Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vandiver filed a pro se civil action against Prison Health Services (PHS) and five medical professionals, alleging that the defendants violated and are continuing to violate his Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to the health care needs associated with his serious chronic conditions, including Hepatitis C and diabetes and that as a result, he has undergone partial amputations of his feet and suffered visual impairment. He claimed that he is at risk of further injury, including additional amputations, coma, and death. He acknowledged having previously filed three complaints that were dismissed as frivolous. The district court denied his application to proceed in forma pauperis, applying the three-strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that alleging a danger of serious physical injury as a result of being presently denied adequate medical treatment for a chronic illness satisfies the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes rule. Allegations of incremental harm culminating in serious physical injury may present a danger equal to that of an injury that occurs all at once. View "VanDiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Crum, a small company near insolvency, agreed to service Martin’s light-duty vehicles. Martin was a subsidiary of Massey Coal, a publicly-traded corporation. The agreement allowed Crum to enter Martin’s property to pick up vehicles; Martin required Crum to enter into an indemnification agreement and Crum agreed to Martin’s terms. Crum obtained insurance coverage required by the agreement from Universal. Philip, a Crum employee, rode with a Martin employee to pick up a truck from Martin property. A boulder rolled down hill, hit the vehicle, severely injuring Philip. The U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration cited Martin for having loose rock above the roadway. Philip and Crum sued Martin; Martin counterclaimed based on the indemnification. Universal declined to defend on the counterclaim. After mediation, Martin agreed, without admitting liability, to pay $3,650,000. The parties also entered an “agreed judgment” against Crum for $3,650,000, on Martin’s counterclaim. Martin agreed not to pursue Crum for that judgment and sued Universal. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that Universal had no duty to indemnify Martin because there was enough evidence to show that Crum was not actually liable to Martin. The indemnification was unenforceable as against public policy; it was the product of a significant disparity in bargaining power and attempted to shift liability for compliance with at least one mining-safety statute. View "Martin Cnty. Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ward, a 50-year-old man from the United Kingdom, obtained lawful-permanent-resident status in 1995. Ward left the U.S. in 2003 to take care of his mother, who suffered from dementia. When he returned in 2006, Ward presented an expired green card and was charged as subject to removal under 8 U.S.C.A. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The government asserted that Ward had abandoned permanent resident status.” At a hearing, the government called Ward to testify, but called no other witnesses. Ward testified in his behalf and his brother also testified. Both sides also introduced documentary evidence. The Immigration Judge held that removability had been sustained by the requisite clear and convincing evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Immigration Judge erred in applying the wrong degree of proof and in assigning the burden of proof to the immigrant. View "Ward v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1975, Brumley assigned to his sons, Robert and William, his interests in a copyright to the hit gospel song, “I’ll Fly Away.” In 2006, Brumley’s four other children sought to terminate the assignment. Robert refused to recognize the termination as valid, arguing that Brumley was not the statutory author of the song and that a 1979 assignment of interests by Brumley’s widow prevented the heirs from later exercising termination rights. The district court ruled in favor of the heirs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed admission of a transcript and recording of a 1977 conversation between Brumley and one of the plaintiffs, but reversed and remanded because of the court’s exclusion of two articles discussing Brumley’s employment status at the time that he composed the song. View "Brumley v. Albert Brumley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Kindred, a nursing home and rehabilitation center in Mobile, has beds for about 170 residents and eight departments into which employees are classified: nursing, nutrition services, resident activity, maintenance, administration, medical records, central supply, and social services. The nursing department has 53 Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) not including the Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) and Registered Nurses (RNs). The LPNs supervise the CNAs; RNs supervise the LPNs and report to the nursing director. The union petitioned to represent the CNAs. , Kindred argued that the bargaining unit should be expanded to include an additional 86 non-supervisory, non-professional service and maintenance employees. The NLRB regional director certified the CNAs as an appropriate bargaining unit and the union won a representation election. Kindred refused to bargain. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for enforcement, applying the “community of interest” approach. View "Kindred Nursing Cts. E. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Mendel was employed by the City of Gibraltar as a police department dispatcher. After his employment was terminated, he sued under the Family Medical Leave Act. At that time, the city employed 41 employees, excluding 25-30 “volunteer” firefighters, who are not required to respond to any emergency call, but are paid $15 per hour for time they do spend responding to a call or maintaining equipment. They have no consistent schedule and receive a Form–1099 MISC to report their income. They do not receive health insurance, sick or vacation time, or social security benefits, but may be promoted or discharged. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that Mendel was not an “eligible employee” under FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2611(4), because the city did not have more than 50 employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The substantial wages paid to the firefighters constitutes compensation, not nominal fees, so that they are employees, not volunteers, for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and FMLA. View "Mendel v. City of Gibraltar" on Justia Law

