Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2011, a group of protesters calling themselves “Occupy Nashville” established an around-the-clock presence on the Nashville War Memorial Plaza, with the aim of bringing attention to disparities in wealth and power in the United States. After several weeks of occupying the Plaza, representatives of the protesters sought a meeting with state officials to discuss safety and health concerns that had developed. The state agreed and adopted a new policy that imposed a curfew for the Plaza. Those policies may have been promulgated in derogation of Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Six protesters were later arrested for violating that curfew and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against state officials, alleging violations of rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Two officials appealed the district court’s ruling that that they were not entitled to qualified immunity and were personally liable for damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state officials are protected by qualified immunity because, regardless of the specifics of Tennessee’s administrative law, the protesters’ claimed First Amendment right to unrestricted 24-hour access to the Plaza is not a clearly established constitutional right. View "Occupy Nashville v. Haslam" on Justia Law

Miller disappeared in 1988. In 1999 interviews of Miller’s associates, Lamp admitted involvement in the disappearance and led police to Miller’s remains, buried in woods near Lamp’s property. Lamp stated that he and Blackston had killed Miller with the help of Simpson. The state charged Blackston with first-degree murder. In exchange for his testimony, the state granted Simpson immunity from prosecution and permitted Lamp to plead guilty to manslaughter. No physical evidence connected Blackston to Miller’s death. The state’s case depended on testimony by Lamp and Simpson and three women friends. Lamp and Simpson described the crime. The defense noted their favorable deals and inconsistencies in their stories. The jury convicted Blackston but the judge reversed because he had misinformed the jury regarding the extent of Simpson’s immunity. Before the second trial, Zantello and Simpson prepared written statements, recanting their testimony. At trial, the judge tired of their erratic behavior, deemed Simpson and Zantello to be “unavailable” and ordered their testimony from the first trial read to the jury. The judge did not allow the recantations to be read to the jury. The testimony of all remaining witnesses was consistent with testimony at the first trial. The second jury convicted Blackston. The Michigan Supreme Court twice reversed the appeals court, finding that it was not error to exclude the recantations or that other evidence rendered any error harmless. A federal district court granted a conditional habeas writ, finding that Blackston’s rights of confrontation and due process were violated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state unreasonably abridged Blackston’s clearly established federal constitutional right. View "Blackston v. Rapelje" on Justia Law

Calhoun, a Michigan state prisoner, filed a federal habeas petition in 2003. Although the petition included only exhausted claims, Calhoun also sought to litigate some unexhausted claims and moved to stay his petition while he exhausted the additional claims in state court. The district court granted the stay on conditions that Calhoun file his additional claims in state court within 90 days of the stay order and that he return to federal court within 30 days of exhausting them. Rather than file his unexhausted claims within 90 days, he waited more than six years, until 2010, to file them in Michigan state court. The Michigan trial and appellate courts denied relief. In 2012, Calhoun returned to the district court and filed an amended petition that included his old claims from the initial petition and his newly (but tardily) exhausted claims. The district court vacated its stay as of the date it had been entered and dismissed Calhoun’s original petition and amended petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Calhoun v. Jackson" on Justia Law

F.H., born in 1994, has cerebral palsy syndrome, asthma, sleep apnea, auditory and visual limitations, and significant learning disorders; he needs a wheelchair or walker and has limited use of his hands. It is difficult for him to use the bathroom without assistance. From 2002 until 2010, F.H. attended four different Memphis City Schools (MCS) and had 11 different aides. F.H. and his mother claim that he was: frequently left unattended in the bathroom, distraught and unable to clean himself; subjected to verbal and physical abuse, on multiple occasions by aides and school personnel; returned to class with dirty underwear; and sexually abused by an aide. His mother’s claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) resulted in a Settlement Agreement. In 2012, F.H. and his mother sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), with claims of retaliation, and of breach of the Settlement Agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that claims accruing prior to the Settlement Agreement were barred by the Agreement, and that all other claims required exhaustion under the IDEA. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 did not arise under the IDEA, were not released by the Agreement, and that administrative exhaustion of these claims would be futile. The language of the Agreement and 2004 Amendments to the IDEA, make the Agreement enforceable in court, so that the breach of contract claim does not require administrative exhaustion. View "F. H. v. Memphis City Schs." on Justia Law

Fabian, a financial advisor, diverted millions of dollars to companies that he controlled. He pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and agreed to criminal forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. 853, of $4.8 million. He paid one million dollars. After U.S. Marshals inventoried his property, the district court entered an order that listed, as substitute property subject to forfeiture, real property and more than 800 items of personal property, including a collection of military trucks and equipment. Mais a victim of the fraud and member of a companies that Fabian controlled, contested the forfeiture, claiming that property in which Mais asserted a “legal interest” lacked any “nexus” to Fabian’s fraud. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under section 853(k), a third party “claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture” cannot “intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving forfeiture of such property.” Nor can third parties file a separate lawsuit to assert their interest in forfeitable property. A district court “must enter” its preliminary order of forfeiture “without regard to any third party’s interest in the property.” The sole avenue for a third party to assert an interest in forfeitable property is an ancillary proceeding under section 853(n). Mais’s petition asserted only a conclusory legal interest in the properties, which Mais conceded does not meet the requirements of 853(n)(3). View "United States v. Fabian" on Justia Law

