Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Judge, who worked as an airline baggage handler and ramp agent for 20 years, underwent surgery to repair an aortic valve and a dilated ascending aorta. He applied for disability benefits under a group insurance policy issued by MetLife. MetLife denied benefits, finding that Judge was not totally and permanently disabled under the terms of the Plan. After exhausting internal administrative procedures, Judge sued to recover benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The district court granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of MetLife. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that MetLife applied the wrong definition of “total disability,” erred in failing to obtain vocational evidence before concluding that Judge was not totally and permanently disabled, erred in conducting a file review by a nurse in lieu of having Judge undergo independent medical examination, and that there was a conflict of interest because MetLife both evaluates claims and pays benefits under the plan. View "Judge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Debtors, five single-asset limited partnerships holding apartment complexes developed under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, 26 U.S.C. 42, filed for relief under Chapter 11 in 2010. The properties were put into service in 2005 and 2006, and their tax credit recapture periods expire in 2019 and 2020. The bankruptcy court conducted a valuation hearing and concluded that, for purposes of determining the value of the secured portion of the (mortgage holder) Bank’s claims under 11 U.S.C. 506(a), a determination of the fair market value of the properties included consideration of the remaining federal low-income housing tax credits. The Bankruptcy Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s Valuation Order. The Debtors failed to amend their plan or disclosure statement to reflect the values set by the bankruptcy court until ordered to do so in 2012. The court ultimately dismissed the petitions, based on continuing loss to or diminution of the estate, coupled with absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation; the Debtors’ inability to effectuate a plan; and bad faith under 11 U.S.C. 1112(b). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Creekside Senior Apts." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 91 current and former special investigators (SIs) employed by Nationwide Mutual Insurance claimed that Nationwide improperly classified SIs as administrative employees exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207 and 213(a)(1)) and analogous provisions of New York and California law. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Nationwide, then ruled in the company’s favor following trial on other issues. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reference to investigators, 29 C.F.R. 541.3(b)(1), read in context, pertains to law enforcement and public safety personnel and not to the Sis employed by Nationwide. Plaintiffs perform work “directly related” to Nationwide’s “general business operations.” The district court properly found that their investigations, with the purpose of resolving the indicators of fraud and the legitimacy of the suspicious claims, are unlike the narrower more formulaic background investigations into facts and records that have been found to not involve the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. View "Foster v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, on behalf of present and future recipients, alleging that Tennessee’s Medicaid program violated federal requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1396, and the Due Process Clause. The decades that followed involved intervenors, consent orders, revisions, and creation of a subclass. In 1994, Tennessee converted to a managed care program, TennCare. In 1995, five class members filed motions alleging that TennCare was being administered inconsistent with a 1992 decree and federal law. In 2009, the district court awarded plaintiffs more than$2.57 million for fees and expenses leading up to a 2005 Revised Consent Decree. Plaintiffs had originally requested a lodestar amount of $3,313,458.00, but the court reduced the award by 20 percent on account of plaintiffs’ “limited” success relative to the breadth of defendants’ requests and the scope of the litigation. The court noted that there was “no dispute that Plaintiffs in this case are the prevailing party, and thus entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988.” The Sixth Circuit vacated parts of the award, noting that section 1988 “is not for the purpose of aiding lawyers and that the original petition for fees included requests for dry cleaning bills, mini blinds, and health insurance. View "Binta B. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Geraldine Fuhr successfully sued to be instated as varsity boys basketball coach at Hazel Park High School, where she had been employed as varsity girls basketball coach. For five years she coached both teams. In 2006, she was removed from her position coaching varsity girls basketball. She claims that her dismissal as the varsity girls basketball coach and other acts of harassment were a result of her 1999 suit. The district court granted the district summary judgment, rejecting claims of retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)), gender discrimination, and hostile work environment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting a substantial time gap between the suit and the complained-of actions and the district’s complained-of actions were not discriminatory. View "Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Omstott told Lexington police that her boyfriend, Kinison, was involved in criminal sexual activity with children and that Kinison had been sending text messages concerning his desire to get involved with a Savannah group that allegedly adopts children and allows people in the group to engage in sex with those children. Agents downloaded 1,646 pages of text messages with her consent; the messages corroborated Omstott’s claims. In one message Kinison suggested that they could babysit a child under two-years-old that would not be able to talk so that they could, perform sexual acts on the child, and take photos to send to the group. Omstott claimed Kinison was viewing pornographic videos on his home computer. After obtaining warrants, agents seized a computer and a cell phone from Kinison’s house and the phone from his car. He was indicted for receiving and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and 2252(a)(4)(B). Kinison admitted in a post-Miranda statement that he authored and sent the text messages. The district court granted Kinison’s motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that there was “no culpable police conduct to deter here.” View "United States v. Kinison" on Justia Law

