Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Miller was convicted in Michigan of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. The evidence included email and instant-message conversations between Miller and her lover, Cassaday, in which Miller lied to Cassaday that she was pregnant with his children but that her husband abused her, causing her to miscarry; convinced Cassaday that her husband was involved in organized crime and that her life was in danger; and plotted her husband’s murder. Cassaday told his brother Mike that he was leaving town and that, if he did not return, Mike should look for a briefcase under Cassaday’s bed. Bruce Miller was murdered on November 9, 1999. Miller promptly ended her relationship with Cassaday and started dating someone else. Cassaday committed suicide. Mike found the briefcase and notes, which he opened in the presence of an attorney. The case contained copies of the emails and IM conversations. Its contents were admitted into evidence with evidence linking the communications to Miller’s and Cassaday’s AOL accounts. Cassaday’s suicide note was also admitted. Miller claimed that admission of the note violated her clearly established Sixth Amendment right to confront her accuser and sought habeas corpus. Following a remand, after the Supreme Court vacated an earlier decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals decision upholding the note’s admission did not violate clearly established law. View "Miller v. Stovall" on Justia Law

Gerald and his adult children, Jeremy and Ashley, grew marijuana on Gerald’s farm. As a “patient” under Michigan’s Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), Gerald was permitted to grow no more than 12 marijuana plants for personal use. His children, both registered as MMMA “patients” and “caregivers” could grow up to 72 marijuana plants apiece. In 2011, officers executed search warrants at Gerald’s farm, confiscating more than 100 marijuana plants, drug paraphernalia, and firearms. Gerald and Jeremy were charged with conspiracy to manufacture 100 or more marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846; manufacturing 100 or more marijuana plants with the intent to distribute the drug, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); and possessing a firearm in the furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government also charged Gerald as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A jury convicted them on the drug-related counts, but acquitted them on the counts related to the firearms. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in concluding that compliance with the MMMA was irrelevant to the warrant application and that the indictment did not allege a federal crime because the Duvals are registered MMMA “caregivers” and because Jeremy qualifies under the “practitioner exception” of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802(21). View "United States v. Duval" on Justia Law

The Miks sued the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), claiming that they were unlawfully evicted from their rental home after their landlord defaulted on her mortgage and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The district court dismissed, under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (12 U.S.C. 5220), which imposes certain requirements on successors in interest to foreclosed properties in order to protect tenants, but which does not provide a private right of action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the PTFA does not provide a private right of action. The PTFA does, however, preempt less protective state laws, and requires that successors in interest to foreclosed properties provide bona fide tenants with 90 days’ notice to vacate and to allow them to occupy the premises until the end of their lease term unless certain conditions are met. While tenants may not bring a federal cause of action for violations of the PTFA, they may use such violations to establish the elements of a state law cause of action. Under state law, the Miks stated a claim for wrongful eviction but did not state claims for denial of due process and outrageous infliction of emotional distress. View "Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp" on Justia Law

Reed, who suffers from seizures as the result of a motorcycle accident, filed suit based on two incidents. In the first, inside Reed’s cell at the Franklin County Corrections Center, deputies were unable to handcuff Reed for transport to a hospital following a seizure, due to his resistance. They twice used a Taser to subdue him. The incident was captured on videotape. Later that day at the hospital emergency room, a deputy used a Taser on Reed after Reed lunged at the deputy. Reed argued that the deputies used excessive force and that the county failed to train the deputies on the proper use of Tasers, creating a policy and practice of abuse. Finding that “no rational fact finder could conclude that the defendant deputies acted with conscience-shocking malice or sadism” toward Reed during either incident, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it would not put the onus on the deputies to assess the seriousness of Reed’s seizure in order to determine whether it warranted immediate medical treatment. The decision to use a Taser to subdue Reed to take him to the hospital “might have been unwise, but it was not unconstitutional.” View "Shreve v. Franklin Cnty." on Justia Law

Responding to a report of underage drinking in a home, officers found a group celebrating eighth grade graduation. Police asked the teens to step outside individually for breathalyzer testing. Seven tested positive for alcohol. Police arrested them and notified their parents. In the morning, a juvenile worker arrived at the police station, and, after speaking with a judge, indicated that the children were to be detained for a court appearance the next day. At the regional juvenile detention center, the minors underwent routine fingerprinting, mug shots, and metal-detection screening. During a hygiene inspection and health screening, they were required to disrobe completely for visual inspection to detect “injuries, physical abnormalities, scars and body markings, ectoparasites, and general physical condition.” A same-sex youth worker observed the juveniles for several minutes from a distance of one to two feet, recording findings for review by an R.N. The minors were required to shower with delousing shampoo. They were released the following day. The charges were dropped. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the juveniles, based on a “clearly established right for both adults and juveniles to be free from strip searches absent individualized suspicion” that negated a qualified immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that no clearly established principle of constitutional law forbids a juvenile detention center from implementing a generally applicable, suspicionless strip-search policy upon intake into the facility.View "T. S. v. Doe" on Justia Law

