Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gecewicz began working for the hospital in 1998. She took Earned Time Off leave and leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, during her employment due to a number of surgical procedures. She was never disciplined for any of these absences. Over the years, her supervisor commented several times about her surgeries. In 2007, Gecewicz accrued a number of unscheduled absences from work. She received a written warning that she had accrued seven occurrences. In 2008, she received a written warning that she had seven occurrences and was eligible for termination at nine. According to her supervisor, Gecewicz failed to show up for work on May 22, 2008, accruing three “occurrences” under hospital policy. At a meeting with management, Gecewicz did not argue the number of absences and was fired. In March 2009, Gecewicz filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC), claiming that her termination violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12300. The district court entered summary judgment for the hospital, holding that she could not show that she was "regarded as" having a disability, and that the hospital had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Gecewicz v. Henry Ford Macomb Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

Having served as an expert witness and attorney in Ohio and federal courts, Boland possessed and created child pornography by combining benign images of identifiable children and pornographic images of adults and used the images to suggest that his clients do not satisfy the mens rea requirements of laws under which they are prosecuted. The images constitute child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(C), but he claims that his use is legal an Ohio exemption for "bona fide medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by ... person having a proper interest." Boland was detained by the FBI and his computers were seized. He signed an agreement admitting to creating and possessing child pornography in violation of federal law; the government agreed not to prosecute. The district court denied Boland an injunction preventing the government from prosecuting. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that federal laws do not preempt Ohio child pornography law exceptions; that the First Amendment prevents prosecution of creation and possession of child pornography for use in court; and that unless defense attorneys and experts may take advantage of the Ohio exceptions, defendants in child pornography cases will be denied a fair trial. View "Boland v. Holder" on Justia Law

Deputy Dugle's police cruiser was struck by a Norfolk train as he left firearms training at the county range. Dugle spent 11 days in a coma, suffered broken bones, and incurred traumatic brain injury. The range is accessible by a gravel drive that crosses a farm and the tracks. There is no evidence that the county maintains the drive; it is not shown on the official map. Despite signs instructing crews to sound the horn on both approaches the crew failed to do so. Dugle had slowed as he approached the crossbuck sign with the words "railroad" and "crossing," but the parties dispute by how much and when. A camera on the train demonstrates that the cruiser was visible to the crew for about 4.25 seconds before impact. Norfolk claimed that it maintains its 30-foot right-of-way in compliance with Kentucky law and that any obstructions were on private property. The district court granted summary judgment for Norfolk, holding that the crossing was not ultrahazardous because Dugle could have avoided the collision by stopping at the sign. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that no Kentucky case has concluded that sight lines of over 400 feet indicated that a crossing is safe as a matter of law. View "Dugle v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

As one of the largest developers in Cincinnati, Erpenbeck defrauded buyers and banks out of nearly $34 million. Erpenbeck pled guilty to bank-fraud in 2003, received a 300-month sentence, and was ordered to forfeit proceeds: $33,935,878.02, 18 U.S.C. 982(a). The FBI later learned that Erpenbeck had given a friend more than $250,000 in cash. The friend put the cash in a cooler and buried it on a golf course. Agents unearthed the cooler. The government sought forfeiture of the cash and posted online notice in 2009. Three months later, the trustee of Erpenbeck’s bankruptcy estate contacted an Assistant U.S. Attorney, told her the estate had an interest in the cash and asked about the government's plans. The attorney did not mention the forfeiture proceedings. Because no one asserted an interest, the district court entered an order vesting title to the cash in the government, 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(7). The trustee sought to stay the order in November 2010. The district court denied the motion because the trustee did not file a timely petition. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Even though the trustee’s interest in the cash was "far from a mystery," the government did not take even the "modest step" of sending a certified letter. View "United States v. Erpenbeck" on Justia Law

