Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tragas bought information that is encoded in the magnetic strip on the back of credit and debit cards from overseas suppliers and re-sold the information to the Hunter brothers, who created “clone” gift and credit cards with which they purchased goods and bona fide gift cards. Tragas and the Hunters communicated online. Police discovered records of their conversations on the Hunters’ computer. Transcripts of the conversations were read at trial. Although the parties did not use names, a picture of Tragas appeared on the account and Tragas made purchases with card information exchanged during the conversations. Tragas purchased a house in Florida after a conversation about buying a house in Florida. As a result of the scheme, credit and debit card users and their financial institutions lost $2.18 million. Tragas was convicted of conspiracy to commit access device fraud offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1029(b); aiding and abetting unlawful activity under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting claims that the prosecutor improperly read evidence aloud, that the court should have given the jury a specific unanimity instruction, that the Travel Act convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and that her Vienna Convention rights were violated. The court remanded the sentence; the court used an incorrect version of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Tragas" on Justia Law

Officers on patrol in a high-crime, high-drug area observed a vehicle, occupied by Hinojosa, parked next door to a house that had been the site of past drug activity. After Hinojosa walked up and down the driveway, went into the house, and left after less than one minute, officers followed him. There had been reports of drug manufacturing in an apartment in the building where he stopped. An officer exited the unmarked police car; the other parked the car so that it would not have blocked Hinojosa if he had tried to leave. The officer approached Hinojosa, indicating that he wanted to talk, with his hand on his weapon. Hinojosa, with his window rolled up, asked why he wanted to talk. The officer responded that they had suspicions about his odd behavior in the other driveway. After Hinojosa provided a driver’s license, a dispatcher stated that the license was suspended and that Hinojosa was on parole. Hinojosa was arrested. Hinojosa stated that he was carrying a pistol, which the officer removed from Hinojosa’s waistband. After denial of his motion to suppress, Hinojosa pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed: the questioning leading up to Hinojosa’s arrest and search occurred during a consensual encounter. A reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter. Hinojosa was not seized. View "United States v. Hinojosa" on Justia Law

In 2008, the FBI issued its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) to implement newly revised Department of Justice guidelines, addressing use of race and ethnicity in investigations. Under this guidance, the FBI may identify and map “locations of concentrated ethnic communities” to “reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities … assist domain awareness,” and collect “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU submitted a Freedom of Information Act request, seeking release of documents concerning policy on collecting such information, and records containing information actually collected. The FBI initially released 298 pages (48 partially redacted) of training material, previously released for a similar request by the ACLU’s Atlanta affiliate. The ACLU filed suit. With additional releases, the FBI identified 1,553 pages of potentially responsive records: training materials, “domain intelligence notes,” “program assessments,” “electronic communications,” and maps. The district court held that the FBI appropriately withheld records under a FOIA exemption for law enforcement information whose release could “interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed; release of publicly available information selectively used in investigations may reveal law-enforcement priorities and methodologies and interfere with enforcement. The ACLU’s proposed procedure for resolving the dispute was inadequately protective of sensitive information; in camera review was appropriate. View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Scozzari was fatally shot by two police officers. Plaintiff, as representative of decedent’s estate, brought a civil rights action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to a known medical need. After the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was denied, a jury found in favor of the officers. The district court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required to prove that deliberate indifference proximately caused decedent’s death. The district court later granted plaintiff a new trial on the deliberate indifference claim because our circuit has held that “in delay-of-treatment cases, it is not necessary to show that the delay in providing medical care proximately caused the injury” when it would be obvious to a layperson that there was a risk of serious harm without immediate medical attention. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for interlocutory appeal. Defendants cannot satisfy the requirement that “a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists regarding the correctness of the decision.” View "Miedzianowski v. City of Clare" on Justia Law

