Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally in 1991. In 1997, he pleaded guilty to felony flight after attempting to elude a police officer who had signaled him to stop for speeding. As a first-time offender, he received a sentence of 40 days. In 2006, INS issued a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), which permits removal of an alien present without being admitted or paroled, and 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), which permits removal of an alien convicted of acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude. Petition conceded the first ground for removability but challenged the second ground. The IJ concluded that because of the wanton or willful mental state required under the state statute and the resulting inference that petitioner had disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the safety of others, his Washington law categorically rose to the level of a CIMT, and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Police received multiple 911 calls regarding Kevin’s threatening behavior. After verifying the threats, officers went to his father’s property, which was dark and surrounded by heavy woods. His father told officers that Kevin had been drinking, was possibly suicidal, and owned guns. Before officers could implement their plan, Kevin drove up, approaching the patrol cars. Officers activated lights and ordered Kevin to raise his hands and exit the vehicle. Kevin shifted into reverse and backed into the woods. During pursuit, Kevin’s truck became stuck in snow. Officers approached, ordering Kevin to show his hands. Kevin refused; an officer opened the truck door, yelled “Taser,” and deployed his taser. Kevin’s jacket prevented the taser from properly functioning. Kevin arose from the seat, yelled that he had a gun and turned toward the officers, his hands extended in a firing position. After shooting Kevin, officers began lifesaving procedures until an ambulance arrived. Kevin did not survive. Police found cell phone with the antenna extended on the front seat and a rifle in the snow, several car lengths away from Kevin’s truck. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. View "Simmonds v. Genesee County" on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiff’s car collided with a train owned by defendant. The train was stopped on the tracks in Louisville, Kentucky, blocking a crossing. Plaintiff never hit her brakes and slammed into the side of the red boxcar at 40 to 45 miles per hour. She survived the crash, claimed that warning lights were not flashing and that she never saw the train until the instant before the impact, and sued in state court for negligence and failure to comply with the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. 421, and other federal laws, including 49 U.S.C. 20134, by failing to properly maintain, employ, use and install proper warning devices and procedures at railway crossings. Defendant removed the case to federal court, where it was granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Although plaintiff never moved for remand, courts are required to consider jurisdiction. The cited federal regulations do not create or imply a cause of action. View "Hampton v. R.J. Corman R.R. Switching Co." on Justia Law

During a traffic stop for speeding, a dog deployed to the scene alerted to drugs. A search revealed cash and false drivers' licenses. Defendants were part of a conspiracy that created the licenses, using genuine identity information of others, in order to cash counterfeit checks at Wal-Mart stores. They pled guilty to conspiracy to utter counterfeited securities, to knowingly possess five or more false identification documents with intent to use them unlawfully, and to commit aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 371 and to aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). Two also pled guilty to knowingly possessing five or more false identification documents with intent to use them unlawfully, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(3). They were sentenced to terms of 54 months, 42 months, and 61 months in prison and each was ordered to pay $68,742 in restitution to Wal-Mart. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, but remanded for resentencing of one defendant. The traffic stop was not unreasonably extended by deploying the drug-detection dog; the court rejected arguments that the dog was unreliable, and that the alert did not justify opening the envelope containing the first set of counterfeit documents. View "United States v. Earvin" on Justia Law

A BOLO alert issued for a suspect involved in a shooting, thought to be driving a black Tahoe with stripes and chrome wheels. An officer, familiar with the suspect, spotted a similar vehicle and performed a traffic stop for failure to signal. Defendant and his passenger were each holding open, partially consumed bottles of beer. Neither had a valid driver’s license. The officer then realized that there was no connection with the incident that precipitated the BOLO, but conducted a background check and found a warrant for defendant’s arrest. The officer determined that, in accordance policy, the Yukon would have to be towed because it was illegally parked in the driveway of a residence with no discernible connection to either occupant and neither could drive it to another location. Before releasing the vehicle to the towing company, he performed an on-site inventory search; under the driver’s seat. He noticed that the carpet had been ripped up and appeared to be loose. Lifting it, the officer found a handgun. Defendant conditionally pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress the firearm. . View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Cogswell purchased the vacant paper mill in a tax foreclosure sale for $70,000. The site has more than 20 buildings, covering 440,700 square feet. Evanston issued first-party property insurance with a building coverage limit of $1,000,000, subject to coinsurance at 80%. On the first day of coverage, 15,700 square feet (less than 4%) were damaged by fire. Evanston determined that actual cash value of the buildings at the time of loss was $10,223,384.80; under the coinsurance provision, Cogswell was required to carry insurance of $8,178,707.84. Cogswell carried only $1 million. Evanston determined that it was liable for 12.23% ($1 million/ $8,178,707.84); calculated cash value of loss at $342,836.46; and determined that it was liable for $36,918.27 ($342,836.46 times 12.23% less $5,000 deductible). An umpire, appointed under the contract determined actual cash value of $1,540,000.00 and damage at $736,384.89. Cogswell demanded $554,553.49, the net amount under the appraisal after application of the coinsurance provision and deductible. The district court vacated the appraisal and granted Evanston judgment on a second appraisal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The provision calling for appointment of an umpire is not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which would require deference; the parties agreed to the process under Michigan law.View "Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC" on Justia Law

