Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sweet and Cook stole 32 firearms from two licensed firearms dealers. Arrested separately, days later, Sweet admitted that he sold two guns to his “dope dealer” for $200 plus three rocks of cocaine base and that he and Cook sold eight firearms for $500 and four grams of heroin. Cook helped authorities retrieve nine firearms that were hidden. Both pled guilty to two counts of theft of firearms from a licensed dealer, 18 U.S.C. 924(m). Presentence Investigation Reports recommended a base offense level of 20 (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)) for each, and enhancements: six levels (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)), because the theft involved 32 firearms; two levels (2K2.1(b)(4)(A)), because the firearms were stolen; four levels (2K2.1(b)(5)) because they trafficked firearms; and four levels (2K2.1(b)(6)(B)), because the firearms were used in connection with another felony, distribution of heroin. Both contended that the 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement did not apply because the firearms did not facilitate the drug offense and that application of both 2K2.1(b)(5) and 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) constituted double counting because they were based on the same conduct, firearms trafficking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancements, which address different aspects of the same action: selling firearms and purchasing drugs. Each could have occurred without the other. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 created an arbitration procedure for automobile dealerships to seek continuation or reinstatement of franchise agreements that had been terminated by Chrysler during bankruptcy proceedings, with the approval of the bankruptcy court. After an arbitral decision favoring the dealer, the manufacturer was required to provide the dealer a “customary and usual letter of intent” to enter into a sales and service agreement. After arbitrations, a trial was held to determine whether Chrysler supplied each prevailing dealer with such a letter. Most of the rejected dealers reached settlements with New Chrysler. The court determined that the remaining dealers had received “customary and usual” letters. The Sixth Circuit agreed that section 747 does not constitute an unconstitutional legislative reversal of a federal court judgment and that the only relief it provides to successful dealers is the issuance of a letter of intent. The letters at issue were “customary and usual,” except one contractual provision that required reversal. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion application Michigan and Nevada state dealer acts is preempted by section 747, because those acts provide for redetermination of factors directly addressed in federally-mandated arbitrations closely related to a major federal bailout. View "Chrysler Grp. LLC v. Sowell Auto., Inc." on Justia Law

Officers learned that a school-bus driver had reported that a man was approaching young girls. The man was described as black, with medium-toned skin and short hair, driving a black GMC SUV on Euclid Avenue between Rally’s restaurant and Eastham Avenue. Officers arrived within a minute, drove into an area parking lot, and saw a dark grey GMC SUV with Gatson, a black male with short hair and medium-brown skin in the driver’s seat. The officers noticed that Gatson’s speech was slurred and his movements sluggish. He admitted that he had been drinking and talking to young girls. Officers asked for identification, then saw Gatson push something between his seat and center console. With Gatson locked in the police cruiser, they walked around the SUV and saw a pistol handle protruding from between the seat and console. Indicted as a misdemeanant with a domestic-violence conviction and a felon (arson) in possession of a firearm, Gatson moved to suppress evidence of the pistol. The district court denied the motion and determined that Gatson was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum under the ACCA. Gatson’s Guidelines range was, therefore, 180 to 210 months. Following his guilty plea, the court sentenced Gatson to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress and the sentence View "United States v. Gatson" on Justia Law

LVNV buys uncollectable debts at a discount and pays Northland Group to collect them. LVNV purchased a debt of Buchanan’s and assigned it to Northland for collection. Northland sent Buchanan a letter, proposing to “settle” the balance of $4,768.43 for a payment of $1,668.96. The letter did not disclose that the Michigan six-year statute of limitations had run on the debt or that a partial payment on a time-barred debt restarts the statute-of-limitations clock under Michigan law. Buchanan alleged that the letter falsely implied that Northland held a legally enforceable obligation. Buchanan filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p.The district court rejected Buchanan’s discovery request and dismissed, concluding that Northland’s letter was not misleading as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the term “settlement” is one of “equivocal meaning” and that an unsophisticated debtor who cannot afford the settlement offer might nevertheless assume from the letter that some payment is better than no payment. View "Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1992, Fugate, receiving workers’ compensation, obtained disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. In such cases, SSA reduces payments until the total benefits equal 80 percent of the recipient's “average current earnings.” Using Fugate’s December 1991 pay stub, SSA calculated “one-twelfth of the total of his wages . . . for the calendar year in which he had the highest such wages,” on which FICA taxes are paid. Fugate had 1991 gross earnings of $22,964.41. After subtracting pretax benefits and retirement contributions (not subject to FICA), SSA calculated his covered earnings as $21,693.30. Fugate complained that SSA should have used pay stubs from his three highest months of earnings in 1991. In 2004, after a periodic review, SSA erroneously determined that Fugate’s covered earnings should have been $22,964.41 and paid Fugate an extra $8,875. In 2006, after another periodic review, SSA realized its mistake and asked Fugate to refund the $8,875. Instead of requesting a refund waiver, Fugate sought reconsideration of calculation of benefits for the same reasons he had cited since 1993. An ALJ declined to reconsider the 2004 decision, but erroneously held that Fugate was entitled to a waiver even though he had not requested one. Fugate nonetheless appealed. The Appeals Council vacated. The district court granted the Administration summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Fugate v. Comm'r of Social Sec." on Justia Law

