Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Underhills received their discharge under a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in May 2010, Golf Chic, an LLC in which Beth Underhill was the sole member, filed a claim for tortious interference against several entities in October 2010. The lawsuit was settled and $80,000 was awarded to the LLC, but the settlement check was made payable to Beth Underhill and her attorney, rather than to the LLC. Huntington Bank successfully moved to reopen the case so that the settlement proceeds could be administered as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The settlement proceeds received after the discharge were sufficiently rooted in the debtors’ pre-bankruptcy past to be property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) and the claims were not abandoned by the trustee when the bankruptcy case was closed. The claim was known to Beth Underhill and affected the value of her membership interest. Placing a value of zero on the membership interest with that knowledge constituted failure to disclose the asset and warrants reopening and a determination by the bankruptcy court of the value of the interest in the LLC. View "In re: Underhill" on Justia Law

Satyam approached the Trust about forming a joint venture to provide engineering services to the automotive industry. Satyam represented that it was an IT-services provider with a base of automotive customers, that it was publicly-traded, audited, and financially stable. The Trust formed VGE, a separate legal entity; in 2000, VGE and Satyam formed SVES under the laws of India; VGE contributed $735,000. VGE and Satyam signed agreements calling for binding arbitration. In 2005, Satyam initiated arbitration. VGE counterclaimed that Satyam had breached its obligations. The arbitrator rejected VGE’s counterclaims, found that Satyam never competed with SVES, and found an event of default entitling Satyam to purchase VGE’s shares in the joint venture for book value. Satyam filed an enforcement action. The district court ordered VGE to comply with the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Following a 2007 contempt proceeding, VGE complied. In 2010, VGE and the Trust sued, alleging that, starting before the joint venture, Satyam engaged in a massive fraud scheme about its financial stability, and claiming civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961–1968. The district court dismissed, based on res judicata defense, and denied leave to amend. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The complaint adequately alleged that Satyam wrongfully concealed the factual predicate to claims, so the defense of claim preclusion does not apply. View "Venture Global Eng'g, LLC v. Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd." on Justia Law

As part of a separate drug investigation, the FBI began wire intercepts of cellular telephones of several individuals (Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22) including West, Freeman’s co-defendant. They overheard a murder-for-hire plot. West was convicted of paying Freeman to murder Day. Freeman was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1958 for conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire and received a life sentence. At trial, FBI agent Lucas, interpreted the conversations as they were played. His testimony ranged from voice and nickname identifications to substantive interpretations of the meaning of the various statements. Defense counsel objected: “I think this is outside of the scope of both the notice we received regarding this witness’s expertise and his expertise.” Lucas had been qualified as an expert to testify to the meaning of specific code words and drug slang. The prosecution responded: “Your honor, this is not expert testimony. This is based upon his personal knowledge of the investigation.” The objection was overruled, and Lucas continued to testify as a lay witness under Rule 701, interpreting conversations to broadly illustrate the prosecution’s theory of the case. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court erred by permitting the testimony. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In 2003, Henderson was stopped for speeding. The officer discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen. A Detroit Police Officer attempted to organize a live lineup, but could not locate five males of defendant’s description. The officer then conducted a photographic lineup, at which Henderson was identified as the suspect in a carjacking. Police records indicate that an attorney representing Henderson’s interests, Corr, was present for the photographic lineup. After Henderson’s conviction, Corr wrote a letter to Henderson stating that he had not been present at the lineup. At trial, Henderson’s counsel challenged neither admission of the photographic lineup, nor testimony regarding it and presented no evidence. Henderson was convicted of armed robbery and carjacking. State court efforts were rejected as untimely because the filing arrived one day late due to failings in the prison mail system. Henderson filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court found several claims to be procedurally defaulted based on the lateness of Henderson’s application for leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his first motion for reconsideration, which caused the Michigan Court of Appeals to dismiss his application. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Sixth Circuit law, Maples v. Stegall, (2003), provides that “[w]here a pro se prisoner attempts to deliver his petition for mailing in sufficient time for it to arrive timely in the normal course of events” that circumstance “is sufficient to excuse a procedural default based upon a late filing.” View "Henderson v. Palmer" on Justia Law

GM provides its salaried retirees with continuing life insurance benefits under an ERISA-governed plan. MetLife issued the group life insurance policy and periodically sent letters to participants advising them of the status of their benefits. The plaintiffs, participants in the plan, allege that those letters falsely stated that their continuing life insurance benefits would remain in effect for their lives, without cost to them. GM reduced their continuing life insurance benefits as part of its 2009 Chapter 11 reorganization. The plaintiffs sued MetLife under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2) & (a)(3) and state law. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MetLife did not tell participants that the benefits were fully paid up or vested upon retirement, but that their benefits would be in effect for their lifetimes, which “was undeniably true under the terms of GM’s then-existing plan.” The court rejected claims of estoppel, of breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of plan terms, and restitution. View "Merrill Haviland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

