Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After September 11, 2001, the FBI assigned informant Griffin to embed himself in the Toledo Muslim community. Griffin enrolled in mosque classes and obtained employment with a Muslim charity. Griffin met El-Hindi, who discussed kidnaping an Israeli soldier or politician; Amawi, who suggested recruiting Mazloum; and Mazloum, who agreed to participate in jihad training. The three were convicted of conspiracy to kill and maim persons outside the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1), and conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in furtherance of killing U.S. nationals, 18 U.S.C. 2339A. Amawi and El-Hindi were also charged with distributing information regarding manufacture of explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 842(p)(2)(A) and sentenced to below-Guidelines terms of 240, 144, and 100 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court upheld the district court’s decisions: to delete classified information from discovery under the Classified Information Procedures Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; to exclude defendants’ proposed expert testimony concerning Islamist culture and social norms; to reject entrapment and outrageous-conduct defenses; not to provide requested jury instructions concerning the First Amendment; and rejecting a claim of Miranda violations during interrogation that occurred on a jet returning Amawi from Jordan. View "United States v. Mazloum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are retired unionized employees of defendant and were covered by collective bargaining agreements that addressed healthcare benefits. The parties contest whether the CBAs guaranteed employees and their spouses lifetime healthcare benefits after retirement. After retiring, the employees and spouses continued to receive healthcare insurance from defendant. Between ages 62 to 65, defendant paid 80% of the premium costs. When the retirees turned 65, defendant assumed 100% of premium costs. In 2006, defendant informed plaintiffs that the company was instituting a new healthcare plan that would no longer cover 100% of the premiums. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132. The district court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor as to employee coverage, but in favor of defendant as to spouses. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, in favor of plaintiffs. Although healthcare is a “welfare benefit,” not entitled to the same ERISA protection as pension benefits, employers are free to waive their power to alter welfare benefits. Defendant did so by offering vested healthcare coverage to retired employees and spouses, and by agreeing that CBAs could only be modified with signed, mutual consent of the parties. View "Moore v. Menasha Corp." on Justia Law

In 2003, Kroll began working for WLAA as an Emergency Medical Technician and was considered to be “good employee” by her direct supervisor, Binns. After Kroll became romantically involved with a co-worker, the office manager, Dresen, received reports of concerns from WLAA employees about Kroll’s well-being. Kroll maintains that Dresen “requested” that Kroll “receive psychological counseling.” Later, Binns told Kroll that he had received a complaint and was concerned about Kroll’s ability to perform her job safely; he told Kroll that she must attend counseling in order to continue working at WLAA. Kroll told Binns that she would not attend the counseling, left the meeting, and did not return to work at WLAA. In Kroll’s suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), the district court entered summary judgment for WLAA. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Kroll presented sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the “psychological counseling” Kroll was instructed to attend did constitute a “medical examination” under the ADA, although WLAA may still be entitled to judgment if such counseling was “job related” and consistent with “business necessity.” View "Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth." on Justia Law

T-Mobile proposed to build a cellular tower in an area of West Bloomfield Township, Michigan, that had a coverage gap. After deciding that sites in the township zoning ordinance’s cellular tower overlay zones were infeasible, T-Mobile decided that the best option would be to construct a facility at a utility site on property owned by Detroit Edison. The facility contained an existing 50-foot pole, which T-Mobile wanted to replace with a 90-foot pole disguised to look like a pine tree with antennas fashioned as branches. The township denied special approval. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of T-Mobile in a suit under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Five stated reasons for denial of the application were not supported by substantial evidence and the denial had “the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services” in violation of 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). View "T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield" on Justia Law

Frankenmuth, “Michigan’s Little Bavaria,” is a tourist destination, famous for Bavarian-themed stores, family-style restaurants, and the world’s largest year-round Christmas store. Plaintiffs own a 37-acre tract just outside city limits. A 2003 property-tax appraisal valued the land at $95,000. It has been used as farmland for nearly 100 years. Under a joint agreement with the township, about 15 acres on the western portion of the property was zoned as Commercial Local Planned Unit Development, with the remaining 22 acres designated as Residential Planned Unit Development. In 2005, the plaintiffs agreed to sell 23.55 acres to Wal-Mart for $125,000 per acre. Wal-Mart had 180 days to determine the feasibility of its plan and was permitted to, for any reason, cancel and receive a refund of the $50,000 deposit.” The city first enacted a moratorium and then rezoned a relatively small area, including the property. Wal-Mart cancelled the agreement and a jury awarded plaintiffs $3.6 million for selective zoning. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the city harbored animus against the plaintiffs, as opposed to animus against Wal-Mart and gave inaccurate instructions on damages. View "Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth" on Justia Law

