Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Werth was charged with robbing a convenience store. Before he pleaded guilty to breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny and to possession of burglar’s tools, Werth attempted at least seven times to assert his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The trial court denied his request summarily the first six times. The seventh time, the judge explained the nature of the charges against Werth, told him that she could not give him special training or treatment, and denied his request without giving him an opportunity to speak. Three weeks later, the judge denied Werth’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in which he argued duress. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. The district court denied Werth’s petition for habeas corpus. Applying AEDPA deference, it held that Werth waived his self-representation claim by pleading guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent for the Michigan appellate courts to conclude that Werth’s guilty plea foreclosed his challenge. View "Werth v. Bell" on Justia Law

Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public. View "McCullum v. Tepe" on Justia Law

Tangled in a prolonged legal dispute over visitation rights to see his daughter, Jeffries wrote a song, “Daughter’s Love,” which contains passages about relationships between fathers and daughters, but also includes complaints about his ex-wife, ranting gripes about lawyers and the legal system, and threats to kill the judge if he doesn’t “do the right thing” at an upcoming custody hearing. Jeffries created a video of himself performing the song on a guitar painted with an American flag and posted the music video on YouTube. He shared it with friends, family and the media. In the video, Jeffries says “This song’s for you, judge.” Agents charged Jeffries with violating a federal law that prohibits “transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to . . . injure the person of another” 18 U.S.C. 875(c). A jury convicted Jeffries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All that the First Amendment requires in the context of a section 875(c) prosecution is that the threat be real; there was sufficient evidence to convict. View "United States v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

Seven times, Coles secured firearms in the U.S. and directed co-conspirators to deliver the firearms to purchasers in Canada. For the eighth sale, Coles arranged to deliver, in person on the U.S. side of the border, firearms in exchange for 50,000 tablets of Ecstasy. The buyers were actually undercover Toronto police officers. Coles was arrested by ATF agents. Coles’ continuing dissatisfaction with assigned counsel delayed the jury trial until the district court ruled that Coles waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Coles was convicted of seven counts of aiding and abetting unlicensed dealing in firearms; eight counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm; one count of aiding and abetting attempted possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; one count of carrying and using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime; and one count of conspiracy. He was sentenced to180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible error even though the court did not use the exact model inquiry set forth in the Bench Book. The court advised Coles several times about the difficulties in self-representation. An attorney was available throughout trial as stand-by counsel, and subsequent to conviction, assisted him during sentencing proceedings. View "United States v. Coles" on Justia Law

Smith filed a numerically second petition for habeas corpus that he claims is not “second or successive” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) because the claims included in the petition are newly ripe. The district court transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the transfer. A district court has jurisdiction to consider numerically second petitions that are not “second or successive” and needs no authorization. A district court may (and should) rule on newly ripe claims. The district court never ruled that Smith’s petition was successive and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction. There is no rule, statute, or case that permits a lower court to transfer a case to an appellate court when it is uncertain of its jurisdiction for an advisory ruling. View "In re: Smith" on Justia Law

Patrizi, an attorney, was at Bounce nightclub in Cleveland with her friend Baron, Baron’s brother, and his girlfriend, Mills. Officers Huff and Connole arrived in the early morning hours in response to a reported assault. They met the victim reporting the incident, Wallace and she led them inside the nightclub to identify perpetrators. The officers escorted the group, which included Mills, toward the exit. Patrizi joined the group. Connole began to question Mills and Patrizi interjected; eventually, Patrizi was handcuffed and placed under arrest. The parties dispute the interactions leading to the arrest for obstructing official business. In Patrizi’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly established that nonaggressive questioning of police officers is constitutionally protected conduct. When the facts are viewed in her favor, Patrizi’s actions fall within the protected ambit because her conduct did not cross the line into fighting words or disorderly conduct prohibiting the officers from conducting their investigation. View "Patrizi v. Huff" on Justia Law

