Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Thompson signed a $354,800 mortgage note with AME as the lender. Several sections of the note and deed of trust noted AME’s intent to transfer the note. Its signature page contains a signed, undated stamp memorializing AME’s transfer to Countrywide and another signed, undated endorsement from Countrywide to blank. BOA purchased Countrywide and has the note. In 2012, BOA offered to short-sell her house in lieu of foreclosure. Thompson requested modification of her repayment terms under the HAMP program (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. 5201), that gives lenders incentives to offer modifications to borrowers with a payment-to-income ratio over 31%. Thompson claims that she complied with numerous document requests. BOA never granted her application. She sued BOA, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, and unidentified persons she believes to be the note’s true owners, claiming: that BOA falsely induced her to sign the mortgage by pretending it was an actual lender; that her title is clouded by the note’s transfer; and that BOA fraudulently induced her to seek modification, knowing it lacked authority to modify her terms or intending to drive her into foreclosure. The district court dismissed for failure to comply with pleading standards. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Welch entered a plea agreement to charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government withdrew the plea agreement upon receipt of the presentence report, which recommended that Welch be sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) because he had three convictions for a “violent felony.” The district court found that Welch’s conviction in Ohio state court for attempted failure to comply with order or signal of police officer constituted a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, and that Welch therefore had three convictions for a violent felony. The other two qualifying convictions were uncontested. Welch entered a plea of guilty but preserved his right to appeal his ACCA mandatory minimum of 180 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. An attempt to commit third-degree felony failure to comply, as a categorical matter, presents a serious potential risk of physical injury that is comparable to that involved in arson and burglary. View "United States v. Welch" on Justia Law

Keathley retired from working at strip mines. His health deteriorated. He sought Black Lung Benefits Act benefits, 30 U.S.C. 901. Keathley established eligibility under the 15 -year presumption; he had worked in mines for more than 16 years and was able to show a totally disabling impairment by medical opinion testimony and tests showing poor pulmonary function. His employer rebutted this presumption by offering testimony by Dr. Broudy, who diagnosed Keathley with “a combination of chronic obstructive asthma and pulmonary emphysema and chronic bronchitis” caused by smoking. Conceding that “coal dust may have contributed,” Broudy concluded that “it’s far more likely that the impairment was due to obstructive airways disease from cigarette smoking and some predisposition to asthma or bronchospasm.” On remand, the ALJ awarded benefits; the Benefits Review Board affirmed, rejecting Broudy’s opinion that “bronchitis associated with coal dust exposure usually ceases with cessation of exposure,” as contrary to federal regulations, which state that “pneumoconiosis” may be “latent and progressive” and arise after exposure ceases. The Sixth Circuit denied the employer’s petition for review. The employer did not challenge the evaluation of individual tests, identify any factor the ALJ overlooked, or offer any basis for distinguishing among the tests. View "Sunny Ridge Mining Co., Inc. v. Keathley" on Justia Law

Debtors filed their bankruptcy petition on July 30, 2013. The first date set for the meeting of creditors was August 29, 2013. Under 11 U.S.C. 523(c), the deadline for objecting to discharge was October 28. On October 29, Creditor filed an Extension Motion, alleging that his counsel had suffered a disabling brain injury in a car wreck on September 4 and had hired a newparalegal “on or about” the week of the deadline. Following a hearing, the bankruptcy court “agreed” that it “does not have the discretion to grant the requested extension” but also stated that “the deadline governing the filing of dischargeability complaints is not jurisdictional in nature, but rather, is subject to the court’s equitable authority.” In denying the Extension Motion, it found that there was “no allegation that the Debtor engaged in any conduct which prevented the Creditor from filing a timely motion to extend the time within which to file a dischargeability complaint.” After the Creditor filed deficient briefing, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed denial of the Extension Motion. The court noted that Creditor’s counsel had not provided any facts to support his claims. View "In re: Doyne" on Justia Law

In 1999, 76-year-old Dorothy Brown was found murdered in her Cleveland apartment, having suffered blunt-trauma injuries to the head. She was partially clothed, and foreign human pubic hairs were collected from her mouth. Ayers spent 12 years in prison based on a state-court murder conviction for Brown’s murder that was later overturned. He was freed in 2011 after the Sixth Circuit granted his habeas corpus petition, finding that the detectives leading the investigation (Cipo and Kovach) had violated Ayers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by using a fellow inmate to induce Ayers to make allegedly incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. Ayers filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Cipo, Kovach, and others, alleging a Brady violation and malicious prosecution. The district court denied Cipo and Kovach’s motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, and a jury found in favor of Ayers and awarded $13 million in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to address the denial of summary judgment, denial of a preverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the evidence, and denial of a motion in limine to exclude certain expert testimony because those arguments were procedurally forfeited. View "Ayers v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law