Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lesley and Fogg presented the Benistar 419 Plan to the Ouwingas, their accountant, and their attorney, providing a legal opinion that contributions were tax-deductible and that the Ouwingas could take money out tax-free. The Ouwingas made substantial contributions, which were used to purchase John Hancock life insurance policies. In 2003, Lesley and Fogg told the Ouwingas that the IRS had changed the rules; that the Ouwingas would need to contribute additional money; and that, while this might signal closing of the “loophole,” there was no concern about tax benefits already claimed. In 2006, the Ouwingas decided to transfer out of the Plans. John Hancock again advised that there would be no taxable consequences and that the Plan met IRS requirements for tax deductible treatment. The Ouwingas signed a purported liability release. In 2008, the IRS notified the Ouwingas that it was disallowing deductions, deeming the Plan an “abusive tax shelter.” The Ouwingas filed a class action against Benistar Defendants, John Hancock entities, lawyers, Lesley, and Fogg, alleging conspiracy to defraud (RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d)), negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of consumer protection laws. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, View "Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, Castleman pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault (TN Code 39-13-111(b) under an indictment that asserted that he “did intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to [the mother of his child].” Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Under the scheme, Castleman’s wife purchased firearms, allegedly lied on federal firearms paperwork by stating that she was the actual buyer of the firearms, and turned the firearms over to her husband, who was legally prohibited from purchasing firearms because of his domestic assault conviction. Castleman was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The district court dismissed those counts, reasoning that Castleman’s misdemeanor domestic assault conviction did not qualify as a domestic violence crime requiring the “use or attempted use of physical force.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Tennessee assault statute does not define “serious bodily injury” to require any particular degree of contact. View "United States v. Castleman" on Justia Law

Goodyear announced in 2003 that it would restate its earnings for some prior years. The next day, shareholders filed class-action lawsuits against Goodyear and several of its officers and directors. The SEC also commenced an investigation. Eventually, the lawsuits were dismissed and the investigation terminated. Goodyear incurred $30 million of legal and accounting costs and sought recovery from two of its insurers. After several years of litigation, Goodyear released its claim against National Union in exchange for payment of $10 million, but the excess policy with Federal states that coverage attaches only after National Union pays out the full amount of its liability limit, which was $15 million rather than the $10 million that National Union paid. The district court granted summary judgment to Federal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments based on Ohio’s “public policy favoring settlements,” and that the settlement did not prejudice Federal in any way. View "Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement governs the relationship between Acument and its retired employees. Prior to 2008, the company paid healthcare and life-insurance benefits to qualified retirees. When Acument ended these benefits in 2008, a class of 64 retirees claimed that the company had violated the CBA in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. The district court granted Acument summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the issue as “a matter of contract.” The relevant language states that the company “reserves the right to amend, modify, suspend, or terminate the Plan,” consisting of: retiree medical coverage; retirement income; disability income; and life insurance. View "Witmer v. Acument Global Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

Jolivette served as a Republican State Legislator and Butler County Commissioner, 1997-2010; he also served on the Butler County Republican Party’s Central Committee. In November 2011, Jolivette filed a Declaration of Candidacy to run as a Republican for the Office of State Representative for Ohio’s 51st House District. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 3513.05, Jolivette submitted part-petitions containing 72 signatures; he failed to sign one, containing 17 signatures, and six signatures on the other signed petitions were of “questionable validity.” The Board of Elections met; Jolivette argued in favor of certifying his petition. Two weeks later Jolivette withdrew his candidacy as a Republican and resigned from the Republican Party Central Committee. He prepared a nominating petition to run as an independent candidate for the same office and did not vote in any party primary. Members of the Republican Party challenged his candidacy on the basis that he was not unaffiliated from the Republican Party. The Board of Elections approved Jolivette’s petition, but scheduled a protest hearing. After the protest was granted, Jolivette filed suit. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no merit to Jolivette’s constitutional claims. View "Jolivette v. Husted" on Justia Law

