Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Doe sued the Salvation Army and its warehouse supervisor, claiming employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). The supervisor allegedly inappropriately asked him in an interview what kind of medications Doe was taking and refused to hire Doe as a truck driver when Doe responded that he was taking “psychotropic” medications. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, holding that material issues of fact existed as to Doe’s disability and the legitimacy of the warehouse’s safety concerns. On remand, the court granted the Salvation Army summary judgment on the basis that it was a religious organization and not principally engaged in social services. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The statutory definition of “program or activity” permits consideration of the whole organization if the organization is principally engaged in the business of providing social services. That the Salvation Army views its social service as a way of spreading its spiritual teachings is not dispositive; an activity can be both. View "Doe v. Salvation Army in the U.S." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to an act of juvenile delinquency, 18 U.S.C. 5032, for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. He was 16 years old when arrested. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that he was responsible for distribution of 647 grams of heroin and sentenced him to five years’ official detention. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The maximum period of a juvenile’s official detention is the lesser of five years or “the maximum of the guideline range ... applicable to an otherwise similarly situated adult.” The district court’s finding that defendant was responsible for 647 grams of heroin raised his maximum period of detention so that the district court was required to make the drug-quantity finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the “Apprendi” holding, the court stated that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” is treated as an element of the crime itself, rather than as a sentencing factor. Juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with violation of a criminal law. View "United States v. CTH" on Justia Law

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires a sex offender to “register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides.” 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). After failing to persuade the district court that SORNA violates the federal Constitution, Stock pleaded guilty to failing to register. The district court set Stock’s base offense level at 16, presuming that Stock had been required to register as a “Tier III offender,” U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(a)(1). Stock’s base offense level, reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility and combined with Stock’s criminal-history category of VI, yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Stock to 72 months with lifetime supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court selected the wrong base offense level.View "Unted States v. Stock" on Justia Law

A woman, who had worked as an informant in the past, was arrested for solicitation or prostitution and agreed to cooperate as a confidential informant in a controlled buy of crack cocaine. After the controlled buy, officers obtained a warrant and searched an apartment at which defendants were present. Officers discovered crack cocaine on Jenkins, a large amount of cash on Archibald, and a loaded pistol and a substantial piece of crack in the kitchen. A canine search of Archibald’s car, in the driveway, revealed $12,000 cash. The state court suppressed the evidence; the appellate court affirmed. A federal grand jury indicted Archibald, Jenkins, and Muse, the leaseholder, on charges including use of premises to manufacture controlled substances, possession with the intent to distribute cocaine near public housing, making false statements to federal agents, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the affidavit presented probable cause, but the probable cause had gone stale when officers executed the warrant, eight days after the controlled buy. Without conducting a Franks analysis, the court concluded that the affidavit contained knowing or reckless falsities regarding the reliability of the informant. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "United States v. Archibald" on Justia Law

Brinley operated an investment company; his investors were friends, neighbors, and family. He told them that the certificates of deposit were FDIC insured and that their principal was not at risk, and promised above-market returns. He used their money to pay returns to other investors, overhead and living expenses. Brinley lied to investors who attempted to withdraw funds. In 2009, unable to continue the scheme, Brinley, accompanied by his attorney confessed that he owed investors approximately four million dollars. He entered a plea of guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The probation officer calculated a Guidelines sentence range of 63-78 months. Brinley presented evidence of depression and argued for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.16 for acceptance of responsibility. The court rejected a claim that the offense would not have been detected absent disclosure, concluded that the guidelines failed to capture the severity of the offense, given the number and vulnerability of the victims, the need for deterrence, and the amount of loss, and imposed a sentence of 108 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court failed to notify of intent to vary upward, gave unreasonable weight to certain factors, considered impermissible factors, and imposed an unreasonable sentence. View "United States v. Brinley" on Justia Law

In 2001 Bunch, then age 16, committed robbery, kidnapping, and repeated rape of a 22-year-old female university student. He was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 89 years. Ohio courts rejected appeals. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments by sentencing him to the functional equivalent of life without parole for crimes he committed as a juvenile. Even if the 2010 Supreme Court holding, Graham v. Florida, that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide” applies on collateral review, it does not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles who have committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole. View "Bunch v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1957, Dominic opened an Italian restaurant, “Dominic’s.” It closed in 2007, but daughter-in-law, Anne, continues to market “Dominic’s Foods of Dayton.” In 2007, Christie, a granddaughter, contracted to operate a restaurant with Powers and Lee, a former Dominic’s chef. In pre-opening publicity, they promised to bring back original Dominic’s recipes. They named the business “Dominic’s Restaurant, Inc.” and registered with the Ohio Secretary of State. Anne brought claims of trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair practices, unfair competition, tortious interference with contract, conversion, misappropriation of business property, breach of contract, fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that defendants had engaged in infringing behavior before and after entry of a TRO. Powers and Lee later closed the restaurant and withdrew registration of the name, but motions continued, arising out of efforts to open under another name. The district court eventually granted default judgment against defendants, rejecting a claim that proceedings were automatically stayed by Powers’ bankruptcy filing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stay does not protect a debtor’s tortious use of his property and, while the stay would bar assessment of damages, it would not bar injunctive relief. View "Dominic's Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia" on Justia Law

Sypher alleged that University of Louisville’s head basketball coach, Pitino raped her; Pitino testified that they had consensual sex. Sypher learned that she was pregnant and contacted Pitino. Sypher alleges that Pitino raped her a second time. Eventually, Pitino, arranged for an abortion. Goetzinger, a friend of Sypher’s, testified that Sypher asked Goetzinger to call Pitino to request $200,000 to $400,000. Goetzinger testified that he made three anonymous calls to Pitino’s cell phone. Eventually, Sypher admitted her involvement to FBI agents. Sypher was convicted of willfully causing another to transmit threatening communications in interstate commerce with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 875(d); making threatening communications with intent to extort, under 875(d); mailing threatening communications with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 876(d); making false statements to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and retaliating against an individual for providing truthful information about a crime to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments of ineffective assistance by counsel and that the district court erred by denying a change of venue; creating a web page for public access to trial materials; releasing completed juror questionnaires before seating a jury; denying post-trial access to documentary and other evidence; and denying her motion for recusal. View "United States v. Sypher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of MCL 169.252(1), which sets limits on individual campaign contributions per “election cycle,” and includes criminal penalties. Plaintiff attested that he wished to make contributions to the candidate committees of individuals running for state House and state Senate in Michigan in 2010 in excess of the limits imposed for an individual. The district court denied a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly considered that there was no showing of irreparable harm to plaintiff while there would be significant harm to defendant and the public if a preliminary injunction issued; that the only hard evidence in the case was that the statutory limits are not indexed to inflation, a showing that did not lead to the conclusion that plaintiff had a strong likelihood of success on the merits; and that there was no empirical evidence to determine the effect of individual contribution limits on the power to mount a campaign. View "McNeilly v. Land" on Justia Law

Keys filed a class-action lawsuit against her former employer, alleging claims of race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court dismissed, finding that Keys failed to plead a prima facie case of race discrimination under the burden-shifting framework of “McDonnell Douglas.” The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at the pleading stage and the complaint detailed several specific events in each of those employment-action categories where Keys alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts; it identifies the key supervisors and other relevant persons by race and either name or company title; and it alleges that Keys and other African Americans received specific adverse employment actions notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances. View "Keys v. Humana, Inc." on Justia Law