While Daugherty worked as a manager in the city’s Department of Public Utilities from January 2006 to March 2007, he complained that he was underpaid and that he was paid less than white managers. His annual salary was $48,500, his white predecessor had earned $56,000, and his white subordinate earned $49,000. In 2006, Daugherty assisted two black DPU employees with discrimination complaints against the City of Toledo and individuals. Daugherty claims he was evaluated more harshly than white employees and that, despite his position as second-in-command in his division, was not placed in charge when the supervisor was absent. He also claimed derogatory remarks by one individual. Daugherty was terminated and filed suit under state law and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court required Daugherty to present more evidence than required under the McDonnell-Douglas framework and failed to adequately analyze evidence of discriminatory comments by the mayor. On remand, the court should also conduct a hostile-work environment analysis. The court erred in excluding testimony regarding other acts of alleged retaliation by the city, basing its decision solely on whether the same person made each termination decision. View "Griffin v. Finkbeiner" on Justia Law

Four plaintiffs each established an employee benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act funded by a combination of employer contributions and covered employee payroll deductions; each entered into a Benefit Management Service Agreement with PBA, which specified that PBA would provide services, such as paying medical providers for claims incurred under the Plans. Each Agreement required PBA to establish a segregated bank account for each Plan into which it would deposit the funds that it received from the corresponding plaintiff for paying the medical claims and authorized PBA to pay medical claims by writing checks from this account. PBA not only failed to use funds supplied by plaintiffs to pay the claims incurred under the corresponding Plan, but commingled and misappropriated Plan funds. PBA did not pay all claims, despite receiving money for payment of those claims from the respective plaintiffs. The amounts unpaid for the plaintiffs are: $501,380.75, $409,943.88, $384,574.17, and $44,290.12. The district court found that PBA was a fiduciary under ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A)), had breached its fiduciary duties, and that ERISA preempted Permco’s breach-of-contract claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Guyan Int'l, Inc. v. Prof'l Benefits Adm'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Michigan law permits debtors in bankruptcy to choose exemptions from: 11 U.S.C. 522(d); a set of general exemptions available to all Michigan residents irrespective of bankruptcy status, Mich. Comp. Laws 600.6023; or a list of exemptions available solely to debtors in bankruptcy, Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5451. The debtor chose a homestead exemption under the last option, which permits only bankruptcy debtors to exempt up to $30,000 of the value of the home, or up to $45,000 if the debtor is over the age of 65 or disabled. The figures are adjusted for inflation triennially, such that the debtor, who is disabled, claimed a total exemption of $44,695 in the value of his home; the federal exemption would be $21,625 and the Michigan general homestead exemption was $3,500. The trustee filed an objection. The Bankruptcy Court upheld the exemption. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The phrase “uniform Laws” in the Bankruptcy Clause permits states to act in the arena of bankruptcy exemptions, without violation of the Supremacy Clause, even if they do so by making certain exemptions available only to debtors in bankruptcy .View "State of MI v. Schafer" on Justia Law

Wooten approached a bank teller, placed his hands on the counter, and twice quietly stated, “I am going to rob you.” When the teller was slow to respond, Wooten finally said, “I have a gun. Give me your money.” The teller handed over $4,130 in cash. The teller later testified that he never felt threatened by Wooten. Wooten told investigators that he actually wanted to be caught and that he committed the robbery because “he was just tired of living in his car and he was running out of money;” he had attempted a similar bank robbery shortly before the one at issue, but left empty handed after the teller at the other bank laughed at him. Wooten pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Based on his declaration that he had a gun, the district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) for making a threat of death. Wooten argued that his conduct and demeanor were so nonthreatening as to eliminate the possibility that any reasonable teller under the circumstances would have believed his or her life to be in danger. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on the specific circumstances. View "United States v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Watkins, an African-American, worked for the school district, overseeing security systems. Fultz supervised Watkins and, relying on Watkins’s advice, Fultz awarded Vision a $182,000 annual contract for service of security cameras. Vision’s president, Newsome, testified that Watkins called her and talked about a “finder’s fee.. Newsome went to Cleveland for a customer visit. She e-mailed Watkins and he replied: “Absolutely$.” Newsome believed that Watkins expected her to pay him at their meeting. Newsome notified Fultz. At the meeting, Watkins requested “an envelope.” After Fultz contacted police, the FBI recorded meetings at which Newsome gave Watkins $5,000 and $2,000. A white jury convicted on two counts of attempted extortion “under color of official right” (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and one count of bribery in a federally funded program, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court determined a total offense level of 22, applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, another two-level enhancement for bribes exceeding $5,000, and a four-level enhancement for high level of authority, plus an upward variance of 21 months under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and sentenced Watkins to six years’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the jury’s racial composition, and the reasonableness of the sentence.View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law