Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The debtors are limited partnerships that own real estate on which they operate low-income housing. In their Chapter 11 cases, the bankruptcy court concluded that, for purposes of determining the value of the secured portion of the bank’s claims under 11 U.S.C. 506(a), determination of the fair market value of various apartment complexes included consideration of the remaining federal low-income housing tax credits. The court also concluded that various rates and figures used by the bank’s appraiser were more accurate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A major component of the value of the bank’s claims was determination was whether the value of the remaining tax credits would influence the price offered by a hypothetical willing purchaser of the property that serves as collateral for the claims. View "In re: Creekside Senior Apts" on Justia Law

In 1993, Lancaster, a former police officer with a long history of mental illness, shot his girlfriend and was charged by the state of Michigan with first-degree murder and with possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his 1994 jury trial, he was convicted on both counts despite his asserted defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. The judgment was overturned, however, due to a Batson violation. When Lancaster was retried in 2005, he opted to be tried without a jury. Lancaster had planned to limit his defense to diminished capacity. But the trial court prohibited Lancaster from asserting the defense because, in the interim between his two trials, the Michigan Supreme Court had abolished the diminished-capacity defense (Carpenter decision). Lancaster was convicted and sentenced to life plus two years in prison. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lancaster claimed that his right to due process was violated by the state court’s retroactive application of Carpenter. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed, granting the petition unless the state commences a new trial within 180 days in which Lancaster is permitted to assert the defense of diminished capacity. View "Lancaster v. Metrish" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs participated in UMC’s self-administered retirement contribution plans. UMC provided participants with a variety of investment choices. Plaintiffs elected to locate 100 percent of their investments in the default investment for participants who failed to elect preferred investments. The 2007 Pension Protection Act created “safe harbor relief from fiduciary liability” for plan administrators that directed automatic-enrollment investments into Qualified Default Investment, “capable of meeting a worker’s long-term retirement savings needs.” The regulation grandfathered in stable-value funds that employers used as default investments prior to PPA’s enactment. In 2008, UMC sought to harmonize its practices with new DOL regulation by transferring investments in the prior default fund, the Lincoln Stable Value Fund, into the Lincoln LifeSpan Fund. Because UMC did not have records of which participants chose the fund and which were investors by default, UMC sent notice to all participants with 100 percent in the Fund. Plaintiffs claim that they never received the notice. They suffered financial losses. After exhausting administrative procedures, they sued for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. The district court ruled that Lincoln was not a fiduciary under the plan and that UMC was immune from liability under the DOL Safe Harbor regulation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Bidwell v. Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. in a check cashing scheme, Vreeland was sentenced to imprisonment, supervised release, and restitution. While on supervised release, he committed a home invasion and larceny. Co-defendant Russell later testified as to Vreeland’s role, disposal of stolen items and the getaway vehicle and their agreement to deny knowing each other. Vreeland informed Probation Officer Bobo that he and Russell were suspects in the case, but denied knowing Russell and stated that his vehicle had been sold to a junk yard. Officer Bobo requested documentation regarding the car, but Vreeland did not comply and was arrested for a supervised release violation and placed in a halfway house. Bobo began his own investigation and concluded that Vreeland had violated supervised release by committing the home invasion. Vreeland signed a written statement that he did not know Russell. Vreeland’s release was revoked when he was convicted of two counts of making false oral and written statements to a probation officer, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) (a)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. False statements during monthly supervisory meetings are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and do not fall within the “judicial function exception” to prosecution of 18 U.S.C. 1001(b). View "United States v. Vreeland" on Justia Law

