Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Forrest Construction was the named insured on a commercial general liability policy with Cincinnati Insurance. In 2004, Forrest was hired toconstruct a home for the Laughlins. A dispute arose over the amount owed and Forrest filed suit. The Laughlins counter-sued based on alleged defects in the workmanship of the construction, particularly the foundation. Forrest notified Cincinnati Insurance of the counter-complaint and requested defense. Cincinnati Insurance based its denial on an exclusion in the policy for work done by the insured its position that the underlying complaint did not allege damage caused by a subcontractor, thereby rendering the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion inapplicable. Forrest sued, alleging breach of contract, bad-faith denial, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The district court found that Cincinnati Insurance had breached its contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Cincinnati Insurance was given sufficient notice of the facts giving rise to its obligation to defend and that, under Tennessee law, “property damage” occurs when one component (here, the faulty foundation) of a finished product (the house) damages another component. View "Forrest Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

McClellan, then age 19, was convicted of first degree murder in connection with a barroom conflict between two groups. McClellan received a mandatory life sentence without parole and a consecutive two-year sentence for a firearm conviction. The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that McClellan’s defense lawyer did not provide the effective assistance of counsel required by the Sixth Amendment because the lawyer did not interview numerous eyewitnesses who would have testified that McClellan acted in self-defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s assertions that the defense lawyer did not violate the ineffective assistance of counsel standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); that the district court should not have reached the merits because McClellan defaulted his claim by not raising it in a procedurally correct way; and that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and recent Supreme Court cases so limit the federal courts’ authority to decide habeas cases on the merits that McClellan’s petition must be dismissed. View "McClellan v. Rapelje" on Justia Law

Martinez worked for Cracker Barrel until 1999 when she voluntarily left. She was rehired in 2000 as retail manager, a position she held until her termination in 2010, after she engaged in wide-ranging, heated series conversations with four employees, involving the Haiti earthquake, the plight of those in Haiti, and the use of a state public assistance program by several employees. An associate manager overheard the conversations and filed a formal complaint, alleging Martinez made inappropriate racial comments. Martinez claims that she was singled out while all four employees participated in the discussion. During an investigation, it became apparent that other employees, not managers, used inappropriate racial terms such as “ghetto card” and Cracker Barrel imposed policy reviews on those employees, all African-American. Cracker Barrel determined that Martinez had violated specific company rules prohibiting rude and boisterous conduct, or any form of discriminatory or harassing behavior. Martinez sued (42 U.S.C 1981; MCL 37.2101) , alleging “reverse” racial discrimination in the handling of her termination. Cracker Barrel offered reinstatement, but interpreted her response letter from counsel as a rejection. The district court entered summary judgment for Cracker Barrel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc." on Justia Law

Keith has been deaf since his birth in 1980. Wearing a sound transmitter, he can detect noises. He is unable to speak and communicates using American Sign Language (ASL). In 2007, Keith successfully completed a lifeguard training program, with assistance from an ASL interpreter, and applied for a position at the county’s wave pool. Stavale, the county recreation specialist, explained to her supervisors that Keith had requested an ASL interpreter for meetings and classroom instruction. Having received no objection, Stavale extended an offer of employment, conditioned upon a pre-employment physical. During that physical, the doctor stated: “He’s deaf; he can’t be a lifeguard” and “I have to [fail him]. If something happens … they’re going to come after me.” Aquatic safety and risk management consultants expressed concern about whether a deaf individual could perform effectively as a lifeguard. Stavale identified accommodations that she believed could successfully integrate Keith. The employment offer was withdrawn. The district court granted the county summary judgment in his suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that issues of material fact exist regarding whether Keith is otherwise qualified to be a lifeguard, with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland" on Justia Law

