Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Office of the Racing Commissioner regulates the Michigan horse-racing industry. The ORC hires racing stewards as independent contractors to perform regulatory, judging, and enforcement functions in conjunction with three types of horse races. The plaintiffs were appointed as racing stewards in the 1980s and 1990s. Hall currently works as a state steward for the Michigan Gaming Board. Dye was appointed in 1988 and was promoted to Administrative Liaison Steward in 1998, but was demoted to State Steward in 2006 and was terminated in 2009. Perttunen was appointed in 1994, and remains employed as a racing steward for the Gaming Board. Erskine was appointed in 1999, and was terminated in 2009. The four claim that their Democratic supervisors retaliated against them for voicing support for or being perceived as affiliated with the Republican candidate in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Although certain stewards openly endorsed the candidate in the workplace, others remained silent. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Dye’s protected-speech, holding that retaliation based on perceived political affiliation is actionable under the political-affiliation retaliation doctrine. View "Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm'n" on Justia Law

Remark produced a distinctive series of television commercials for radio stations known as the “remarkable mouth” or “hot lips” commercials. The U.S. Copyright Office issued a copyright for a version of this commercial in 1980. The original holder of the copyright assigned it to Remark, which registered it with the Copyright Office in 2002. WADL, a Detroit television station, broadcast two commercials that resemble the copyright. After the commercials aired, Remark sent a cease-and-desist letter to the producer, Adell. After some negotiation, the parties agreed that $50,000 would settle Remark’s claims. Remark drafted an agreement, and Adell produced a revised version. Remark’s counsel e-mailed Adell’s counsel saying that Remark agreed to the changes. Adell forwarded a final version. Remark signed and returned the originals, but Adell never signed the agreement. It instead retained new counsel and for the first time balked at the $50,000 figure, offering to settle for a more “reasonable” amount. Remark filed suit. The district court granted Remark summary judgment but denied its request for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Remark, LLC v. Adell Broad. Corp." on Justia Law

Zhang is a Chinese citizen. She was stopped by INS upon her entry to the U.S. without valid documents in 2001. In 2002, Zhang was ordered removed; the BIA affirmed. Zhang did not leave the country; she converted to Roman Catholicism, was married in the Catholic Church, and had two children. In 2011, Zhang moved to reopen her case based upon the claim that conditions in China had materially worsened with respect to: religious persecution and enforcement of China’s coercive population control program. She also challenged the adverse credibility finding made during her 2002 proceedings and alleged that she was denied an opportunity to seek new legal representation after her counsel withdrew. The Board denied the petition on all claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Board abused its discretion in summarily dismissing certain evidence regarding Zhang’s claims of religious persecution. The court affirmed dismissal of the claim regarding the enforcement of coercive population control because Zhang failed to demonstrate that country conditions in this respect have worsened in her native province. View "Zhang v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dixon, an African-American woman and then-interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo, wrote an op-ed column in the Toledo Free Press rebuking comparisons drawn between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Shortly thereafter, Dixon was fired. Claiming violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Dixon filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speech of a high-level Human Resources official who writes publicly against the very policies that her government employer charges her with creating, promoting, and enforcing is not protected speech. View "Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo" on Justia Law

In 1992 Navistar attempted to reduce its costs for retired employee health and life insurance benefits. Navistar’s retirement benefit plan is a registered employee health benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 and Navistar is both plan administrator and fiduciary. In 1993, the district court entered judgment in a class action challenging the change, adopting an agreement between the parties and retaining jurisdiction. The Agreement established the Retiree Health Benefit and Life Insurance Plan. The Plan established the Health Benefit Program Summary Plan Description, which contains a description of the health benefits and is furnished to all beneficiaries. The Agreement divides health benefits into two plans: Plan 2 for those eligible for Medicare and Plan 1 for those who are not eligible. A prescription drug benefit was provided under the Agreement, identical for both Plan 1 and Plan 2. When Navistar moved to substitute Medicare Part D into the Plan, class members claimed violation of the Agreement. The district court ordered Navistar to reinstate, retroactively, the prescription drug benefit that was in effect before Navistar made the unilateral substitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed,View "Shy v. Navistar Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific sued Four-U-Packaging, alleging that Four-U’s supply of off-brand paper towels for use in Georgia-Pacific paper-towel dispensers infringed on its trademarks. Four-U distributes paper and janitorial supplies; it does not manufacturer commercial paper systems. Four-U argued that the claims were barred by the ruling in a similar case brought by Georgia-Pacific in Arkansas against a different distributor of generic paper towels. The district court granted summary judgment to Four-U. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All of the elements of issue preclusion are met and applying the doctrine poses no risk of creating inconsistent rulings. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods., LP v. Four-U-Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law