In 1993, Dr. Dargie was a student at the UT College of Medicine. In 1994, Middle Tennessee Medical Center agreed to pay Dargie’s tuition, fees, and other reasonable expenses for attending UT. After graduation and completion of his residency, Dargie was required to repay MTMC’s grant by either working as a doctor in the medically underserved community of Murfreesboro for four years or repaying two times the uncredited amount of all conditional award payments he received. MTMC paid UT $73,000 on Dargie’s behalf. After completing his medical training in 2001, Dargie chose to practice in Germantown, near Memphis. In 2002, Dargie repaid $121,440.02. In 2005, the Dargies filed an amended tax return for 2002, claiming they had “inadvertently omitted an ordinary and necessary business expense” on their Schedule C for the $121,440 repayment. The IRS disallowed the deduction under I.R.C. 162. The Dargies sued. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the repayment was a personal expense and, regardless, no deduction would be allowed under I.R.C. 265(a)(1) because the amount was allocable to income the Dargies had received tax-free. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the repayment a personal expense.View "Dargie v. United States" on Justia Law

Gentry has psoriasis, a chronic autoimmune condition causing patches of raised skin covered with flaky buildup of dead skin cells that crack and bleed and can interfere with sleeping, walking, sitting, standing, and using one’s hands. She also has psoriatic arthritis, an inflammatory disease that causes fatigue, stiffness and swelling in and around the joints, tenderness, pain and swelling in the tendons, swollen fingers and toes, and reduced range of motion. There is no cure for either condition. Gentry suffered severe injuries to her ankle, arm and wrist, and hip in a 1994 car accident and developed avascular necrosis and post-traumatic arthritis. She requires a brace on her leg to walk, has a limp and waddling gait, and has frequent pain in her leg and foot, back, neck, and hands. She also has deformities in her foot, ankylosing spondylitis cervical radiculopathy, cervical stenosis, lumbar spondylosis, possible sacroilitis or facet arthropathy in the low back, degenerative joint disease in the low back, chronic lumbar strain, possible herniated disc carpal tunnel syndrome, and lumbosacral/thoracic radiculopathy, among other things. In 2004, Gentry (age 29) applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42. U.S.C.401. She had worked 10 years as a pizza maker and delivery driver. She had most recently worked as a receptionist, but was discharged because her psoriasis bled on the paperwork. After Gentry’s application was denied, the case was remanded twice. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial as not supported by substantial evidence. View "Gentry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

In 2011 Rizzo filed a voluntary petition for personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a general discharge. Despite his discharge, the Michigan Department of Treasury sent collection letters demanding that he pay $72,286.39 in delinquent Single Business Tax that had been assessed against a company, for which Rizzo had been an officer. Rizzo filed an adversary action, contending that his personal liability for the unpaid SBT had been discharged in bankruptcy. Treasury claimed that liability for the SBT deficiency is a nondischargeable “excise tax” debt under 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(E). The bankruptcy court agreed and dismissed. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rizzo’s argument that the debt was derivative, not primary, and therefore not an excise tax. Rizzo conceded that the unpaid SBT was an “excise tax” deficiency as to the company and did not dispute that he was personally liable for the company’s unpaid tax under state law. Michigan law simply confers derivative liability upon Rizzo for precisely the same excise tax deficiency that was assessed against the company. View "Rizzo v. MI Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

Javery began working for Lucent as a software engineer in 1998 and participated in Lucent’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, qualified disability plan, administered by CIGNA. In November 2002, he reported back pain. His family doctor, Dr. Dorado, prescribed medicine and testing, and recommended some time off work. In January 2003, after Lucent transferred him from Ohio to Illinois, Javery sought treatment from another physician, Seymour. The pain worsened. In May 2005, Javery stopped working on Dr. Seymour’s advice. Lucent approved and paid short term disability benefits from until those benefits expired in November 2005. Lucent notified CIGNA that it believed Javery might be eligible for long term benefits. Javery applied, submitting extensive medical evidence of his pain and resulting cognitive impairment and of his successful application for Social Security disability benefits, but the claim was denied. In addition to claiming that Javery had not shown that he was “disabled” as that term is defined in the Plan, CIGNA claimed that Javery should be judicially estopped from pursuing his ERISA claim because Javery failed to disclose the claim in his Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy action. The district court upheld the denial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Javery v. Lucent Tech., Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan" on Justia Law