Watson’s companies, Cyberco and Teleservices, defrauded lending institutions and other businesses that provided funding for Cyberco to purchase computer equipment from Teleservices. Cyberco never actually received any equipment, but the lending institutions forwarded funds to Teleservices based on phony invoices Watson arranged. Watson packed Cyberco’s computer room with fake servers and swapped serial numbers among those servers to deceive the victims when they attempted to audit their collateral. Teleservices “funneled” the funds back to Cyberco, which used them to make payments to allow the fraud to continue and to pay Watson and others substantial salaries. The payments were made through Huntington Bank, which also facilitated payments through its cash management services, but Cyberco owed Huntington more than $16 million. Teleservices, which had no banking relationship with Huntington, made payments so that Huntington could reduce its exposure to about $600,000 in a few months, just weeks before the FBI raided Cyberco. After that raid, creditors commenced an involuntary Chapter 7 proceeding against Cyberco. A state-appointed receiver filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition for Teleservices. The bankruptcy court dismissed Huntington’s motions for substantive consolidation of the Chapter 7 petitions. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel determined that the denials were not final appealable orders. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "In re: Cyberco Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Joiner pled guilty to crimes involving 129.77 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B). At the time, offenses involving more than 50 grams and a defendant who had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense had a minimum penalty of 20 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The district judge granted a reduction for substantial assistance, enabling Joiner to be sentenced below the statutory minimum. Rather than using the statutory minimum as the starting point, the district judge increased Joiner’s base level to 33, the lowest level that, coupled with Joiner’s criminal history, would correspond to a guideline range containing 240 months, then reduced Joiner’s base offense level by three for acceptance of responsibility and by five for substantial assistance, and imposed a sentence of 107 months of imprisonment. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger the 20-year statutory minimum to 280 grams. The 2011 crack-cocaine-guideline amendments lowered the section 5A guideline range to which Joiner would have been subject absent a statutory minimum. The district court denied Joiner a sentence reduction, holding that when a defendant was subject to a statutory minimum at his original sentencing but received a downward departure for substantial assistance, a Guidelines amendment that lowered the sentencing range under Section 2D1.1 did not lower an “applicable” guideline range as required by U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Joiner" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) under an agreement specifying that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court was bound by a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. The government moved for a downward departure in return for Defendant’s substantial assistance and the court granted further reductions for Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty. Ultimately, the district court sentenced Defendant to 130 months of imprisonment, the low end of the advisory range. Four years later the Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute so that an offense must involve at least 280 grams of cocaine base to trigger a 10-year statutory minimum sentence. Following the district court’s original sentencing formula, but using the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines, Defendant would now be subject to a sentence of 70 months. In 2012, Defendant sought sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Defendant was ineligible for sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating an intent to give “effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Officers observed a Chrysler with heavily tinted windows playing loud music and initiated a traffic stop. After the officers knocked on the car’s windows several times, Evans, the car’s driver and owner, and Walker, the front seat passenger, rolled down the windows and began speaking. The officers smelled marijuana and noticed that Walker was agitated. After Evans exited the vehicle and was under supervision, officers asked Walker to step out and keep his hands in sight. As he released the seatbelt, officers believed that Walker was reaching between the passenger seat and the door in an unnatural movement. Walker ignored warnings until he was restrained. An officer found a gun on the floor between the passenger’s seat and the door, near the floor mounting for the front passenger’s seat belt; it was loaded, had a round in the chamber, and was positioned to be grabbed from the front passenger’s seat. Walker was convicted as a felon in possession of ammunition transported in foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the firearm containing this ammunition; that the government constructively amended or prejudicially varied from the indictment with respect to evidence showing that the ammunition traveled in foreign commerce; and to sentencing himGibb to an additional 24 months because he violated the terms of supervised release. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Greco worked at MetroHealth, a county-owned health-care provider in Cleveland, from 1997 until 2009, supervising independent contractors who worked on MetroHealth construction projects, selecting contractors for small-scale no-bid maintenance projects, and authorizing payment for their work. Greco used his authority to facilitate a bribery scheme set up by his boss and Patel, the vice-president of a construction company. The participants became nervous and Greco took action to hide his involvement in the scheme, but Patel contacted the government and confessed; in exchange for a reduced sentence, Patel provided detailed information about the scheme. Greco was convicted of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery involving programs receiving federal funds (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 371), violation of and conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951), making false tax returns (26 U.S.C. 7206(1)), and conspiracy to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349) and was sentenced to 112 months’ imprisonment and required to pay $994,734.84 in restitution to MetroHealth. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court improperly applied a 12-level enhancement based on an erroneous loss calculation; improperly applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice; and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. View "United States v. Greco" on Justia Law

American loaned $429,991 to Saberline to pay an insurance premium; Saberline agreed that, if it defaulted on the loan, American could cancel the policy and obtain return of any unearned premiums. USIG brokered the deal. American would deliver funds to USIG’s account at Cornerstone; USIG would forward the money to the insurer. Instead of placing the money in a trust account for Saberline, USIG told American to deposit the funds in USIG’s general operating account at Cornerstone. USIG was indebted to Cornerstone and had authorized it to sweep the operating account and apply anything over $50,000 to the debt. As a result, when American deposited Saberline’s premiums, Cornerstone reduced USIG’s debt. Saberline defaulted. American canceled the policy and attempted to recover the premium. USIG repaid American with funds drawn from a different bank, but then filed for bankruptcy, turning that transfer into a preference payment. American settled with the bankruptcy trustee, reserving its right to pursue a conversion claim against Cornerstone. A magistrate judge issued a declaratory judgment that American had a superior security interest in the disputed funds and that Cornerstone was liable for conversion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Premium Finance Company Act, Tenn. Code 56-37-101, gave American a senior perfected security interest in the contested funds. View "American Bank, FSB v. Cornerstone Cmty. Bank" on Justia Law