Watts began working for UPS in 1990; in 2000 she injured her back while unloading her truck. She was diagnosed with acute back strain and placed on medical leave. Watts was awarded Temporary Total Disability (TTD) payments, including medical treatment, and did not return to work for two years. In 2002 a doctor reported that Watts had reached “maximum medical improvement,” as defined by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and was ready for gradual return to normal work in a restricted time frame. UPS terminated Watts’s TTD payments. UPS had a light-duty work program, Temporary Alternative Work. Typical tasks included answering phones, pumping gas, and washing cars. Watts was rejected from the program. UPS claims that Watts was not qualified for the program under the collective bargaining agreement. Watts’s claims have gone to trial three times and been appealed once before. Most recently the district court granted UPS judgment as a matter of law on grounds that Watts’s claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and was untimely under the six-month limitations period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that section 301 does not preempt an Americans with Disabilities Act claim in federal court. View "Teresa Watts v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Paul brought state law claims for disability discrimination and retaliation against her former employer after her 12-year employment as a CT Technologist came to an end following a work-related injury. The employer removed the action to federal court on the basis of complete preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act, contending plaintiff’s claims implicated rights under the collective bargaining agreement, which included a mandatory arbitration requirement. The district court denied remand to state court and dismissed for failure to submit to mandatory arbitration. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although plaintiff’s claim of unlawful discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability implicates an employment relationship created and defined by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the employer did not demonstrate that resolution of the claim is so “inextricably intertwined” with interpretation of CBA terms as to trigger complete preemption. View "Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of OH" on Justia Law

The affidavit for a warrant for Fields’s arrest for misdemeanor domestic assault noted that arrest would be without bond. Three days later, Fields turned himself in. During booking, Fields requested to post bail. Told that he could not do so until the next day, Fields demanded to speak to a judge. There is no right under Tennessee law to post bail immediately after arrest. The Sheriff incorrectly stated that Fields had to be detained for 12 hours because he was charged with domestic assault. Under Tennessee law, domestic violence defendants must be held for 12 hours only if the official authorized to release the arrestee “finds that the offender is a threat to the alleged victim.” No such finding was made. The county admits that it had a policy of placing a 12-hour hold on all persons arrested for domestic violence regardless of individual circumstances. The next morning, a judge set bail and imposed conditions. Ten months later, prosecutors dropped the charge. Fields sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail and his right to procedural due process. The district court granted Henry County for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Fields v. Henry Cnty." on Justia Law

SEW operated 113 franchise Waffle House restaurants when it filed its Chapter 11 petition in 2008. From January, 2005, to the Petition Date, SEW did not pay federal income tax withholding, social security (FICA), or unemployment (FUTA) taxes or timely file returns. During four years before the Petition Date, the IRS assessed penalties of more than $1,500,000. SEW subsequently made payments that were applied to its tax obligations and also made undesignated prepetition payments that were applied in partial satisfaction of the assessed penalties. SEW later sought recovery of prepetition tax penalty payments of $637,652.07 or an offset against the tax amounts still owed. SEW alleged that payment of these penalties provided no value to SEW; that SEW did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Penalty Payments; that at the time that of the payments, SEW was insolvent; and cited 11 U.S.C. 548 and 544. The government argued that dollar-for-dollar reduction in SEW’s antecedent tax-penalty liabilities constituted reasonably equivalent value. SEW did not allege that the penalty obligations were themselves avoidable. The Bankruptcy court dismissed SEW’s adversary petition for failure to state a clam. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "SE Waffles, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law