C. 7403). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for reconsideration under the "Rodgers" factors.

Plaintiff, born in 1946 in Mexico to a U.S.-citizen mother and a Mexican national father, allegedly entered the U.S. in 1949. It is disputed whether the entry was legal. His mother remarried a U.S. citizen in 1960. Plaintiff alleges that he has lived in the U.S. continuously for 60 years, has been married to a U.S. citizen since 1967, and is the primary caretaker of his son, who has spinal meningitis and requires constant care. In 2003 plaintiff requested a Certificate of Citizenship based on his mother’s citizenship (8 U.S.C. 1401); he separately claimed citizenship through his stepfather. The Administrative Appeals Office denied both, ruling that plaintiff’s mother did not meet the physical presence requirement of law in effect at the time because she gave birth at age 16 and there was no evidence that his stepfather had adopted him. Plaintiff had not proven that he had been admitted as a lawful resident prior to age 18, as required to establish prima facie eligibility. The district court dismissed claims that the Nationality Act of 1940 violates the equal protection clause and that this interpretation of the Act creates an arbitrary and inequitable outcome. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the language of the statute is clear.

Davis, an insulin-dependent inmate chosen to participate in an off-site public works program, claimed that he was removed from his public-works employment because of his sexual orientation. He claimed that officers supervising his work crew ridiculed and belittled him and that when he believed he was suffering a low blood sugar incident at the work site, the supervisor refused to directly hand him a packet of honey. Supervisors had Davis complete a medical health care request and meet with a nurse upon his return to the correctional facility. Although the nurse determined that his blood sugar levels were normal and that the episode was a false alarm, the health unit manager, ordered that Davis be removed from the public-works program. Davis claimed that non-homosexual, insulin-dependent diabetic inmates were allowed to continue working in the program and filed a grievance, which was denied. The district court screened his pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed.

Mortgage Electronic is a third party in a foreclosure action, based on its assignment of a mortgage. The case was remanded from federal to Kentucky state court. Mortgage Electronic sought permission to appeal to the Sixth Circuit (28 U.S.C. 1453(c)). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), allows the court to accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action if the application for leave to appeal is timely. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition and affirmed, noting that it has previously held that third-party defendants may not remove an action not under the Act. The Act's reference to "any defendant," in context, does not change the rule: a third-party defendant cannot seek removal of a state court action under the Act.

Maker's Mark sued Jose Cuervo for trademark infringement, based on Cuervo's use of red dripping wax seal on bottles of premium tequila. The district court found that the Maker's Mark trademark was valid, rejecting an argument of "functionality" under 15 U.S.C. 1065, and had been infringed. The court entered an injunction, but denied damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court traced the history of bourbon whiskey and noted that Maker's Mark and its use of a red dripping wax seal, a registered trademark since 1958, occupy a central place in the modern story of bourbon. The majority of the factors indicate a possibility of "confusion of sponsorship" trademark infringement: strength of the trademark, relatedness of the goods, similarity, and marketing channels. Whether there was actual confusion was a neutral factor.

In 2005, Surles, a prisoner, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Michigan DOC officials confiscated legal papers and computer disks. The district court dismissed without prejudice, finding that he failed to show that he exhausted administrative remedies available through the MDOC grievance process. In 2007, the court denied a motion to reconsider, again because Surles failed to include documentation that showed exhaustion. In 2007 he filed another pro se 1983 complaint alleging confiscation of legal documents; damage or destruction of legal and religious papers and property; actions to deprive him of access to the courts, violation of First Amendment rights; retaliation by false misconduct charges and transfer; and conspiracy. Surles attached eight grievances, filed in 2006, relating to incidents in 2004-2005, all denied as untimely. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the burden was on defendants to show that the prisoner did not exhaust administrative remedies and that they failed to meet the standard for summary judgment.

Seeger worked since 1979 under a union contract. Employees on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, were also eligible for paid disability leave under the employer’s (CBT) disability plan. CBT’s plan required that the employee work in a light-duty position tailored to individual needs and medical restrictions, if medically able. In 2007 Seeger suffered a herniated disc and commenced FMLA and paid disability leave approved by CBT. CBT later asked the physician to consider part-time sedentary work. The doctor indicated that Seeger was unable to perform any work. Days later, Seeger was seen walking, seemingly unimpaired. Human Resources investigated and suspended him. The doctor responded that Seeger could walk, but could not perform even limited duties for eight hours. The company concluded that Seeger was avoiding work required by the policy and terminated his employment for disability fraud. Seeger alleged violation of the FMLA. The district court granted CBT summary judgment, finding that CBT articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination and Seeger failed to show that it was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Seeger established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, he failed to refute evidence that CBT had an honest belief in its basis for termination.

In 2001, Horn was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 following his guilty plea to bank robbery. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 709, changing the method by which a court calculates prior offenses, declining to give the amendment retroactive application. Had Amendment 709 been in effect when Horn was sentenced, he would not have been deemed a career offender. In 2008, Horn moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2). The district court granted the reduction, reasoning that the Commission’s retroactivity decision was not binding under the Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 991–998. Based on the 2010 decision, Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s interpretation of the SRA, determined that the district court lacked authority to resentence Horn, and remanded. The district court again applied Amendment 709 retroactively, finding the Commission's retroactivity decision arbitrary and that the issuance of binding policy statements violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The SRA authorizes the Commission to issue binding retroactivity decisions, these retroactivity decisions do not present separation-of-powers problems, and the retroactivity decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Jackson entered a plea of guilty to intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) in June 2009. After waiting for a change in the guidelines with regard to crack versus powder cocaine, the district court imposed sentence in July, 2010. The court did not apply “career offender” guidelines and imposed a sentence of 150 months, below the advisory range for career offenders and within the old range for crack cocaine violations. Less than three weeks after Jackson was sentenced, the Fair Sentencing Act was signed into law and the ratio for crack versus powder cocaine was reduced from 100:1 to 18:1. The Sentencing Commission promulgated emergency amendments to the guidelines, which became effective immediately; other amendments were later promulgated that made the reduced guideline ranges for crack cocaine permanent and retroactive on November 2011. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that the case is governed by the 2011 case, Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685. Jackson’s criminal history required the court to consider the career offender guidelines, but in deciding whether the now-amended and retroactive crack cocaine guidelines apply, the focus is on the range that was actually applied.