Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Foster was convicted of second-degree murder in connection with a shooting death. After trial, the Michigan trial court conducted a Ginther hearing and concluded that Foster’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an alibi defense, stemming primarily from the testimony of a witness who said that Foster was with him at the time of the killing. The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the failure to raise the alibi defense was an exercise of sound trial strategy by Foster’s trial counsel. On habeas review, the district court held that Foster’s trial attorney was deficient for failing to raise the alibi defense, but that the deficiency did not prejudice Foster. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the deficient performance finding, but reversed with respect to the prejudice determination, and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus giving the state 180 days to retry Foster or to release him. The relative weakness in the state's case and strength of the potential alibi defense created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. View "Foster v. Wolfenbarger" on Justia Law

Emswiler sued his employer, CSX, a railroad, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen after his seniority on the roster of train engineers was adjusted. Emswiler alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement, breach of duty of fair representation, and disability discrimination under Ohio law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined it could not reach the merits of claims for breach of CBA and disability discrimination due to his failure to pursue arbitral mechanisms mandated by the Railway Labor Act, which governs disputes between management and labor in the railroad industry, 45 U.S.C. 151, 153. The RLA divides disputes into two categories: Major disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements, whereas minor disputes deal with the interpretation of existing CBAs. This is a minor dispute. Emswiler’s claim for breach of duty of fair representation lacked merit. View "Emswiler v. CSX Transp. Inc." on Justia Law

Campbell pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, by engaging in a mortgage-fraud scheme that violated 18 U.S.C. 371. As part of the plea agreement, Campbell partially waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. In a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Campbell claimed that his attorney’s failure to file an appeal despite Campbell’s alleged express instruction to do so amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing to answer whether Campbell did unequivocally instruct his attorney to file an appeal, the district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded; a defendant is entitled to counsel who will follow through on express instructions to proceed with an appeal, no matter what the ultimate odds of success. View "Campbell v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued behalf of themselves and all other purchasers of title insurance in Ohio from March 2004 through the present. They alleged that 22 title-insurance companies and the Ohio Title Insurance Rating Bureau violated antitrust laws (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; Ohio Rev. Code 1331.01) by conspiring to set unreasonably high title-insurance rates. The title-insurance companies filed rates with the Ohio Department of Insurance through OTIRB, a properly licensed rating bureau. Plaintiffs claimed that it was impossible for the Department to review the reasonableness of the rates collectively set by defendants because those rates are based principally on undisclosed costs, which allegedly included “kickbacks, referral fees and other expenses designed to solicit business referrals.” The district court dismissed, holding that the filed-rate doctrine applied to title insurance, and foreclosed claims for monetary damages and that Ohio statutes (Title XXXIX) completely foreclosed federal and state antitrust claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that there are at least 45 similar cases, nationwide. The filed-rate doctrine, which limits antitrust remedies available to private parties, is irrelevant because the actions are barred by state law. View "Katz v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins." on Justia Law

Holmes, a confidential informant, telephoned a man he identified as Gill and arranged to buy cocaine at a specific location. Police were present with Holmes, but did not record the call. Holmes told officers that Gill would drive a green Acura. Officers set up surveillance and observed Gill arrive in a green Acura, exit the car, and join a group of people. Officers approached and identified themselves as police. Gill ran about 20 feet, dropping keys, then responded to the officers’ commands. Officers discovered a small quantity of marijuana in Gill’s waistband and arrested Gill. Officers found a loaded handgun under a child safety seat at the place on the stoop where Gill had stopped and lain down minutes earlier. After a drug dog alerted on the car, officers used the dropped keys to open the car and found five ounces of cocaine. Gill was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(c); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of a motion to suppress. View "United States v. Gill" on Justia Law

Ogden began online communications with a girl who stated that she was 15; he said he was 25, lived in Pennsylvania, and was a cancer patient. She sent Ogden sexually explicit photos of herself. At Ogden’s request, she masturbated in front of a webcam. He saved the images. She turned 16 and Ogden traveled to California; they checked into a hotel and had sex. When he discovered the relationship, the victim’s father invited Ogden to visit. He was arrested. Ogden was 34, not 25, was cancer-free, and lived in Tennessee. The victim’s chat logs showed that she sent explicit images of herself to other men. The court held that they could not be used as evidence against Ogden. Ogden unsuccessfully sought to use the logs to show that images on his hard drive were produced by the victim for others. Convicted of persuading a minor to engage in sexually explicit activity for the purpose of producing a visual depiction, use of interstate commerce to persuade a minor to perform sexual acts, receipt of child pornography, and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2422(b), 2252(a)(2),(4)(B), Ogden was sentenced 204 months and ordered to pay $64,735 in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ogden" on Justia Law

Following the death of Waeschle’s mother, the medical examiner performed an autopsy to determine the cause of her death. While the mother’s remains were returned to Waeschle, the medical examiner retained the brain for further study without Waeschle’s knowledge. After Waeschle discovered that her mother’s brain had been retained and later incinerated as medical waste, she sued, alleging due process violations. The district court dismissed state law claims but declined to dismiss the due process claim, finding that, under Michigan’s clearly established law, next-of-kin have an interest in their deceased relative’s remains/body parts. Following remand and certification of the question, the Michigan Supreme Court responded that: Assuming that a decedent’s brain was removed by a medical examiner to conduct a lawful investigation into the decedent’s cause of death, the decedent’s next of kin does not have a right under Michigan law to possess the brain in order to properly bury or cremate the same after the brain is no longer needed for forensic examination. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to sanction plaintiff for frivolous appeal. View "Waeschle v. Oakland Cnty. Med. Exam'r" on Justia Law

Chattman, an African American, worked as a shipping coordinator, and had been with the company for 20 years when Tullock, a Caucasian and then Human Resources Director, recommended that management terminate Chattman’s employment following an incident of “horseplay,” during which a worker was injured. Chattman cited three incidents in which Tullock made racial comments as evidence of his animosity toward African Americans. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on claims under Title VII, 42 U .S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Chattman has presented evidence of Tullock’s discriminatory animus and offered sufficient proof to create genuine issues of fact as to intent and causation, so that summary judgment was improper. The adverse employment actions alleged by Chattman and any damages are matters to be resolved by a jury. View "Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, a Tennessee jury convicted Rayner of five counts of rape of a child (his daughter) and five counts of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 51 years: 21 years for each rape conviction, and nine years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, with two rape counts and one sexual battery count to run consecutively, and the remainder to run concurrently. He exhausted state direct and collateral review. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that had not been raised in state court. At trial, the prosecution presented medical proof that the victim suffered from trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted disease. No evidence was presented that Rayner had trichomoniasis. On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed out that trichomoniasis could be transmitted in ways not involving sexual contact. Defense strategy focused on the theory that the victim was lying about the abuse. View "Rayner v. Mills" on Justia Law

Woodall pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first degree rape in connection with the 1997 murder of a 16-year-old girl. After a penalty trial, the trial court adopted the recommendation of the jury and sentenced Woodall to death on the murder conviction and life imprisonment for the remaining convictions. Woodall unsuccessfully appealed his sentence to the Kentucky Supreme Court and then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition because the trial court denied him his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by refusing to give a requested “no adverse inference” instruction with respect to Woodall not testifying and made a constitutional error during jury selection in allowing the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American member of the jury without holding a hearing pursuant to Batson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Woodall v. Simpson" on Justia Law