Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana and of aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and sentenced to 320 months of incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after testimony of a prosecution witness that purportedly revealed a Brady violation and constituted a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The evidence at issue was neither exculpatory nor material. The court remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to identify particular statements that amounted to perjury, to justify enhancement for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Macias-Faria" on Justia Law

Johnson was a heroin dealer. After a 17-year-old customer died of acute heroin toxicity, Johnson and customers who had been with the decedent during the fatal overdose were charged in state court. Johnson and one customer were subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for distribution of heroin resulting in death; distribution of heroin to a minor resulting in death; and possession with intent to distribute heroin. Johnson agreed to plead guilty. The probation office determined a base offense level of 43 (USSG 2D1.1(a)(1)) because he was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), the offense resulted in death, and Johnson had a prior conviction for a “similar offense,” a 2009 conviction for based on 3.5 grams of heroin found in Johnson’s possession. Johnson received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. His total offense level was 40. He had a criminal history category of IV. The court rejected an argument that his prior conviction was not a “similar offense,” but departed downward by five levels for an advisory guidelines range of 235 to 293 months and an effective range of 240 to 293 months because of a mandatory minimum. The district court imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Lumbard was arrested by Michigan authorities on warrants charging breaking and entering, destruction of a building, and larceny. He was released on a $100,000 bond. Other outstanding warrants charged aggravated battery, obstruction of justice, receiving stolen property, and more. Eluding capture on the other warrants, Lumbard paid Cheesebrew $500 for his birth date, social security number, and information about his place of birth and his parents. Lumbard used the information to obtain a driver’s license, a copy of Cheesebrew’s birth certificate, and a passport. He traveled to Tokyo, Thailand, and Burma after attempting to stage a “suicide.” Lumbard was eventually located and, during transport, attempted to stab a Burmese officer in order to be charged in Burma, which would have prevented extradition. He entered a conditional guilty plea to falsely representing information in an application for a passport and knowingly providing false identifying documents, 18 U.S.C. 1542 and using the name, social security number, date of birth, and driver’s license of another person to obtain a passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and (c)(7), (aggravated identity theft). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that a purchase of identification can constitute aggravated identity theft. View "United States v. Lumbard" on Justia Law

Glassman is a car dealer in Southfield, Michigan and an authorized Kia dealer, under an Agreement that states that Glassman’s rights are not exclusive. Glassman agreed to assume certain responsibilities in its Area of Primary Responsibility, an area undefined in the Agreement, but agreed “that it has no right or interest in any [Area of Primary Responsibility] that [Kia] may designate” and that “[a]s permitted by applicable law, [Kia] may add new dealers to … the [Area of Primary Responsibility].” Michigan’s Motor Dealers Act grants car dealers certain limited territorial rights, even when the dealer has a nonexclusive franchise, and requires manufacturers to provide notice to an existing dealer before establishing a new dealer within a certain distance of the existing dealer’s location. Receipt of notice gives the existing dealer a cause of action to challenge the proposed new dealer. Kia and Glassman entered into their Agreement in 1998, when the distance for notice was 6 miles. A 2010 amendment increased the distance to 9 miles. The district court found that the parties did not agree to comply with the 2010 Amendment and that the 2010 Amendment is not retroactive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 6-mile distance applies. View "Kia Motors Am., Inc. v. Glassman Oldsmobile Saab Hyundai, Inc." on Justia Law

Columbia Gas disagrees with the Singhs over the scope of an existing pipeline right-of-way. Columbia suit in federal court to enjoin the Singhs and their tenant from engaging in activity that Columbia believed could lead to violations of Columbia’s duties under federal laws regulating natural gas service and pipeline safety. Although the cause of action appeared to be an Ohio interference-with-easement claim, Columbia’s complaint referred to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717–717w, as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Without explicitly addressing jurisdiction, the district court held a status conference at which the parties reached a settlement. When the Singhs refused to comply with Columbia’s understanding of the settlement, the district court granted Columbia’s motion to enforce the settlement. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this property dispute between nondiverse parties. Columbia’s complaint neither asserted a federal cause of action nor showed that a substantial federal interest was implicated by its state-law claim. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Singh" on Justia Law

