Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Forensic examination of Hargrove’s computer revealed more than 800 images and 16 videos depicting the sexual exploitation of children. “L.S.” appeared in eight of those images, “Amy” in three images, and “Vicky” in one video. He was indicted on two counts of transporting child pornography in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1); receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A) & (b)(1); and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(1). Hargrove pled guilty to the possession charge under a plea agreement with the government and then absconded. Upon return to federal custody, Hargrove pled guilty in a separate case to a charge of failure-to-appear, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1). At sentencing the district court ordered Hargrove to pay restitution to the victims and imposed contingent joint and several liability on Hargrove in the event the victims are unable to acquire necessary resources to pay for their psychological treatment from defendants convicted in other cases who also viewed the images and videos. The Sixth Circuit vacated the restitution order and remanded for calculation of damages attributable to Hargrove. Courts may not apportion restitution by imposing joint and several liability. View "United States v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

Based on a mortgage fraud scheme that caused the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to insure loans for unqualified applicants based upon forged documents and false information provided by Wendlandt, he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371, and was sentenced to 42 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s computation of financial loss for purposes of determining his offense level under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 and to the court’s decision to vary upward from the advisory Guidelines range of 24 to months in prison. View "United States v. Wendlandt" on Justia Law

Local resident Banks told police that on a specified date, he witnessed manufacture of methamphetamine, firearms, and a bomb at Hodge’s home. He observed a person shaking “sports drink bottles that appeared to have a grayish, sandy, sludge in the bottom with liquid and pieces of black chunks floating on the top,” characteristic of a “one pot style methamphetamine cook.” Banks gave a detailed description of a pipe bomb. Hodge claimed it could “blow up the entire house,” showed Banks a firearm that he called an AK-47, and told Banks that, if confronted, he “would shoot every cop that he could.” Officers obtained a warrant and found a pipe bomb, marijuana, prescription drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a rifle. Indicted for possession of an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and possession of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Hodge moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that statements he made alerting officers to the pipe bomb were obtained through custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The district court denied the motion. Hodge entered a conditional guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The questioning was permissible because officers had a reasonable belief based on articulable facts that they were in danger. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Three minors told Cincinnati police that Rose had sexually molested them and had shown them pornographic images on a computer in his bedroom. Police obtained a warrant to search Rose’s computers; its front page identified “Kenneth Rose” as the subject, and immediately below, identified the search location as “709 Elberon Av. [sic], Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio.” The warrant described physical attributes of the address, including that the name “Rose” appeared over the doorbell of apartment number one and included a photograph of the property taken from the Hamilton County Auditor’s website. The supporting affidavit summarized the testimony of the three victims, but did not provide Rose’s address. Forensic analysis of a computer seized during the search revealed numerous images of child pornography, with several of Rose engaged in sexual conduct with male minors under the age of 16. Rose entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading guilty to three counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251, preserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to 51 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the warrant and an argument that the charged activities were only intrastate. View "United States v. Rose" on Justia Law

