Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Jackson filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy petition. His mortgagee (BOA), sought relief from the stay; abandonment of his residence, a condominium; and in rem relief for two years under 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(4)(B), alleging a substantial arrearage and prior bankruptcy filings that included the Condominium as scheduled property. The court granted the motion. BOA and Jackson entered into a loan modification agreement. The owners’ association (Carlton House) sought a permanent in rem order. The court stated that post-petition amounts were current “and the issue seems to be the desire to move forward with the foreclosure for the outstanding [pre-petition] approximately $5,900.” The court entered a two-year in rem sanction. Jackson received his discharge; the case was closed. Carlton House immediately went to state court to schedule a sheriff’s sale--the final step in a foreclosure action commenced in 2008 by BOA’s predecessor. Carlton House and the lender had obtained a foreclosure decree in 2009. The bankruptcy court reopened the case, concluded that Carlton House violated discharge order by scheduling the sale, awarded monetary sanctions, and enjoined re-scheduling of the sale. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, noting that Carlton House has statutory obligations to other unit owners. The bankruptcy court effectively imposed an “equity requirement” that is not part of the Ohio foreclosure sale process. View "In re: Jackson" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in July 2014, listing a debt for delinquent property taxes, “oversecured” by a lien, so that 11 U.S.C. 506(b), authorizes payment of interest. Debtor’s plan proposed 12% interest under Tenn. Code 67-5-2010(a)(1) which provides: To the amount of tax due and payable, a penalty of one-half of one percent (0.5%) and interest of one percent (1%) shall be added on March 1, following the tax due date and on the first day of each succeeding month, except as otherwise provided in regard to municipal taxes.” Metro argued that the proper interest rate was 18% under Subsection 67-5-2010(d): For purposes of any claim in a bankruptcy proceeding pertaining to delinquent property taxes, the assessment of penalties determined pursuant to this section constitutes the assessment of interest (effective July 1, 2014) Subsection (d) was a response to an earlier decision that a 6% annual penalty under Subsection (a)(1) was not allowed under 11 U.S.C. 506(b). The bankruptcy court agreed with Debtor’s assertion that the rate should be 12%, holding that Subsection (d) directly conflicted with the bankruptcy statutes and “a well-defined federal policy that post-petition penalties that might otherwise be owed to secured creditors are simply not paid in bankruptcy cases.” The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, holding that Subsection (d) is not applicable to determine the interest rate under 11 U.S.C. 511, and did not address whether Subsection (d) is constitutional. View "In re: Mildred Bratt" on Justia Law

The Hargers were Jones’ neighbors. Police reports indicate that there were issues between the neighbors for several years. Grad worked for CarMeds, ostensibly owned by Jones’ mother and run by Jones, occasionally visiting Jones’ home. Grad claimed to have been assaulted after such a meeting. At the police station, Grad identified Harger from a photo line-up. Ultimately, charges were dropped. The Hargers sued Grad and Jones, asserting conspiracy to have Harger falsely arrested. Meanwhile, Jones filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Hoover, the Hargers’ attorney, moved to modify the automatic stay and filed an adversary complaint, alleging that Jones's debt was non-dischargeable and seeking denial of discharge based on the assertion that Jones lied about the ownership of CarMeds. The bankruptcy court later dismissed the adversary proceeding on the Hargers’ motion, and set a hearing sua sponte, directing the Hargers and Hoover to show that they had reasonable grounds for filing. The court found that Hoover violated Rule 9011 by filing without specific evidence and made intentional misrepresentations in his filings; directed him to pay $26,000 in attorneys’ fees; revoked Hoover’s electronic bankruptcy filing authority; and referred the matter for possible prosecution. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings ;erred as a matter of law in awarding fees on a sua sponte basis; and abused its discretion in imposing any sanctions. View "In re: Jones" on Justia Law

Village Green owes FNMA $8.6 million under loan agreements executed when it purchased a Memphis apartment building. Village missed its $55,000 payment in December 2009; four months later it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court stayed creditor actions, 11 U.S.C. 362(a), preventing FNMA from foreclosing on the building, which is worth $5.4 million and is Village’s only bankruptcy. Village’s only other creditors are its former lawyer and accountant. (minor claims) Village’s proposed reorganization plan called for paying down FNMA’s claim slowly, leaving a balance of $6.6 million after 10 years (foreclosure would reduce its balance to $3.2 million immediately) The plan would strip FNMA of protections in the loan agreements: requirements that Village properly maintain and insure the building. Village would pay the minor claims in full, but in two payments ($1,200 each) over 60 days. That 60-day delay, the court held, meant that those claims were “impaired,” so that the minor claimants’ acceptance would satisfy the requirement that “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,” 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(10). The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan. The district court vacated. Following a second remand, the bankruptcy court dismissed the case and lifted the automatic stay. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the plan was an artifice to circumvent the Code requirement and was not proposed in good faith. View "Village Green I, GP v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Assoc." on Justia Law

Martin filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on January 28. On April 9, the Pecks sought relief from stay to continue state court litigation against Martin. On April 29, the Pecks filed an adversary proceeding seeking nondischargeability of a debt stemming from the same litigation. The court indicated that it would grant relief from stay, noting that the state court discovery process was further along; additional parties are involved in that case; and the Pecks had requested a jury trial. On July 7, the bankruptcy court granted relief from the stay, holding the adversary proceeding in abeyance. On July 17, Martin timely filed notice of appeal. On July 22, Martin sought a stay pending appeal in the bankruptcy court. The Pecks filed opposition. On October 5, Martin filed his appellate brief. The Pecks filed their brief on November 5. Martin filed his reply brief on November 23, requesting oral argument. On November 19, before obtaining a ruling from the bankruptcy court and before completion of briefing, Martin moved, in the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, for stay pending appeal. On November 30, the Pecks filed a response and the bankruptcy court denied a stay. On December 11, Martin filed an “Emergency” second motion for stay pending appeal. The Panel declined oral argument and affirmed relief from the automatic stay. View "In re: Daniel Martin, Sr." on Justia Law

