Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Jackson pleaded guilty to possessing, with the intent to distribute, more than five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The offense then carried a maximum penalty of 40 years of imprisonment. Because Jackson had two prior felony controlled-substance convictions, he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a). Because Jackson’s offense level for a career offender from the table (34) was greater than the offense level otherwise applicable (29), the career-offender offense-level applied. His criminal-history category was VI. Jackson received a reduction of three levels for acceptance of responsibility, so his final offense level was 31, resulting in a range of 188 to 235 months. In 2010, the district court, citing the “crack versus powder cocaine disparity issue,” exercised its discretion to depart downward and imposed a sentence of 150 months. Later that year, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, and the Sentencing Commission amended the crack-cocaine guidelines. Following a remand by the Sixth Circuit, the district court used the amended guidelines, noted that, were Jackson not a career offender, his new sentencing range would be 84 to 105 months, applied the offense level from the career-offender table, but reduced Jackson’s sentence below the bottom end of his amended guideline range. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to reinstate the sentence of 150 months. U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b)(2) prohibits courts from reducing a defendant’s term of imprisonment to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties. In 2011 Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager under then-existing law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of retired city employees and severance benefits, including pension benefits, for retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Retired employees sued under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied an injunction. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters later rejected Public Act 4 by referendum. Following rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for consideration of whether, under section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Public Act 4 prescribed a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude application of section 903(1) in this case; whether the emergency manager’s orders were legislative acts under the Contract Clause; whether the reductions and eliminations of health care benefits were “necessary and reasonable” under the Contract Clause; whether the retirees’ procedural due process claim is viable; and, assuming the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections apply, whether the collective bargaining agreements, considered in their entireties, establish protected property rights. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

After losing her job as an appraiser for St. Joseph County, Trayling filed a grievance with her union and a discrimination charge with the Michigan Civil Rights Department. The union refused to pursue the grievance because the collective bargaining agreement’s election-of-remedies clause prohibits use of the internal grievance process and an external process simultaneously. Trayling sued the county for age and disability discrimination, and sued the union and the county for implementing an allegedly unlawful election-of-remedies rule. The district court held that the election-of-remedies rule violated federal law. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s order granting partial summary judgment did not amount to a final decision; it did not even fully resolve the election-of-remedies claim (damages remain undecided), much less the whole case. An exception to the finality requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a), does not apply because the order did not involve an injunction. View "Trayling v. St. Joseph Cnty. Emp'rs Chapter" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party of Ohio (LPO) sought to enjoin Ohio Secretary of State Husted from enforcing Ohio Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1) and to restore its candidates to the May 2014 primary ballot. The Code requires that, to appear on the primary ballot and qualify for the general election, candidates must file petitions with (for statewide office) signatures of at least 500 qualified electors who are members of the same political party as the candidate. A petition consists of separate papers, each with signatures of electors of only one county; only one circulator can circulate each paper. Signatures must be in ink and include the location of the signer’s residence, as it appears on registration records. The circulator must note the number of signatures on each paper, and sign a statement that the circulator witnessed every signature and that, to the best of the circulator’s knowledge, each signature was that of a qualified voter and of the person whose signature it purports to be. The circulator must also identify the circulator’s name, address of permanent residence, and the name and address of the person employing the circulator to circulate the petition, if any. LPO previously successfully challenged an Ohio residency requirement for circulators. Hatchett collected signatures for LPO candidates and was paid about $2300. Hatchett, an independent contractor, believed it was unnecessary to fill in the employee information box, having circulated about 10,000 petition papers without completing that box. In response to a protest, papers submitted by Hatchett were invalidated. This was the first time enforcement of the employer disclosure requirement resulted in the disqualification of a statewide candidate. Absent a protest, practice had been not to check petitions for that disclosure. Because of the disqualification, LPO will likely lose its recognition as an Ohio political party. The district court rejected due process and First Amendment challenges to the statute. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Libertarian Party of OH v. Husted" on Justia Law