In the boarding house where both lived, Perry pointed a revolver at Tibbs’s head. He shut the door and called police. Perry left. When she returned, her landlord stated that she needed to move out. Minutes later she pointed her gun at another resident and forced herself into his room, threatening to kill him. Police arrived and found Perry in the hallway. She complied with an order to put her hands up. Officers withdrew their guns and handcuffed her. Perry’s room was nearby, with the door open. According to witnesses, she consented to a search. Officers saw a revolver sticking out from under a pillow. Their report said that they found the gun during a “protective sweep” and did not mention consent. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Perry entered a conditional plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g).; her presentence report said that she was subject to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act based on three prior convictions, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). At sentencing, Perry disputed that a 2001 aggravated-assault conviction qualified as a “violent felony.” The district court rejected her argument. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Columbus motorists reported a person driving erratically. One saw that the driver was a woman and that there was a child in the truck. Both witnessed the truck jump onto the median at least twice. One followed the truck, trying to help the police locate it. The truck crashed into a tree. At the scene, the police found Volpe, intoxicated and trapped behind the steering wheel. Volpe’s daughter, ejected from the truck, died days later from multiple injuries. Volpe was convicted on two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide (operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) and recklessly causing her daughter’s death), each with a specification that she had been convicted of three or more OVI or equivalent offenses within the last six years, and of OVI with a specification that she had been convicted of five or more equivalent offenses within the last 20 years. Volpe received a total prison term of 20 years and six months. She argued that convictions of both OVI, Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and aggravated vehicular homicide as a proximate result of OVI, 2903.06(A)(1)(a), violated the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of her habeas corpus petition. View "Volpe v. Trim" on Justia Law

Alman and Barnes are gay domestic partners. Alman was arrested in Westland, Michigan in 2007, during an undercover police operation in Hix Park, while taking a break from helping his mother move to a nearby apartment building. When officers arrived at the park, they observed Alman sitting on a picnic bench. A decoy officer sat down and struck up a conversation with Alman. The nature of the conversation and subsequent physical contact between the two is disputed. Alman was arrested; the charges were ultimately dropped. The car he was driving, which belonged to Barnes, was towed and impounded. In Alman’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that probable cause existed for the state and municipal offenses charged. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that there was no probable cause supporting any of the charges brought against Alman; that the officer was not shielded by qualified immunity; and that Alman had not stated a claim for malicious prosecution, for failure to train, or for abuse of process. View "Alman v. Reed" on Justia Law

Diaz, a Michigan Department of Corrections employee, he was diagnosed with heart and abdominal conditions that forced him to take intermittent leave. Diaz alleges he was fired for attendance violations after taking leaves and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages and reinstatement, alleging: interference with Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612 (a)(1)(D) rights; retaliation for exercising FMLA rights; and deprivation of a protected federal right. Boden, an employee of the Michigan Department of Human Services, was placed on stress leave by her doctor; she claims that her supervisor dramatically increased her workload and disciplined her for petty infractions because of that leave. She brought suit with the same allegations. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded the claim for reinstatement, but affirmed with respect to claims for damages. The Supreme Court has held that a state employee may recover damages for a state’s failure to comply with family-care provision of the FMLA, but the Sixth Circuit has held that the rationale did not extend to FMLA self-care provision. Suits against the states for damages under 2612(a)(1)(D) are barred by the states’ sovereign immunity and public employers cannot be held individually liable under the FMLA.View "Boden v. MI Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2009 Universal demanded payment from Allstate for medical services that Universal allegedly rendered to 36 persons claiming coverage under Allstate insurance policies. Allstate denied payment, contending that Universal had not, in fact, rendered any services to those persons. Universal filed suit asserting claims for reimbursement, for defamation, and for tortious interference with business relationships. In November 2009, Allstate served Universal with interrogatories and document requests. Universal failed to respond for more than two months, so Allstate filed a motion to compel. In May 2010, the magistrate judge granted Allstate’s motion and ordered Universal to “provide full and complete responses” no later than June 7, 2010. Again Universal did not respond by the deadline or by an extended deadline. Universal finally responded on October 6, but its responses were incomplete. After Universal failed to supplement or to Allstate’s efforts to depose employees, Allstate filed a second motion to dismiss, which was granted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Allstate’s repeated motions, and the court’s own orders, were not enough to compel Universal to do what the Rules required. “Universal’s conduct violated the rules of civil procedure and common courtesy alike” View "Universal Health Grp. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004 Taylor, an employee of the IRS, began applying for promotions and transfers, and was rejected until she received a promotion in 2006. In 2004, after being denied a promotion, Taylor filed her first discrimination complaint and was assigned to work in a unit supervised by Shields. While working in this unit, Taylor alleges that Shields took several retaliatory actions against Taylor, including written reprimands, a three-day suspension without pay, and providing negative references for Taylor to prospective employers. Based on these alleged actions, Taylor filed additional complaints for retaliation. In 2005, the IRS and Taylor entered into a settlement agreement. Taylor subsequently alleged noncompliance by the IRS. In 2006 and 2008, the agency issued decisions concluding that although the IRS had breached the agreement, it was currently in compliance. Taylor did not appeal either decision, but filed a complaint alleging retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) and breach-of-settlement-agreement. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the breach claim, holding that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to such claims, but reversed with respect to retaliation.View "Taylor v. Geithner" on Justia Law