In 2004, Yeremin, a Russian citizen who lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999, pleaded guilty (18 U.S.C. 1028(f)) to conspiracy to traffic in identification documents. Section 1028(a)(3) prohibits knowingly possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents or false identification documents. The Department of Homeland Security initiated proceedings and an immigration judge ordered removal, finding that Yeremin’s conviction was for an offense qualifying as a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Under the categorical approach, Yeremin’s conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Peterson is a prisoner in Michigan’s Iona maximum-security penitentiary, convicted of murder. After a scuffle during an attempt to remove Peterson from his cell, an officer filed a major misconduct report, alleging assault and battery. Peterson appeared at his hearing, heard all the evidence, pled not guilty, provided sworn statements to support his account, called witnesses in his defense, and moved to disqualify the hearing officer for bias. The only evidence that the hearing officer did not permit Peterson to view was the video of the event, exercising his authority under Mich. Comp. Laws 791.252(h), stating that “to allow [the video’s] actual viewing would reveal the limitations and capabilities of the fixed security device.” The hearing officer gave Peterson a detailed description the video, including the time-stamped second of each event. The hearing officer imposed a sentence of 30 days in detention. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that where a disputed issue of fact is resolved at a major misconduct hearing as a necessary part of the hearing’s judgment, it has preclusive effect in collateral litigation brought by the prisoner. View "Peterson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Grigoleit supplied knobs for Whirlpool’s washing machines and dryers for several years, and sought to increase prices and amend the parties’ purchase contracts in 2004. The parties reached an amended agreement in 2005, which Whirlpool terminated later that year. When Grigoleit demanded final payment, Whirlpool sued, arguing the contract was unenforceable. The district court upheld the contract but found some aspects of it unconscionable. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the contract was enforceable. Under Michigan law both substantive and procedural unconscionability are required to hold an agreement unenforceable. Refusing to certify questions to the state’s supreme court, the Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that a $40,000 flat fee and 8% increase are unconscionable. Whirlpool created the urgent and unfavorable conditions under which it proposed these terms, and had ample time and opportunity to negotiate more favorable terms. Whirlpool had the resources, experience, and ability to avoid the terms entirely, yet chose not to do so. View "Whirlpool Corp. v. Grigoleit Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, Warf began working for Veterans Affairs as a program assistant to the Chief of Psychology. In 2004, a specialist from Human Resources performed an audit and concluded that Warf was performing duties that warranted GS-7 status on the government pay scale, a step higher than her GS-6 status. Between 2004 and 2008, Warf requested promotions, but nothing happened. In 2008 Warf filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The director retroactively promoted Warf and she received back pay. Warf was subsequently denied a promotion and brought claims of hostile work environment, gender discrimination, retaliation, and Equal Pay Act violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the department. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Warf provided no any evidence that she and DeLong (who got the promotion) performed substantially similar jobs. Warf’s position was that of an administrative assistant, which did not encompass any education or training responsibilities. There is a significant difference between DeLong, who held a master’s degree in business and had seven years of experience teaching, and Warf, who was working towards her bachelor’s degree. View "Warf v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Grigsby, a middle-age man who lived in homeless shelters, was charged with three unarmed bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Psychologists conducted examinations and filed reports that diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and stated that Grigsby was not competent to stand trial. Neither party objected. The court committed Grigsby to custody (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)(1)) to determine whether he could be restored to competency to stand trial. Forensic evaluators concluded that Grigsby did not understand the seriousness of his legal difficulty; lacked ability to assist his lawyer during trial; and was not capable of waiving his constitutional rights rationally or of testifying on his own behalf. Grigsby refused to take oral medication. Because he was not gravely disabled and did not present a danger to himself, others, or the facility, he did not meet the criteria for involuntary medication. The evaluators requested an order authorizing them to inject Grigsby involuntarily with a first-generation antipsychotic drug, (haloperidol (Haldol) or fluphenazine), or a second-generation antipsychotic drug, risperidone, to restore competency. These medications can cause serious side effects. The district court granted an order under Sell v. U.S. (2003). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that special circumstances unique to the case indicate that Grigsby’s liberty interest in avoiding involuntary medication outweighs the government’s interest in prosecution. View "United States v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Conlin refinanced with a loan from Bergin, secured by a mortgage containing a provision that recognized MERS as a nominee for Bergin and Bergin’s successors. Bergin sold the note to the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit, for which U.S. Bank was trustee. The mortgage was held by MERS, and serviced by GMAC. In 2008, MERS assigned the mortgage to “U.S. Bank National Association as trustee.” In 2010 Orlans sent Conlan notice (Mich. Comp. Laws 600.3205a), of default and of his ability to request loan modification, stating that it was sent on behalf of GMAC as “the creditor to whom your mortgage debt is owed or the servicing agent for the creditor.” In 2011, Orlans published notice of foreclosure sale, stating that “the mortgage is now held by U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee by assignment.” The notice was also posted on the property, which was sold at a sheriff’s sale on March 31. On October 28, 2011, Conlin sought damages and to have the foreclosure sale set aside. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even if the “robo-signed” assignment were invalid, Conlin was not prejudiced. He has not clearly shown fraud in the foreclosure process, as required for a challenge after expiration of the six-month redemption period. View "Conlin v. Mrtg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law