Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC’s service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC’s plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press “1” during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson’s extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to “exercise independent judgment” in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Officers tried to serve an arrest warrant on Brown at 3171 Hendricks Avenue in Memphis. On Hendricks Avenue, they could not find a house with a 3171 address, but found two houses on opposite sides of the street with a 3170 address. Noticing that one of the two houses was occupied, they knocked, a woman answered, and she promptly shut the door. While one officer went to the back of the house, the other knocked again. After several minutes, the occupant opened the door. Instead of asking the woman what the address of the house was, whether Brown lived there or whether this was the odd-numbered side of the street, the officer represented to the woman that he had a warrant “for this address.” The woman let the officers into the house, owned by Shaw, where they performed a protective sweep and found a lot of cocaine. They arrested Shaw. The district court denied Shaw’s motion to suppress and pled guilty to distributing cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the officers had no right to enter the house based on a falsity and that their actions were not reasonable. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Officer Parks stopped the car driven by Johnson based on a seat-belt violation. Approaching the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and noticed a license plate on the seat. A passenger admitted she had smoked marijuana in the car and initially provided her sister’s identification information. Johnson stated that he knew he would be arrested because a condition of release for a prior conviction required him to stay away from the passenger and that he was a convicted felon and had a loaded gun underneath the seat. Once the database (NCIC) confirmed that Johnson had been ordered to stay away from LuShanda Giles, Parks handcuffed Johnson; located the passenger’s identifying information, confirming that she was LuShanda; and recovered the weapon. The district court denied a motion to suppress the firearm. Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924. The court held that a Tennessee conviction of facilitation to commit aggravated robbery was not a violent felony, but that a conviction of first-degree stalking did qualify and sentenced Johnson to 180 months, the minimum mandatory under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both the denial of suppression and the sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Fund, a multi-employer pension plan under ERISA, has a Plan, providing for administration by a Board with authority to make benefit determinations and amend the Plan, including retroactively. No amendment may result in reduced benefits for any participant whose rights have vested, except in specified circumstances. Price began receiving Plan disability benefits under the “Total and Permanent Disability Benefit” category in 1990, after work-related injuries left him unable to work. In 2001, the Fund notified Price that he no longer qualified for benefits under this category, but that he could continue receiving benefits under provisions for “Occupational Disability Benefit.” His benefits were discontinued after 2006, according to an Amendment. Price became eligible for early retirement in 2012. The Board rejected an appeal. The district court granted Price judgment in his suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). On remand from the Sixth Circuit, for review determination of vesting under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the judge again ruled in favor of Price. The Sixth Circuit again reversed; the court failed to look to the terms of the plan but instead found that because the Board’s decision letter did not discuss whether the benefits vested, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Price v. Bd. of Trs. of IN Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Peppel, former President, CEO, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of MCSi, a publicly-traded communications-technology company, conspired with CFO Stanley to falsify MCSi accounting records and financial statements in order to conceal the actual earnings from shareholders, while laundering proceeds from the sale of his own shares in a public stock offering. Peppel pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities, mail, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1371 and 1349; willful false certification of a financial report by a corporate officer,18 U.S.C. 1350; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The parties stipulated to use of the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual The district court heard testimony and received reports on five competing amount-of-loss theories and, based almost solely on its estimation of Peppel as “a remarkably good man,” varied downward drastically from this advisory range, imposing a custodial sentence of only seven days—a 99.9975% reduction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonably low sentence, but did not err in calculating the amount of loss or number of victims. View "United States v. Peppel" on Justia Law

Yeremin, a Russian citizen, lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999; in 2004, he pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents in violation based on “unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and … possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification. Yeremin was sentenced to five months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. n 2005, DHS initiated removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which allows removal of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the U.S., if the crime is punishable by at least one year in prison, and second under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ rejected an argument that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude, because he did not plead guilty to an offense which necessarily involved fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review, applying the “categorical approach” because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Governor Strickland appointed Terry to fill a vacancy on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Terry sought reelection to retain the seat and enlisted the help of County Auditor Russo, a presence in Cleveland politics. The FBI was investigating Russo and had tapped his phones. Russo had a phone conversation with an attorney about foreclosure cases on Terry’s docket and promised to make sure Terry did what he was “supposed to do.” Later, by phone, Russo told Terry to deny motions for summary judgment. Terry said he would and did so. Russo ultimately pled guilty to 21political corruption counts and received a 262-month prison sentence. Terry was convicted of conspiring with Russo to commit mail fraud and honest services fraud; and honest services fraud by accepting things of value from Russo and others in exchange for favorable official action, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2).. The district court sentenced him to 63 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, quoting once-Speaker of the California General Assembly, Jesse Unruh, “If you can’t eat [lobbyists’] food, drink their booze, . . . take their money and then vote against them, you’ve got no business being [in politics],” View "United States v. Terry" on Justia Law

For more than 20 years, Kurlemann built and sold luxury homes in Ohio. In 2005-2006 he borrowed $2.4 million to build houses in Mason. When neither sold, he enlisted realtor Duke, who found two straw buyers, willing to lie about their income and assets on loan applications that Duke submitted to Washington Mutual. Both buyers defaulted. Duke pled guilty to seven counts, including loan fraud and making false statements to a lending institution, and agreed to testify at Kurlemann’s trial. A jury convicted Kurlemann of six counts, including making false statements to a lending institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014; and bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The district court sentenced Kurlemann to concurrent 24-month sentences and ordered him to pay $1.1 million in restitution. The district court sentenced Duke to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy fraud conviction, based on Kurlemann’s concealment of his interest in property, but reversed and remanded his false statements conviction, finding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that concealment was sufficient to support conviction. The court also reversed Duke’s sentence, finding that the court failed to explain the sentence it imposed. View "United States v. Kurlemann" on Justia Law

Coley was convicted in Ohio of aggravated murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery and firearm specifications, based on events that occurred in 1996. He was sentenced to death on the aggravated murder charges. His petition for state post-conviction relief was rejected at all levels. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the indictment; ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request that the trial judge recuse herself; prosecutorial misconduct for using inconsistent theories to convict; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation for failing to request that trial judge recuse herself; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; failure to consider mitigating evidence; and of error in the trial court’s decisions to not provide Coley with grand jury transcripts and to not sever certain counts. View "Coley v. Bagley" on Justia Law

D.W., age 13, alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that state defendants violated his procedural due process rights by listing him on the Tennessee child abuse registry. After an interview with a case manager, D.W. requested review and submitted information regarding the alleged victim’s inconsistent statements, but never was told the evidence against him. Children’s Services upheld the classification. Children’s Services then denied administrative review because the classification did not affect his employment. D.W. claimed that being listed deprived affected his liberty interest in pursuing common occupations, because Tennessee law prohibits his employment with child-care agencies and programs and adult-daycare centers and that the listing prohibits contact with children during the course of state agency employment. The district court held that D.W. did not present a justiciable controversy because the alleged deprivation was the possibility of future harm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. D.W. has standing to seek additional procedures because those procedures, if granted, could result in relief that is sufficiently concrete and particularized. The classification is complete and will not be expunged from state records; this is not a generalized grievance or an injury to a third party. No further facts are needed to determine whether the boy was afforded adequate process. View "Wright v. O'Day" on Justia Law