When AFC filed for bankruptcy in 2009, the FDIC was appointed receiver for AFC’s subsidiary, AmTrust and sought payment from AFC under 11 U.S.C. 365(o), which requires that a party seeking Chapter-11 bankruptcy fulfill “any commitment . . . to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution.” The FDIC argued that AFC made such a commitment by agreeing to entry of a cease-and-desist order requiring AFC’s board to “ensure that [the Bank] complies” with the Bank’s own obligation to “have and maintain” capital ratios of 7 percent (Tier 1) and 12 percent (total). The district court found that the order was not a capital-maintenance commitment under section 365(o). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The cease-and-desist order is ambiguous and could reasonably be read as establishing either an oversight role or a capital-maintenance commitment and the bulk of the extrinsic evidence favored the “oversight” reading. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Amtrust Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

In 1981, Standifer, a 23-year-old woman with diffused brain damage and mild retardation, was murdered in Knoxville, at the home of Thomas, where Miller was staying. Standifer had gone to the house, by cab, with Miller. When Thomas returned Miller was hosing the basement floor. Thomas found blood inside the house. The next day, Thomas discovered Standifer’s body in his backyard, with a t-shirt belonging to Miller stained with blood of the same type as Standifer’s. Miller was apprehended in Ohio. After waiving his Miranda rights, he admitted to hitting Standifer and dragging her outside, non-responsive and not breathing. A psychiatrist examined Miller and concluded that he did not believe Miller was insane at the time of the offense. Miller moved for appointment of psychiatric expert at state expense. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Miller was not entitled to a second medical expert. The jury convicted Miller of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Miller’s direct appeals and motions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful in state court. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the state improperly denied him assistance from an independent medical expert and a challenge to jury instructions. View "David Miller v. Ricky Bell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs delivered artifacts from a famous shipwreck to Debtor for display and, according to Debtor, sale in Debtor’s jewelry store. The store went out of business. When Debtor returned the artifacts, an emerald pendant and musket balls were missing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty, common law conversion, and statutory conversion or negligence. A Michigan state court found that Debtor’s failure to respond to any written discovery requests, file a response to the Motion for Summary Disposition, and appear at the hearing were sufficient basis for entry of summary disposition and awarded $42,706.10. The judgment did not specify the claim upon which it was based. Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Plaintiffs filed an adversary complaint seeking to have the debt declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4), stating that Debtor’s actions constituted “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” The bankruptcy court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The bankruptcy court erred when it held that the issue of fraud was “necessarily determined” by the state court; the state court judgment cannot have issue preclusive effect as to this element for nondischargeability under the embezzlement portion of section 523(a)(4). View "In re: Dantone" on Justia Law

GTI went bankrupt after it purchased OAI, a subsidiary of Onkyo for $13 million in cash and $12 million in three-year promissory notes. Onkyo filed a proof of claim for $12 million. GTI responded by suing Onkyo under the theory that the OAI purchase was a fraudulent, voidable transaction. The bankruptcy court agreed, finding that OAI was worth $6.9 million at the time of the transaction, not $25 million. The court voided GTI’s obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price and ordered Onkyo to repay GTI $6.1 million. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court’s determination that the indirect benefits were insubstantial was valid without the necessity of providing calculations; its adoption of GTI’s expert’s value based on the comparable transactions method was not clearly erroneous. Once the bankruptcy court determined that the sale of OAI had been a fraudulent transfer and Onkyo was a good-faith transferee, awarding GTI relief was a simple matter of subtraction. View "Onkyo Europe Elec., GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc." on Justia Law

Back was born in 1954 and began working at the food processing plant in 1998. Sometime before April 6, 2005, Hagerman, another Maintenance Team Leader, told Back that someone in human resources had told him that the company was planning to get rid of the three oldest employees and highest paid team leaders, a category that included Back and Hagerman. During the nine years that Back worked at the plant, he received both positive and negative reviews. His reviews became increasingly negative in 2006. Back was disciplined three times in 2006. One write-up specifically warned Back that he could be terminated for further problems. In 2007, Back was suspended for five days. Several weeks later, an explosion occurred at the plant and Back failed in his assignment to restart his line. Back was terminated, for stated reasons relating to history of failing to properly supervise his subordinates and his team’s history of failing to meet expectations. The district court rejected his suit under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.010 to 344.990, finding Hagerman’s statement to be inadmissible hearsay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Back v. Nestle USA, Inc." on Justia Law