Since at least 1995, Community Trust Bancorp, Inc. (plaintiff) has used the mark “COMMUNITY TRUST” to promote its services; it included this mark on its website since 1998. Defendants, Community Trust Financial Corporation, and two subsidiaries, Community Trust Bank and Community Trust Bank of Texas, use the marks “COMMUNITY TRUST” and “COMMUNITY TRUST BANK,” and display these marks on their website. Defendants’ contacts with Kentucky are limited. They have branch offices exclusively in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi and limit their advertising and marketing campaigns to those states; they have no officers, directors, employees, agents, or any other physical presence in Kentucky. They do have customers who moved to Kentucky and continue to maintain their bank accounts from there. Three or four account owners, while residing in Kentucky, requested passwords to access the Defendants’ online banking website. Plaintiff brought a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1), and state law. The district court denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the cause of action only tangentially related to defendants’ acts, providing passwords, within the forum state. View "Cmty. Trust Bancorp, Inc. v. Cmty Trust Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Hagans, a middle-aged man under the influence of crack cocaine, became paranoid and went into a rage in his yard. He refused to allow police to subdue him. Officer, Ratcliff applied his taser in drive-stun mode, directly against Hagans’ upper back. Hagans, reached back and tried to grab the taser. Ratcliff applied the taser again, to no effect, then tried, unsuccessfully to use the taser in dart mode. Ratcliff tased Hagans two to four more times in drive-stun mode, then joined two other officers in trying to subdue Hagans. The officers finally secured Hagans’ wrists and legs. A medical squad arrived. Alert at the time, Hagans lost consciousness and stopped breathing about ten minutes later. Paramedics administered CPR in the ambulance, restoring Hagans’ pulse and respiration. Hagans never regained consciousness. He died three days later. The coroner found that the cocaine starved his brain of oxygen, leading to fatal respiratory complications. The report listed hardening of the arteries in the heart as “a contributing factor.” Hagans’ estate filed suit, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Ratcliff’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Ratcliff did not violate a clearly established right. View "Hagans v. Franklin Cnty Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

In February 2005, hackers used the wireless network at a DSW store for unauthorized access to plaintiffs’ main computer system and downloaded credit card and checking account information for more than 1.4 million customers. Fraudulent transactions followed; plaintiffs were alerted by an affected credit card company and launched an investigation; National Union was notified of the insurance claim and advised plaintiffs that it would investigate. Plaintiffs incurred expenses for customer communications, public relations, customer claims and lawsuits, and attorney fees in connection with investigations by seven state Attorney Generals and the Federal Trade Commission. More than $4 million in losses arose from costs associated with charge backs, card reissuance, account monitoring, and fines imposed by VISA/MasterCard. National Union denied coverage. The district court awarded $6.8 million, finding that plaintiffs suffered a loss “resulting directly from” the “theft of any Insured property by Computer Fraud” and rejected application of the exclusion of “any loss of proprietary information, Trade Secrets, Confidential Processing Methods or other confidential information of any kind.” The court rejected a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Retail Ventures, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are retirees who received benefits under Commonwealth Industries’ pension plan. They allege that the Plan underpaid them, in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), when it did not include a subsidy for early retirement in its benefit calculations when it switched from a defined-benefit to a cash-balance plan in 1998. The district court dismissed all but one plaintiff (Corley) on limitations grounds and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the merits of Corley’s claims. The court reasoned that, as of 1998, Corley was not yet entitled to his early-retirement subsidy because he was then not yet 55, so the early-retirement benefit had not accrued yet, and the amendment did not reduce any accrued benefit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the time-barred plaintiffs, but vacated as to Corley. On remand, the district court should consider whether the benefits payable to Corley under the relevant versions of the Plan constituted “an early retirement benefit” or “a retirement-type subsidy” which would be protected from elimination or reduction, or “an optional form of benefit” which would only be protected from elimination, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g)(2)(A), (B).View "Fallin v. Commonwealth Indus., Inc." on Justia Law