Three petitioners received separate jury trials in Kent County, Michigan in 2001 or 2002. At jury selection, the petitioners did not object to racial composition of their respective venires; they were subsequently convicted. A few months later, the Grand Rapids Press published a story detailing how jury selection software had a computer glitch that had systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool. Petitioners each filed motions for post-conviction relief in state court. The state court found that the petitioners had waived these claims by failing to object to the racial composition of the jury venire during voir dire. A federal district court denied two habeas petitions, but another court granted the petition, holding that the petitioner could not have known of the computer glitch and presuming prejudice because the glitch caused a structural error. The Sixth Circuit remanded all three cases. Petitioners have shown cause to excuse their defaults, but federal-state comity requires that the district court find actual prejudice before granting relief. View "Wellborn v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs invested in oil-and-gas exploration companies and lost money when the companies’ wells produced little oil or gas. They sued the companies and their officers, claiming violations of state and federal law in selling unregistered securities and in making other material misrepresentations and omissions. They also sued Durham, the lawyer who represented the companies. Durham drafted the documents, including joint-venture agreements and private placement memoranda that provided details about the investment opportunity, and told prospective investors he was available to answer questions. Plaintiffs allege that Durham knew the documents contained material misrepresentations and omissions and that the securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration. District courts ruled in favor of Durham. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Kentucky Securities Act imposes liability on anyone who “offers or sells a security” in violation of its terms and any “agent” of the seller who “materially aids” the sale of securities, defined as someone who “effect[s] or attempt[s] to effect” the sale. Ky. Rev. Stat. 292.480(1),(4); 292.310(1). An attorney who performs ordinary legal work, such as drafting documents, giving advice and answering client questions, is not an “agent” under the Act. View "Bennett v. Durham" on Justia Law

Amos’s third wife died of a cocaine overdose while in a hotel room alone with Amos. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder by poisoning and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On remand, the judgment was amended to reflect only one conviction of first-degree murder under two theories. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. After state courts denied habeas relief, the district court found that three of the claims were procedurally defaulted and rejected remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no merit in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations in the forms of prosecutorial misconduct and false testimony or withholding evidence with regard to the level of cocaine in the victim’s system. View "Amos v. Renico" on Justia Law

Washington Mutual foreclosed on property before receiving assignment and transfer of the promissory note and the delinquent home mortgage and before recording it. The homeowner brought a lawsuit for an allegedly false claim of ownership under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, against the law firm acting for the purported mortgagee. She claimed violation of the Act, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding that she did not state a claim under the Act and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The filing of foreclosure action by the law firm, claiming ownership of the mortgage by its client, constituted a "false, deceptive or misleading representation" under the Act because the bank had not obtained transfer of the ownership documents. The homeowner adequately alleged that the misidentification caused confusion and delay in trying to contact the proper party concerning payment and resolution of the problem. View "Wallace v. WA Mut. Bank, F.A." on Justia Law

Lateef became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. Weeks later she returned to Pakistan to complete medical school. She returned to the U.S. in 1993. She married in Pakistan in 1995. Her daughter obtained LPR status as “born during [a] temporary visit abroad.” Her husband and children obtained immigrant visas in 2000, but did not attempt to enter until 2001. Although she had not been in the U.S. since November 1999, Lateef stated that she was last present in July 2000. During secondary screening Lateef admitted the truth. Lateef’s only ties to the U.S. are LPR parents and brothers. She had never been employed or owned property in the U.S. From 1991 until February 2001, she spent 40 months in the U.S. and 76 months in Pakistan. All were charged with attempting to enter without valid documentation, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Lateef was charged with misrepresenting a material fact, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); her husband was charged with attempting to enter to work without certification, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A). In 2004, the IJ ordered removal, finding that Lateef had abandoned LPR status. The BIA affirmed. On remand, the IJ held that once Lateef had abandoned LPR status it was imputed to her daughter. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Lateef v. Holder" on Justia Law

Access to the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor, Ontario necessitated traversing city streets. The state contracted with the Company, which owns the Bridge, to construct new approaches from interstate roads. The contract specified separate jobs for the state and the Company. In 2010, the state obtained a state court order, finding the Company in breach of contract and requiring specific performance. The Company sought an order to open ramps constructed by the state, asserting that this was necessary to complete its work. The court denied the motion and held Company officials in contempt. In a 2012 settlement, the court ordered the Company to relinquish its responsibilities to the state and establish a $16 million fund to ensure completion. Plaintiffs, trucking companies that use the bridge, sought an injunction requiring the state to immediately open the ramps. The district court dismissed claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, the motor carriers statute, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c), and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. 31114(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. For purposes of the Commerce Clause and statutory claims, the state is acting in a proprietary capacity and, like the private company, is a market participant when it joins the bridge company in constructing ramps. View "Mason & Dixon Lines Inc. v. Steudle" on Justia Law