In the 1990s debtors owned a business that failed and incurred liabilities from unpaid taxes. They had a monthly payment obligation to the IRS. Husband obtained employment; 2003 to 2009, his yearly gross income was between $53,000 and $59,000. In addition, he receives $1,300 per month from a settlement annuity. Wife was employed as a bookkeeper until 1999. In 2000, she pled guilty to felony embezzlement of funds from her former employer and was sentenced to probation and required to pay restitution of $800 per month. Before her indictment wife obtained employment as a bookkeeper for plaintiff, began embezzling, and deposited stolen funds to Debtors’ joint bank accounts. By 2006, she had embezzled $283,391.88 from plaintiff and forged credit card purchases of $2,821.43. In 2007, she embezzled $328,516.10. In 2008, she embezzled $11,230.21. She stole goods valued at $127,156 from her employer. Debtors spent accordingly. The Bankruptcy Court entered an order excepting debt owed to plaintiff from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), finding that husband conspired with wife to convert embezzled funds and other property. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Debtors’ conduct constituted willful and malicious injury to plaintiff. View "In re: Cottingham" on Justia Law

Principals of Cybercos defrauded lending institutions out of more than $100 million in loan. In 2002, Huntington granted Cyberco a multi-million-dollar line of credit, and Cyberco granted Huntington a continuing security interest and lien in all of Cyberco's personal property, including deposit accounts. After discovering the fraud, the government seized approximately $4 million in Cyberco assets, including $705,168.60 from a Huntington Bank Account. Cyberco principals were charged in a criminal indictment with conspiring to violate federal laws relating to bank fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. Count 10 issued forfeiture allegations against individuals regarding Cyberco assets, including the Account. In their plea agreements, defendants agreed to forfeit any interest they possessed in the assets or funds. The district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture with regard to the assets, including the Account. Huntington filed a claim, asserting ownership interest in the forfeited Account. The district court found that Huntington did not have a legal claim. On remand, the district court again denied the claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A party who takes a security interest in property, tangible or intangible, in exchange for value, can be a bona fide purchaser for value of that property interest under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6)(B). View "United States v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Hoover, a combat veteran who served in Iraq, alleged that police violated his rights by stopping his vehicle, prolonging the stop into an investigatory detention, transporting him to a police station and having him committed for psychiatric evaluation. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, with state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Officers had reasonable cause for an investigatory stop after they observed a vehicle, filled to the brim with personal items, traveling at random, through a neighborhood known for theft and property crimes, at 1:20 a.m. Suspicions were further aroused when Hoover informed them that he intended to leave the state with his 18-month-old child and that he did not know where his wife was. They had probable cause to arrest Hoover before they asked him to exit his vehicle; 36 minutes after they initiated the stop, they learned that Hoover’s wife reported a domestic incident and that he was trying to escape with the child. Hoover’s wife confirmed that Hoover had experienced problems after returning from Iraq, had become increasingly violent, had destroyed property, and had held a knife to his neck while threatening to take his life. View "Hoover v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Following a traffic stop for failing to dim her high beams in the face of oncoming traffic, Green was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, based on her responses to a series of field sobriety tests administered by a state trooper. A more definitive test, her urine sample, later came back clean; all charges were dropped. Green sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the trooper violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting field sobriety tests without having a reasonable suspicion that she was impaired and arresting her without probable cause. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A reasonable jury could find that Green's conduct did not create a reasonable suspicion that she was driving under the influence, that Green acted rationally throughout the stop, that her relatively minor traffic violations were not indicative of impairment, and that the officer fabricated the alleged constriction of her pupils to create an after-the-fact justification for the detention. View "Catrena Green v. Adam Throckmorton" on Justia Law