Tennessee participates in Medicaid through “TennCare,” Tenn. Code 71-5-102. The Medicaid Act requires that TennCare administer an Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program for all enrollees under age 21, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(43), 1396d(r) and must provide outreach to educate its enrollees about these services. In 1998 plaintiffs filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that TennCare had failed to fulfill these obligations. The district court entered a consent decree that explained in detail the requirements that TennCare had to meet to “achieve and maintain compliance” with the Medicaid Act, based on the assumption that the Act created rights enforceable under section 1983. Eight years later, the Sixth Circuit held that one part of the Medicaid Act was unenforceable under section 1983. Following a remand, the district court vacated paragraphs of the decree that were based on parts of the Act that are not privately enforceable. After a thorough review of TennCare’s efforts, the court then vacated the entire decree, finding that TennCare had fulfilled the terms of the decree’s sunset clause by reaching a screening percentage greater than 80% and by achieving current, substantial compliance with the rest of the decree. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "John B. v.Emkes" on Justia Law

Williams, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was convicted in 1999 in New York for a firearms charge and deported. Williams re-entered illegally and in 2002 was arrested for kidnapping, robbery, assault, and marijuana possession; he failed to appear for any court proceedings. Williams relocated to Nashville, where he obtained a driver’s license in the name of Arnold Fordham. The DEA began investigating Williams for distributing oxycodone, but believed that he was Fordham. The DEA executed a warrant on Williams’s home and found more than 1,000 oxycodone pills and 190 oxymorphone pills. Williams stated that his name was Fordham and admitted that he had been selling the pills and that he had a gun in the house. Two months after his initial appearance, Williams told the court his real name. He pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The government argued that Williams had obstructed justice when he lied about his identity and requested a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G 3C1.1. The court applied the enhancement and sentenced Williams to 87 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that misrepresentation of identity was not material to any matter decided by the district court. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Fulgenzi was prescribed the generic drug metoclopramide (FDA approved in 1980), sold originally under the brand name Reglan, a drug approved for short-term treatment of patients suffering from gastroesophageal reflux disease. In her suit, claiming failure to adequately warn of risks, she alleged that taking the drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia, an often-irreversible neurological disorder that causes involuntary movements, especially of the lower face. In 2009, the Supreme Court held that with respect to branded drug manufacturers, state failure-to-warn suits were not preempted by the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act , 21 U.S.C. 301. In 2011 the Court held that such suits could not go forward against generic drug manufacturers, as it is impossible to comply simultaneously with their state duty to adequately warn and their federal duty of sameness (federal law requires generic drug labels to be the same as their branded counterpart). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that after the branded-drug manufacturer of metoclopramide strengthened warnings on its label, the generic manufacturer failed to update its label as required by federal law, rendering compliance with both federal and state duties no longer impossible. View "Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Howell, then 17, and five friends left Kentucky, taking guns and a rickety car. At a rest stop in Tennessee, Lillelid, approached the group, sharing his religious views. Risner displayed a gun, directed the Lillelid family to their van even though Lillelid offered his keys and wallet. Risner, still armed, Howell, and others rode with the Lillelids to a secluded road where the Lillelids and their children were shot. Only two-year-old Peter survived, but lost an eye. When they were caught in Arizona, the group had the Lillelids’ possessions. All pled guilty in adult court in exchange for withdrawal of death-penalty requests and for certainty about other punishments. Howell received three life sentences without the possibility of parole and 25 years for attempted murder, each to be served consecutively, plus 25 years for especially aggravated kidnapping, 12 years for aggravated kidnapping and four years for theft, to run concurrently. State courts rejected Howell’s post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorney’s failure to insist that she undertake a psychological evaluation The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, although the attorney had performed deficiently, Howell could not show prejudice. The federal district court rejected her habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howell v. Hodge" on Justia Law