Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ohio individuals and businesses sued Duke Energy, alleging violation of the Robinson-Patman Act , 15 U.S.C. 13, Ohio's Pattern of Corrupt Activity Act, a civil RICO claim, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), and common-law claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs alleged that Duke, through subsidiaries and an affiliated company, paid unlawful and substantial rebates to certain large customers, including General Motors, in exchange for the withdrawal by said customers of objections to a rate-stabilization plan that Duke was attempting to have approved by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio as part of a transition to market-based pricing under Ohio Rev. Code 4928.05, enacted in 1999. The district court dismissed, finding that it was deprived of federal question jurisdiction by the filed-rate doctrine, requiring that common carriers and their customers adhere to tariffs filed and approved by the appropriate regulatory agencies, and that PUCO had exclusive jurisdiction over state-law claims, depriving the court of diversity jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the filed-rate doctrine applies only in challenges to the underlying reasonableness or setting of filed rates and that plaintiffs adequately stated claims. View "Williams v. Duke Energy Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are among the world’s largest purchasers of air conditioning and refrigeration copper tubing. Defendants imported ACR copper into the U.S. In 2003 the Commission of the European Communities found that defendants and other conspired on prices targets and other terms for industrial tubes and allocated customers and market shares in violation of European law. The findings did not identify any conspiratorial agreements with respect to U.S. markets. In 2004, another EC decision found violation in the market for plumbing tubes. Plaintiff claimed that the European conspiracy was also directed at the U.S. market for ACR industrial tubes, violating the Sherman Act and the Tennessee Trade Practices Act. Two similar cases, involving different plaintiffs, had been dismissed. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the complaint adequately stated a claim under the Sherman Act and was not barred by the Act's limitations period, 15 U.S.C. 15b and that the court had personal jurisdiction. The fact that the complaint borrows its substance from the EC decision and then builds on the EC’s findings does not render its allegations any less valid.

A 1998 settlement (MSA), between states and large tobacco companies (OPMs) included incentives for non-parties to join, but OPMs retained the most favorable payment terms. The MSA permitted states to enact statutes requiring nonparticipants to make deposits into escrows to be held for 25 years, in case a state obtained a future judgment against that nonparticipant. The MSA ensured that OPMs retained favored treatment over other participants. Plaintiff entered the market in 2000, as a nonparticipant, paying into state escrow accounts. As escrow payments became more burdensome, Plaintiff joined the MSA after negotiating a back-payment and future payments. During negotiations, defendants denied Plaintiff information about payment reductions granted to grandfathered companies. Plaintiff, unhappy with the disparate treatment and unable to meet its obligations, was unable to negotiate better terms because of an MSA provision that would entitle other participants to more favorable terms if such terms were granted to a late-joiner. Plaintiff sued tobacco manufacturers and attorneys general, alleging antitrust (15 U.S.C. 1, 3 (a)) and constitutional violations. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Manufacturer defendants were immunized under the Noerr-Pennington and state-action doctrines. Plaintiff's waivers were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, regardless of representations made during negotiations.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent local exchange carriers to lease to new competitive LECs, unbundled, at cost, facilities and services (elements) that the FCC deems necessary to provide local telephone service, 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(3), (d)(2). Section 271 requires "Bell operating" companies that seek to provide long-distance service, such as AT&T, to make available a competitive checklist of services to facilitate competition in the local phone service market. In response to regulatory developments, Kentucky competitive LECs asked the state commission to require AT&T to continue de-listed elements. The commission agreed. A district court enjoined enforcement and ordered the commission to calculate the amount a competitive LEC owed AT&T for services obtained at the unlawfully imposed rate. The commission issued another order requiring AT&T to provide de-listed elements at a regulated rate. The court entered another injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding conclusions that the commission may not require continued unbundling of de-listed elements; that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide to competitive LECs equipment known as a line splitter; and that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide unbundled access to high-speed fiber-optic loops in new service areas. LECs, upon request, must package unbundled network elements provided under section 251 with elements mandated only by section 271

In 2007, plaintiff, a carpet dealer, settled state law claims against a competing dealer and a manufacturer, alleging slander and refusal to deal arising from a 1998 agreement between the defendants. The federal district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, based on continuing refusal to deal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiff adequately alleged an ongoing conspiracy to restrain trade and that the defendants acted on their agreement after the settlement. Although the lawsuit was a plausible alternative reason for refusal to deal, conspiracies are presumed to be ongoing and the allegation was sufficient for the pleadings stage. The 2007 settlement did not bar the claims because it did not effectuate a withdrawal from the conspiracy. The defendants took no actions inconsistent with a continuing conspiracy.

Plaintiff alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a), prohibition on selling the same product to different buyers at different prices, by a manufacturer of mowing equipment and a distributor/retailer of that equipment. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, courts may no longer accept conclusory allegations that do not include specific facts necessary to establish the cause of action. The new "plausibility" standard is particularly difficult for the plaintiff in this case, because only the defendants have access to the pricing information necessary to show discriminatory pricing, but the plaintiff may not use discovery to obtain those facts. The plaintiff did not have sufficient facts to establish the manufacturer's control of the distributor to proceed under the "indirect purchaser" doctrine.

The real estate multiple listing service (MLS) website policy prohibited distribution of information about exclusive agency and other nontraditional listings to public advertising sites through its feeds. The FTC determined that the prohibition was an anti-competitive policy in violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after conducting a full rule-of-reason analysis. The MLS is a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" between competing brokers. The policy gave rise to potential genuine adverse effects on competition due to the MLS's substantial market power, the lack of substitutes for its service, and the policy's anticompetitive nature; the policy actually caused actual anti-competitive effects by narrowing information and choices available to consumers and reducing the number of discount-commission listings. Proffered pro-competitive justifications were insufficient to overcome a prima facie case of adverse impact.