MERV, an LLC formed to purchase and operate an antique mall, encountered difficulties paying its mortgage loan and entered into a forbearance agreement with the Bank. MERV later defaulted and filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition. Although a plan of reorganization was confirmed, MERV again defaulted. The Bank foreclosed its mortgage on the property. Before the bankruptcy case closed, MERV retained special counsel and filed an adversary proceeding against some of its founders and the Bank. The claims against the Bank alleged breach of contract, “facilitation of fraud and theft”, and equitable subordination of the Bank’s claim. MERV sought punitive damages. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment, agreeing with the Bank that MERV had executed a release of all of the claims as part of the forbearance agreement. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, finding that the Bank offered prima facie evidence of a complete affirmative defense to the complaint by showing that MERV executed a Release of all claims. MERV did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of that Release. MERV did not file a motion or a Rule 56(d) affidavit or declaration with the bankruptcy court requesting more time for discovery. View "In re: MERV Props., LLC" on Justia Law

A Chapter 7 petition was filed against Connolly in 2001. Shapiro, then the bankruptcy trustee, initiated an adversary proceeding. In 2007, the bankruptcy court concluded that Shapiro and his attorney had breached their discovery obligations due to gross negligence and dismissed Shapiro’s claims with prejudice. Connolly’s unsecured creditors, including Coface, successfully sought to remove Shapiro as trustee. French, Shapiro’s successor, then commenced an adversary proceeding against Shapiro, his law firm, and his professional-liability insurer. The parties reached a court-approved settlement. The bankruptcy court recognized that at least some of the work that Coface paid its attorneys to do substantially benefitted the bankruptcy estate and the unsecured creditors, and contributed greatly to a significant increase in funds that unsecured creditors would receive. Coface sought reimbursement of $164,336.28 in attorney fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. 503(b). The bankruptcy court denied Colface’s motion. The district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that administrative expenses are allowable in these circumstances under section 503(b) in a Chapter 7 case. Denying creditors reimbursement of administrative expenses in such circumstances would disincentivize participation in the bankruptcy process and would impugn the fundamental notion of bankruptcy as equitable relief View "Coface Argentina v. McDermott" on Justia Law

The Debtors’ chapter 13 plan provided for cure of any defaults and maintenance of regular monthly mortgage payments on real property, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(5). The Bank failed to file a proof of claim and did not receive any disbursements for the mortgage debts. After their chapter 13 discharge, the Debtors sought a determination that the Bank’s liens had been discharged. The bankruptcy court determined that the liens had passed through the bankruptcy, but that the amount of debt secured by each should be reduced by the amount that the Bank would have been paid if it had filed proofs of claim. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the reduction of the debt amount. Although a secured creditor is not required to file a proof of claim to preserve its lien, its failure to do so affects its right to payment under a chapter 13 plan. The Debtors or the Trustee could have filed a proof of claim on the Bank’s behalf, so that the Debtors would not have exited bankruptcy in default on the debt. Excess cash of more than $9,000 was returned to the Debtors after the plan was consummated. If the decision to reduce the debt were affirmed, the Debtors would gain a windfall. View "In re: Matteson" on Justia Law

Henry filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition, without counsel. The Trustee objected to confirmation of his plan, arguing that the repayment period exceeded five years and was too speculative; there was no evidence Henry would be able to meet the required payments. Henry agreed to have his original plan denied and was allowed to remedy errors by filing an amended plan by January 22, 2015. Henry maintains that an amended plan was mailed to the Bankruptcy Court on January 22, 2015. The Court never received an amended plan, nor did the Trustee. The Trustee submitted an order for dismissal, which was entered on February 4. Henry received the order on February 9, and immediately went to the Bankruptcy Court and filed amended schedules and an appeal. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Trustee was extremely thorough in explaining what was expected and what to file; Henry was receiving communications from the Bankruptcy Court through traditional mail. If there was any doubt that the documents would arrive through the mail, he should have made arrangements to present the documents physically to the Court. Filing requirements and deadlines are necessary to an orderly bankruptcy process. View "In re: Henry" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and listed Dennison, Ohio as the mailing address on the petition, but listed Debtor’s residence as 2035 First Street, Dock 9, Sandusky, Ohio. This location is the dock slip where Debtor kept his boat. Debtor listed the boat on Schedule B as “residential boat 46 foot 1988 SeaRayBoat.” On schedule C, Debtor claimed the boat exempt pursuant to Ohio’s homestead exemption. In July 2012, Debtor’s 38-year marriage ended. As part of the dissolution, Debtor transferred real property to his ex-wife, including their former marital home. Debtor asserts that after the dissolution of his marriage3 he moved into his boat and began using it as his full-time residence. The mailing address on the petition is Debtor’s former marital home, now belonging to and occupied by his ex-wife. The Trustee timely filed an objection and sought turnover of the boat. The bankruptcy court held that “the Chapter 7 Trustee has met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Sea Ray boat was not Debtor’s residence at the time of filing. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel agreed that the Ohio homestead exemption cannot be claimed on the vessel and ordered turnover of the boat. View "In re: Aubiel" on Justia Law