Coppenger pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mortgage fraud. Coppenger initiated the scheme and worked with mortgage officers and straw buyers, resulting in a loss of more than $32 milion. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the government agreed not to recommend a sentence in excess of the applicable advisory Guidelines range, which was 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. Nonetheless, the district court used information in presentence report prepared for Coppenger’s co-conspirators to vary upward and sentenced Coppenger to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that the district court failed to provide him with notice and opportunity to respond to its intent to vary upward based on information contained in co-conspirators’ presentence reports, which was unavailable to his defense. View "United States v. Coppenger" on Justia Law

Security guards at MotorCity Casino sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime provision, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). They claimed they worked five, eight-hour shifts per week, escorting cash, monitoring the casino floor, and listening to two-way radios. They were required to attend an uncompensated 15-minute meeting before every shift. A guard working an eight-hour shift was entitled to a paid, 30-minute meal period. Guards could not leave casino property, have food delivered, or receive visitors; they spent meal periods in a cafeteria, where free food and drinks were available, or walking along an outdoor path. Guards had to listen to their radios and, if they heard the code, respond to an emergency. Guards who lost meal time responding to an emergency were entitled to have the time made up. Emergencies rarely interrupted meal periods. Guards had to focus on the radio chatter to know if an emergency required occurred, but were able to eat, socialize, and use their phones. The court held that meal periods were non-compensable, that monitoring the radio was a de minimis activity, not a substantial job duty, and that MotorCity could offset paid meal time against time in unpaid, but compensable, meetings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find that the meal periods predominantly benefitted the casino. View "Ruffin v. MotorCity Casino" on Justia Law

Under a 2007 “Purchase Agreement – Public Sale” Eagle agreed to pay $4,812,874.65 to purchase Louisville property owned by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet. Eagle paid a good faith deposit of $962,574.93 to “KY STATE TREASURER.” The Agreement was assigned by Eagle to Shelbyville Road Shoppes, the debtor. Two days before the expiration of an 18-month extension to close the transaction, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy trustee unsuccessfully sought return of the good faith deposit from the Cabinet. The bankruptcy court found that neither the Agreement nor state law granted the debtor the right to have the deposit returned. The district court affirmed, finding: that the debtor had no right to possess or use the deposit prior to filing for relief, so the trustee had no right to request turnover under section 542; that the deposit was not held in escrow; that the transaction was not a contract for deed; and that the debtor did not retain an equitable right to the deposit as a vendee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The debtor did not possess either a legal or an equitable property interest in the deposit at the time of the Chapter 7 petition. View "Lawrence v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Federal agents located a computer downloading child pornography videos using peer-to-peer software that enabled the user to access other computers and vice versa. They executed a search warrant on Walters’ neighbors’ house based on the ISP billing address. The neighbor had shared his internet password with Walters. Walters consented to a search, stating that if there was anything on the computer, they could erase it and it would not happen again. The agents recovered multiple pornographic videos. Walters admitted to downloading pornographic images through the network and that he knew others could obtain child pornography from him. Walters estimated that during one year, he had viewed 500 videos depicting girls, aged five to 14, having sex with an adult male. Walters pleaded guilty to knowingly receiving and distributing child pornography and knowingly possessing a computer containing child pornography. At sentencing, Walters objected to enhancements as impermissible double counting: two level s for “distribution”; four levels for “sadistic, masochistic or other violent images”; and two level s for “use of a computer.” The court assigned a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, with a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, and sentenced Walters to 151 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting due process and double jeopardy arguments. View "United States v. Walters" on Justia Law