In 1990, Pedicini purchased a LICOA supplemental cancer-insurance policy that provided for unlimited cash benefits, payable directly to Pedicini, equal to “usual and customary charges” for radiation or chemotherapy received as treatment. In 2001, Pedicini obtained assistance from an insurance agent, who negotiated a policy with LICOA that capped benefits for treatments at $25,000 per year, lowering the premium. The policy, effective October 2001, tied benefits to “actual charges” made by a person or entity furnishing services treatment or material. Unbeknownst to Pedicini, in February 2001, LICOA changed its practices. It had paid benefits tied to the amount billed by medical providers regardless of the amount accepted in payment, but began paying benefits equal to the amount accepted as full payment by providers. LICOA did not notify policyholders, but did notify its agents. In 2007, Pedicini was diagnosed with cancer. His benefits were only equal to the discounted amount accepted by his provider due to his status as a Medicare recipient. Pedicini won summary judgment on a breach of contract claim, but the court ruled in favor of LICOA on bad faith claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to bad faith claims. View "Pedicini v. Life Ins. Co. of AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an exotic dancer, challenged the nudity ordinances of Van Buren Township under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff works for Garter Belt, an entity that operates a strip club and is currently enjoined from violating the Van Buren nudity ordinances, as a result of a prior suit, in which Garter Belt unsuccessfully challenged the ordinances. In light of the previous suit, the district court dismissed plaintiff's action on res judicata grounds, reasoning that her interests had been adequately represented by Garter Belt in the previous suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. For purposes of her dancing at the club operated by Garter Belt, plaintiff became bound by the injunction when she accepted her employment-like contractual arrangement with a corporation that was bound by a permanent injunction. If a party litigates against a corporation, and obtains injunctive relief, claim preclusion should protect the party against future litigation raising the same issue and seeking the same result.View "Ludwig v. Twp. of Van Buren" on Justia Law

The company services oil wells and hired Wasek as a derrick hand to work in the tower of an oil rig. It assigned Wasek to work on a four-man crew in Pennsylvania that included Ottobre, with whom he initially shared a hotel room. Ottobre discovered that he could rile Wasek with sexually explicit stories. On the rig, Ottobre began touching Wasek in a sexual manner and inflamed the situation with comments such as “you know you like it sweetheart.” Wasek found no help from his boss, who advised Wasek not to report to the Director of Operations or he would put Wasek on a “starvation schedule” and run him off the job. The problem escalated and Wasek left the job site. Wasek called the company on a regular basis thereafter, asking for immediate work. He became frustrated and started work with another company and filed suit, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(g), and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2201. The district court granted the company summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Wasek did not show that the bullying and harassment occurred because of his gender. View "Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the sole shareholder and Chairman of Miami Valley Bank and also own stock in a mortgage lender with which the bank had loan agreements. In 2007, the FDIC began investigating the loan agreements. State and federal regulators closed the bank and appointed the FDIC as a receiver. The FDIC purportedly halted its investigation when an accounting expert confirmed that the loans were legal. The mortgage company then petitioned the receiver for $10 million that the bank owed the mortgage lender. In retaliation for the $10 million request, FDIC investigator Stevens allegedly prompted the FDIC to resume the investigation of the bank. The plaintiffs then sued Stevens, alleging that the retaliatory investigation violated the First Amendment, a “Bivens” action. Stevens died after the lawsuit began. The plaintiffs argued that their Bivens action survived his death, regardless of whether their claim would survive under state law. The district court held that state law controls the survivability of Bivens actions, subject to one inapplicable exception. The court applied Ohio law, under which the death of Stevens extinguished the claims against him. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Haggard v. Steven" on Justia Law

Republic bought more than $50 million worth of residential-mortgage-backed securities from Bear Stearns. It did not read the relevant offering documents before investing. As the national economy crumbled in 2007 and 2008, so did the value of the investments. Republic brought suit in 2009, alleging that Bear Stearns and one of its employees fraudulently induced it to buy, and then to retain, the securities. It claimed that a series of misrepresentations and omissions, both oral and in the written offering documents, were actionable under common-law theories of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and under the Blue Sky Law, Kentucky’s securities statute. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Republic cannot maintain any of its common-law fraud, negligent-misrepresentation, or Kentucky Blue Sky Law claims. It failed to adequately plead actionable misrepresentations or omissions of fact, complained of risks disclosed in offering documents that it failed to read before investing tens of millions of dollars in risky securities, and attempted to maintain claims that are time-barred. View "Republic Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The 119-bed nursing home has 43 charge nurses, represented by AFL-CIO Local 1548 since 2003, when the Regional Director found the charge nurses to be statutory employees and the Board denied review. The 45 certified nursing aides are represented by the UAW. Seven stipulated supervisors manage the nursing department. After a 2004 collective bargaining agreement expired, the employer filed a unit-clarification petition to have the Board determine that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors under 29 U.S.C. 152(11). The Regional Director denied the petition. The Board denied review, noting that it may have been error to allow the employer to relitigate the previously resolved supervisor issue. Because the employer refused the Union’s request to bargain and to provide information, the Union filed unfair-labor-practice charges. The General Counsel issued a complaint. The employer admitted refusing to bargain but claimed that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors. The General Counsel filed a summary-judgment motion, which was granted by the Board. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the Union, rejecting an argument that charge nurses are supervisors because they had the authority to assign, responsibly direct, discipline, hire, and transfer other employees, or effectively recommend these actions. View "Frenchtown Acquisition Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law