Deen was convicted of distributing five grams or more of cocaine base and sentenced to prison for 66 months, followed by four years of supervised release. Deen began his supervised release in 2011. Months later, at a revocation hearing, Deen pleaded guilty to violations stemming from domestic violence incidents, alcohol use, and failure to report and to attend behavioral therapy. The government pushed for “a significant term of imprisonment where [Deen] hopefully can get some treatment for alcohol abuse, and perhaps counseling in terms of anger management.” The court sentenced Deen to 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The judge explained her decision in terms of the goal of rehabilitation. In 2012, Deen and the government jointly requested that this court vacate Deen’s sentence and remand for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court decision, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), that hat the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit a court to “impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the bar on sentencing decisions based on rehabilitative needs applies equally to supervised-release sentences. View "United States v. Deen" on Justia Law

In 2004 Stout pleaded guilty to second-degree escape (KY Rev. Stats. 520.030) from the prison where he was incarcerated. Stout admitted to scaling the wall and escaping through a hole in the fence, but denied cutting the hole in the fence. The government proffered no evidence indicating that Stout cut the hole in the fence. In 2009 Stout pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing body armor after having been previously convicted of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 931(a)(2), after unsuccessfully arguing that the prior conviction for escape did not constitute a “crime of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court reasoned that Stout’s actions were “purposeful and aggressive” and “created a serious risk of the use of physical force against guards and members of the general public.” There is substantial risk that offenders who choose to escape from secured settings will engage in physical violence during the course of the escape. View "United States v. Stout" on Justia Law

Wyko sold parts to tire manufacturers, but in the U.S., provided parts for steel tire-assembly machines only for Goodyear. Wyko contracted with HaoHua, owned by the Chinese government, to supply parts unlike any it had previously built. Goodyear used machines like those Wyko needed. Goodyear asked Wyko to repair tire-assembly machines. Wyko sent engineers. Before their visit, both signed agreements that they might have access to trade secrets or other confidential information and that they would not disclose that information. A security guard reminded them that no cameras were allowed inside the factory. Unescorted for a few minutes, one engineer used his cell-phone camera to take photos that were forwarded to the design team. Wyko’s IT manager forwarded the e-mail to Goodyear. Goodyear notified the FBI. Convicted of theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. 1832(a)) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349), the engineers were sentenced to four months of home confinement, community service, and probation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the photographs did not meet the statutory definition because Goodyear did not take “reasonable measures” to protect secrecy. The court reversed the sentences because the court had not adequately explained its calculation of loss. View "United States v. Howley" on Justia Law

The Memphis nightclub is located in a zoning district where adult entertainment has been prohibited since 1993. Although already allowed to present most forms of adult entertainment under a grandfather clause, the club desires to present adult entertainment in the form of compensated nude dancers and claims that an ordinance requiring a permit to present nude dancers is unconstitutional as an improper prior restraint and as vague. The club claims that a city official’s actions violated its procedural due process rights. Following a remand, the district court rejected its suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the club had forfeited its prior restraint argument, had not established vagueness, and had not established that it was deprived of a protected property or liberty interest when its dance permit was revoked and not reissued. View "600 Marshall Entm't Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

USCA is a non-profit national civic league with approximately 27,000 members that devotes itself to conservative values and opposes efforts of the federal government to interfere with market processes. Some of USCA’s uninsured members object to the purchase of private health insurance because they do not believe in the effectiveness of traditional medicine, prefer alternative and integrative medicine, or prefer to focus on preventative care that is not covered by traditional health insurance policies. Two individual plaintiffs do not have, nor do they wish to acquire, health insurance, but they are not exempt from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, 26 U.S.C. 5000A. They challenged the mandate as violating the Commerce Clause, rights to freedom of expressive and intimate association, rights to liberty, and rights to privacy. The district court dismissed in part, without substantive analysis, holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “plausibility standard” and entered summary judgment on the Commerce Clause challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius controls the outcome on the Commerce Clause count and the remaining constitutional claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim. View "U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius" on Justia Law