Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While employed at an insurance company, Huff used customer information to obtain credit cards, and, with the help a teenager, cell phone contracts, resulting in loss of more than $350,000. Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371; identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7); and access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2). The plea agreement stipulated that the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual applied, calculated an offense level of 22, and agreed that no other adjustments applied. There was no upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust or for use of a minor. The pre-sentence report included upward adjustment for abuse of trust, adjustment for more than 10 victims, and adjustment for use of a minor: a net offense level of 25 after acceptance of responsibility. Huff’s criminal history included prior offenses for forgery theft and attempted misuse of a credit card with concurrent sentences. The district court used the 2006 manual, applied the abuse of trust enhancement and imposed concurrent 60-month prison terms. Huff’s attorney allegedly stated that the judge would be unhappy if reversed and would impose a sentence substantially greater than originally imposed. Huff dismissed an appeal. Huff later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Huff v. United States" on Justia Law

Inmate Santiago, complaining of severe pain and a rash, was seen by Dr.Mosher on January 31. Mosher prescribed Tylenol for pain and antibiotics to treat what she thought might be Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The next day Dr. Ringle diagnosed erythema nodosum (EN), an uncomfortable but non-dangerous skin inflammation that typically disappears in about six weeks but may recur. EN has no known cure. Ringle prescribed an anti-inflammatory and an antibiotic. Four days later, Santiago was transferred to OSU Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with EN and arthralgias, a severe joint-pain condition, and prescribed an anti-ulcer agent and a different anti-inflammatory. Santiago was seen on February 20 by an OSU dermatologist, who recommended a topical steroid, compression hose, and SSKI, which may help treat EN but is not standard treatment. Each day, February 22- 25, Santiago asked prison nursing staff about the treatments. Staff denied knowledge until, on the 25th, nurses found Santiago’s unsigned chart on Ringle’s desk. Ringle had been on vacation. Mosher signed the order on February 27. Santiago received the topical steroid on February 29 and compression stockings on March 10. Santiago waited longer for the SSKI, which is a non-formulary drug. The district court rejected Santiago’s suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on the delays. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Santiago did not prove that the delay caused a serious medical need or deliberate indifference.View "Santiago v. Ringle" on Justia Law

Crockett’s former law firm subscribed to a LexisNexis legal research plan that allowed unlimited access to certain databases for a flat fee. Subscribers could access other databases for an additional fee. According to Crockett, LexisNexis indicated that a warning sign would display before a subscriber used a database outside the plan. Years after subscribing, Crockett complained that his firm was being charged additional fees without any warning that it was using a database outside the Plan. LexisNexis insisted on payment of the additional fees. The firm dissolved. Crockett’s new firm entered into a LexisNexis subscription agreement, materially identical to the earlier plan; it contains an arbitration clause. Crockett filed an arbitration demand against LexisNexis on behalf of two putative classes. One class comprised law firms that were charged additional fees. The other comprised clients onto whom such fees were passed. The demand sought damages of more than $500 million. LexisNexis sought a federal court declaration that the agreement did not authorize class arbitration. The district court granted LexisNexis summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “The idea that the arbitration agreement … reflects the intent of anyone but LexisNexis is the purest legal fiction,” but the one-sided adhesive nature of the clause and the absence of a class-action right do not render it unenforceable. The court observed that Westlaw’s contract lacks any arbitration clause.View "Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

In her representation of a client charged with alien smuggling, 8 U.S.C. 1324, Migdal, an attorney who has served as an Assistant Federal Public Defender for nearly 25 years, had a number of disagreements with the federal prosecutor, who ultimately moved for sanctions against Migdal. The prosecutor failed to follow Department of Justice policy requiring supervisory approval of sanctions requests. Despite the government withdrawing the motion and indicating that it did not believe that Migdal acted in bad faith, the district court entered orders strongly publicly reprimanding Migdal. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that the record does not support any basis for the orders. View "United States v. Llanez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Letters sent between LaDeau and his incarcerated brother, David, came to the attention of authorities. The letters, written in code, allegedly communicated ways to obtain and conceal child pornography. Investigators executed a search warrant at LaDeau’s residence and discovered flash drives containing child pornography. LaDeau was indicted for possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(A), which carried a sentencing range of zero to 10 years’ imprisonment. LaDeau moved to suppress inculpatory statements and evidence seized from his home, claiming that officers had interviewed him in a hospital while he was attending to his wife and improperly coerced his responses by threatening to inform his wife about their investigation moments before she underwent life-threatening surgery. The court granted the motion; there was no longer any admissible evidence that LaDeau had possessed child pornography. Five days before the scheduled trial the government obtained a superseding indictment, adding David as a codefendant and charging both with conspiracy to receive child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, based on evidence that had been in its possession since before the initial indictment. A charge of conspiracy to possess would not have carried the same mandatory sentence. The district court held that the charging decision warranted a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, because there was a realistic likelihood of retaliation for the successful suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ladeau" on Justia Law

Phillips was indicted in 2004 on charged that he had travelled to Thailand and knowingly engaged in illicit sexual conduct (18 U.S.C. 2423(f), 2246) with a minor male, not yet 16 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act). Phillips pleaded guilty to the single count and was sentenced to 37 months in prison, followed by lifetime supervised release. Phillips was released from prison in 2007, violated several terms of his supervised release, and was sentenced to an additional 30 months. Released from his second incarceration in 2010, he unsuccessfully moved to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that PROTECT, which punishes “[e]ngaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places,” applied only to individuals who both traveled in foreign commerce and engaged in illicit sexual conduct after its enactment and that his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto clause. The district court found the motion time-barred and procedurally defaulted, noting that the illicit sexual conduct (not the travel) occurred after the enactment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “actual innocence exception,” to the limitations period should be applied only in case of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The exception cannot be so broadly defined as to be premised upon changes in statutory interpretation of the term “travels.” View "Phillips v. United States" on Justia Law

Burgess was pulled over for speeding and found to be under the influence of alcohol and a prescription drug. After failing sobriety tests, Burgess was arrested for DUI. His resistance caused officers to perform a “takedown,” a tackle to the ground, to place him in handcuffs. Burgess did not suffer any apparent injuries at the scene. Burgess’ disruptive behavior continued during transport. Upon his arrival at the jail, officers attempted to search him and also performed a takedown. The parties dispute whether Burgess was noncompliant and the effect of the takedown. Burgess asserts that he woke several hours later, with pain in his face and head, and a broken tooth. Burgess signed a “Medical Screening Form,” indicating that he had “no visible signs of trauma or illness,” and “no other medical/physical conditions of which the Jail should be aware.” After release, Burgess admitted himself into a hospital where CT scans revealed fractures that required surgery. The district court dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference, and found the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The right to be free from excessive force during booking was clearly established so that the claim should have been reviewed for reasonableness. Material facts are also in dispute on the negligence, assault, battery, loss of consortium, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and spoliation of evidence claims. View "Burgess v. Fischer" on Justia Law