REX was unsuccessful in privately obtaining easements from defendants to install an interstate natural-gas pipeline authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under a coal mine in Ohio and had to condemn the easement, 15 U.S.C. 717f. REX built the pipeline and gas began flowing in 2009. Defendants believed that safety concerns regarding the pipeline would delay its mining permits and accelerated its mining, resulting in unanticipated costs associated with inefficient mining techniques. In valuing the easement, the district court determined that the defendants suffered no compensable damages to its coalmining operations as a result of the pipeline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that FERC found as a matter of fact that the pipeline would not compromise mining and that the two operations could co-exist. View "Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. 4.895 Acres of Land, More or Less" on Justia Law

Danou is a naturalized U.S. citizen from Iraq. He, his family, and his trust own several real estate ventures, including Southfield, Triple Creek, and Danou Technical. In 2006 Southfield borrowed $13 million from Flagstar Bank. Danou, Triple Creek and Danou Technical guaranteed the loan; Southfield and Triple Creek put up collateral. Southfield did not repay the loan in full when it came due in 2009 and the parties restructured the loan. In 2011, Chambless, a Flagstar employee charged with work on the bank’s “troubled assets” and loans, investigated Southfield’s finances, although Southfield claims it was current on all of its restructured obligations. Chambless told Danou that Flagstar “would under no circumstances ever consider an application” to refinance the loan again. The following year, when Danou requested an extension, the bank refused to provide an application, despite Danou’s offer of additional collateral and his wife’s guarantee. The district court dismissed a claim of national origin discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Between the obvious alternative explanation for the denial and purposeful, invidious discrimination a court will not infer discrimination. View "16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

A three-year-old child found a cigarette lighter in his father’s truck and used it to loosen a button on his shirt. His shirt caught fire and he spent three weeks in the hospital, where he was treated for second and third degree burns to his face and chest and underwent several skin graft surgeries. A BIC cigarette lighter was found at the scene and delivered to the police. Who found the lighter, and where, is unclear. In a suit against the manufacturer, the jury found the lighter was not defective or unreasonably dangerous in a way that causally contributed to the injuries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court allowed inadmissible evidence of the failure of the Consumer Product Safety Commission to take action concerning the lighter and that the court erred by permitting BIC’s counsel to argue that the parents were to blame and refusing to instruct the jury to disregard such arguments. The court noted that the lighter admitted in evidence is presumed to be the one that caused the fire; it was worn, and the child safety guard had been removed. View "Cummins v. Bic USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Michigan anti-begging statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 900, has existed since at least 1929 and provides that “[a] person is a disorderly person if the person is any of the following: ... (h) A person found begging in a public place.” A person convicted under section 750.167(1)(h) is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. The Grand Rapids police recorded 409 incidents of police enforcing the anti-begging law from 2008–2011. Plaintiffs, two homeless adults, were arrested. One was holding signs saying: “Cold and Hungry, God Bless” and “Need Job, God Bless.” The other, a veteran, needed money for bus fare, and asked a person on the street: “Can you spare a little change?” The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the law was unconstitutional. Begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects and the statute cannot withstand facial attack because it prohibits a substantial amount of solicitation, but allows other solicitation based on content. View "Speet v. Schuette" on Justia Law