Kathleen was a tenured professor of geology at Central Michigan University (CMU). In 2011, her husband Christopher, a CMU student, sponsored a vote of no confidence in the president and provost of the university. Shortly after, in accordance with the faculty’s collective bargaining agreement, Kathleen took a semester of sabbatical leave, agreeing to return to CMU for at least a full year following sabbatical or return any compensation received during her leave. While Kathleen was on sabbatical, she became eligible for and requested a pay supplement. Her department recommended denial. The reviewing dean agreed. Kathleen appealed, but resigned before a final decision. CMU requested that Kathleen return her sabbatical compensation. When she refused, CMU sued in state court for breach of contract. Because Christopher’s tuition had been remitted for Spring 2012 as part of Kathleen’s benefits and Kathleen was contractually obligated to repay her benefits for that semester, CMU determined that Christopher had an outstanding tuition balance and placed a hold on his transcript. The couple sued in federal court alleging retaliation because of Christopher’s role in the no-confidence resolution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether CMU filed suit against Kathleen and placed a hold on Christopher’s transcript in retaliation for Christopher’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. CMU, as represented by its president in his official capacity, cannot shield itself from liability by invoking qualified immunity.View "Benison v. Ross" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals arrived at Krause’s Redford home on December 12, 2008 with a warrant for Krause’s arrest for felony possession of more than 50 grams of cocaine. When Krause saw the Marshals, he slammed the door shut and ran into a bedroom. The Marshals followed. One entered the bedroom but left when he found Krause standing in the corner pointing a handgun at him. As the others took up positions around the bedroom, they again announced themselves and explained they had a warrant for his arrest. Krause told them he had multiple guns and would kill anyone who tried to enter. A negotiator began talking to Krause from the hallway outside the open bedroom door. They talked for about eight hours. Sometimes Krause yelled and screamed; sometimes he “got very quiet.” Officers brought in Krause’s father and girlfriend to talk to Krause, without success. Eventually, the officers used a “flash bang” device in an effort to stun Krause. In the seconds that followed, Krause fired a shot at the officers; an officer fatally shot Krause in response. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The decisions to use a flash bang and to shoot Krause were reasonable, not “reckless,”View "Krause v. Jones" on Justia Law

Using the ARES Peer-to-Peer network, DHS agents downloaded child pornography images from Mabee's Internet address six times in 2012. Agents confronted Mabee at his home and Mabee admitted that he used the ARES software to download child pornography. Forensic examiners recovered at least 73 images and 14 videos, as well as evidence that Mabee had “searched extensively for child pornography using the ARES program.” All of the videos and one of the images had been stored so that they were available for other ARES users to download from Mabee’s computer. Mabee pleaded guilty to a distribution count; other counts were dismissed under Mabee’s Rule 11 plea agreement. Mabee admitted that he knew that the child pornography he had downloaded was available to other ARES users. There was no agreement as to Sentencing Guidelines factors or the appropriate guideline range. Mabee appealed his 121-month sentence arguing that the court misapplied a five-level offense level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(B)), for “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain.” Mabee argued that the record showed only that he used ARES to download and store child pornography, and there was no evidence that he engaged in trading of images with others. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court could have relied on circumstantial evidence in the record that Mabee made his own computer files available because he expected to receive additional pornography from others.View "United States v. Mabee" on Justia Law

In 1991 Loza shot and killed four members of his pregnant girlfriend’s family. An Ohio jury convicted him of four counts of aggravated murder and he was sentenced to death. Ohio state courts affirmed Loza’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal and denied him post-conviction relief. Loza filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning: refusal to suppress statements Loza made to a detective shortly after the detective encountered Loza on the day of his arrest; the voluntariness and admissibility of his confession; exclusion of the testimony of a clinical psychologist, at the guilt phase of trial; the court’s charge to the jury concerning inability to reach a decision; and failure to inform Loza, after his arrest, that he had a right to contact the Mexican consulate.View "Loza v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Prater was convicted as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Prater’s presentence report determined that U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 provided the base offense level; because Prater had at least two prior felony convictions for “crimes of violence,” his base offense level was 24 The report also determined that Prater qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), because he had at least three separated convictions for a “violent felony,” which subjected Prater to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years of imprisonment. It also raised Prater’s offense level to 33, under 4B1.4(b)(3)(B). The presentence report assigned Prater 20 criminal-history points, which corresponded to a criminal-history category of VI. An offense level of 33 and a criminal-history category of VI resulted in a guideline range of 235–293 months of imprisonment. The report identified four New York predicate convictions qualifying Prater as an armed career offender: a 1980 conviction for attempted third-degree burglary; a 1988 conviction for third-degree robbery; a separate 1988 conviction for third-degree burglary; and a 2000 conviction for attempted third-degree burglary. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence because the court did not apply the Supreme Court’s “modified categorical approach” to determine whether the version of the crimes for which Prater was convicted qualified as violent felonies.View "United States v. Prater" on Justia Law