An internal investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office found evidence suggesting that during the Jefferson trial on drug-conspiracy charges, the prosecution failed to disclose to the defense the extent of the promises of leniency that the prosecution made to cooperating witnesses. In a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, Jefferson alleged that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor violated his obligation under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material impeachment evidence. Following a remand, the district court again denied Jefferson’s motion, finding that Jefferson’s claims were not timely filed, that equitable tolling was not warranted, and that even if timely, Jefferson’s Brady claims failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the claims filed on the merits, because the material at issue was not prejudicial. The court rejected the conclusion that Jefferson failed to exercise due diligence in these circumstance. A section 2255 petitioner is permitted to rely on the government’s representation that it has fulfilled its Brady obligations. Reasonable diligence does not require a section 2255 petitioner repeatedly to scavenge for facts that the prosecution is unconstitutionally hiding from him. View "Jefferson v. United States" on Justia Law

Groeneveld sued Lubecore, claiming that Lubecore’s automotive grease pump is a “virtually identical” copy of Groeneveld’s automotive grease pump. The complaint asserted tradedress infringement in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and violation of related federal and Ohio laws. The trade-dress claim went to the jury, which found for Groeneveld and awarded it $1,225,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a company cannot use trade-dress law to protect its functional product design from competition with a “copycat” design made by another company where there is no reasonable likelihood that consumers would confuse the two companies’ products as emanating from a single source. Trademark law is designed to promote brand recognition, not to insulate product manufacturers from lawful competition. View "Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993, Dixon and Hoffner beat their friend Hammer, tied him to a bed, stole his wallet and his automobile, drove him to a remote area, and buried him alive. One month into the investigation, Hoffner led police to Hammer’s body and Dixon provided a tape-recorded account of the events. Dixon was indicted for aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. At trial, the defense presented no evidence and cross-examined only three of 15 prosecution witnesses. The jury convicted Dixon on all charges and recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed. The Ohio Court of Appeals consolidated Dixon’s direct appeal and post-conviction appeal, arguing ineffective assistance, and affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court also affirmed. Dixon then filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, improper exclusion of mitigating evidence at sentencing, and violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his confession was coerced, deeming his remaining claims pretermitted. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed. After review of the remaining claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instruction, and exclusion of mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas corpus. View "Dixon v. Houk" on Justia Law

In 2003, Bell pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), and possession of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 844. He agreed to 124.7 grams of crack. With a three-point acceptance of responsibility reduction, his offense level was 29. His criminal history category, II, produced a Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months, but the quantity had a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. The district court sentenced Bell to concurrent terms of120 months for the crack conviction and 12 months for the marijuana conviction with a consecutive 60 months for the 924(c) conviction In 2009, the district court denied a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act lowered the penalties for crack offenses and directed the Sentencing Commission to amend the Guidelines. The amendment was made retroactive. A recalculation assigned Bell a new offense level of 25, producing a new Guidelines range on the crack charge of 63 to 78 months. The district court denied a sentence reduction because his sentencing range, based on the mandatory minimum, had not changed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Bell’s sentence was not based on a range that was subsequently lowered. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Inmates at a federal prison celebrated Super Bowl Sunday by drinking liquor. MacAnally, become belligerent and told inmate Church that he intended to stab inmate Reisdorfer. Church, who outranked Reisdorfer and MacAnally in the Aryan Brotherhood, hit MacAnally to force him to abandon the plan. MacAnally apologized, but eventually became belligerent again. The three had another confrontation later, in MacAnally’s cell. Reisdorfer hit MacAnally in the head, knocking him down. Church told Reisdorfer to “kick [MacAnally’s] ass and put him to bed” and left the cell. Reisdorfer beat and stabbed MacAnally and went to get Church. When they returned to the cell, MacAnally was unconscious on the floor, making “a funny noise,” and bleeding profusely. Guards found him later. MacAnally suffered massive head trauma, a collapsed lung, and two stab wounds He has not regained consciousness. Church pleaded guilty to assaulting an inmate resulting in serious bodily harm, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6) and received a below-guidelines sentence of 57 months. Reisdorfer pleaded guilty to the same charge and was sentenced to 65 months of imprisonment. The judge ordered Reisdorfer to pay restitution of $121,496.56. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to denial of Church’s motion for a downward departure based on his claim that the victim provoked his conduct and to the restitution order, payable to a third party, the Bureau of Prisons. View "United States v. Reisdorfer" on Justia Law