Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

SEW operated 113 franchise Waffle House restaurants when it filed its Chapter 11 petition in 2008. From January, 2005, to the Petition Date, SEW did not pay federal income tax withholding, social security (FICA), or unemployment (FUTA) taxes or timely file returns. During four years before the Petition Date, the IRS assessed penalties of more than $1,500,000. SEW subsequently made payments that were applied to its tax obligations and also made undesignated prepetition payments that were applied in partial satisfaction of the assessed penalties. SEW later sought recovery of prepetition tax penalty payments of $637,652.07 or an offset against the tax amounts still owed. SEW alleged that payment of these penalties provided no value to SEW; that SEW did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Penalty Payments; that at the time that of the payments, SEW was insolvent; and cited 11 U.S.C. 548 and 544. The government argued that dollar-for-dollar reduction in SEW’s antecedent tax-penalty liabilities constituted reasonably equivalent value. SEW did not allege that the penalty obligations were themselves avoidable. The Bankruptcy court dismissed SEW’s adversary petition for failure to state a clam. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "SE Waffles, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court held that fees owed to a court-appointed guardian ad litem constitute a “domestic support obligation” under Section 101(14A) of the Bankruptcy Code and are, therefore, a nondischargeable debt under Section 523(a)(5) of the Code. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Kassicieh" on Justia Law

In 2000-2001Alioto spent several hundred thousand dollars of his own money on expenses relating to a new business (BRT) involving use of “celebrity talent” to create internet advertising. Alioto became involved in BRT after being approached by the actor, John Ratzenberger, and claims that he believed he would be reimbursed by Ratzenberger for funds expended on behalf of the business, but was never fully repaid. Alioto filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing $341,363 outstanding loans owed to him from BRT as part of his assets. Alioto sought to deduct the unreimbursed funds as losses for tax year 2005 and to carry forward some of these losses as deductions for tax years 2006 and 2007. The IRS denied the deductions and issued notices of deficiency. The Tax Court agreed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding determinations that any business losses occurred prior to 2005, 26 U.S.C. 165(a) and that the losses did not amount to theft under section 165 (e). View "Alioto v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Al-Mansoob filed a lawsuit concerning a traffic accident in July 2009. When he instituted Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings two months later, he did not list his claims against Malloy and Wilburn Archer Trucking, Inc. (Defendants), among his assets, but did list a suit against State Farm, arising out of the same accident. Upon learning of the omission, Defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that Al-Mansoob was judicially estopped from pursuing the claims. Relying on a Sixth Circuit case decided a few days before Al-Mansoob filed his response, the district court granted the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that judicial estoppel should not apply to the trustee, who had been substituted as real party in interest, and that Al-Mansoob’s failure to disclose the case was inadvertent in any event. View "Al-Mansoob v. Malloy" on Justia Law

Stone owned STM, which owed Fifth Third about $1 million, secured by liens on business assets and on Stone’s house. Stone’s attorney, Atherton, introduced Stone to Waldman, a potential investor. Stone did not know that Atherton was indebted to Waldman and had given Waldman STM’s proprietary business data. Atherton filed STM’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to preserve assets so that Waldman could acquire them. Atherton allowed the automatic stay to expire. Fifth Third foreclosed, obtaining judgments and a lien on Stone’s house. Waldman paid Fifth Third $900,000 for the bank’s rights. Waldman and Atherton offered to pay off Stone’s debts and employ him in exchange for STM’s assets and told Stone to sign documents without reading them, to meet a filing deadline. The documents actually transferred all STM assets exchange for a job. Ultimately, Waldman owned all STM assets and Stone’s indebtedness, with no obligation to forgive it. Waldman filed garnishment actions; Stone filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, alleging that Waldman had fraudulently acquired debts and assets. Atherton was disbarred. The bankruptcy court found that Waldman and Atherton had perpetrated “egregious frauds,” invalidated Stone’s obligations, and awarded Stone $1,191,374 in compensatory and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the discharge, but vacated the award of damages as unauthorized. View "Waldman v. Stone" on Justia Law

In 2008, Auday, age 47, started work at a Wet Seal store. In 2009, Wet Seal fired her. She claimed that the termination was unlawful and discriminatory. Days later, Auday filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing $510,725 in liabilities and $204,370 in assets, without mention of the age-discrimination claim, required by 11 U.S.C. 521(a)(1)(B)(i). Three months later, her lawyer (Pinchak) asked the trustee how to be hired to pursue the claim. Neither the trustee nor Pinchak informed the bankruptcy court, which discharged Auday in January 2010. In February, the trustee applied for authority to hire, Pinchak to pursue the claim against Wet Seal. The court granted the application, but the trustee did not hire Pinchak nor was the schedule amended. Auday later sued Wet Seal, seeking $500,000 in damages. The district court granted Wet Seal judgment, holding that failure to list a potential claim on her bankruptcy petition barred her from bringing the claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. When Auday filed for bankruptcy, her estate became the owner of all of her property, including tort claims that accrued before filing, 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) The trustee may bring the claim or abandon it, returning it to Auday, which would require notice to creditors View "Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

Debtor paid off a line of credit and a $28,000 loan from her parents and transferred her interest in the marital residence to her husband, Bruno. In a separation agreement, Debtor waived any claim to equity in the residence, about $27,500. Bruno agreed to pay the mortgage and retained four vehicles (marital property) plus three other vehicles and tracts totaling 60 acres, non-marital property. Debtor retained a 1999 Pontiac. Both waived claims to support and retirement accounts. Debtor later filed her chapter 7 no-asset petition, listing an $11,000.00 lien on the Pontiac and $60,763.48 credit card debt (both incurred during marriage). The Trustee filed an adversary complaint to recover the value of alleged fraudulent transfers, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B), 544, 550. Bruno argued that in a contested divorce, he would have likely received support, insurance and part of Debtor’s pension. The bankruptcy court concluded that Debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value and entered a judgment of $47,635.27. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value, but remanded to amend the judgment to $4,532.98. It was unnecessary to consider the likely outcome of a contested divorce; the issue was comparison of the value Debtor received with the value Debtor transferred. View "In re: Neal" on Justia Law

When AFC filed for bankruptcy in 2009, the FDIC was appointed receiver for AFC’s subsidiary, AmTrust and sought payment from AFC under 11 U.S.C. 365(o), which requires that a party seeking Chapter-11 bankruptcy fulfill “any commitment . . . to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution.” The FDIC argued that AFC made such a commitment by agreeing to entry of a cease-and-desist order requiring AFC’s board to “ensure that [the Bank] complies” with the Bank’s own obligation to “have and maintain” capital ratios of 7 percent (Tier 1) and 12 percent (total). The district court found that the order was not a capital-maintenance commitment under section 365(o). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The cease-and-desist order is ambiguous and could reasonably be read as establishing either an oversight role or a capital-maintenance commitment and the bulk of the extrinsic evidence favored the “oversight” reading. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Amtrust Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs delivered artifacts from a famous shipwreck to Debtor for display and, according to Debtor, sale in Debtor’s jewelry store. The store went out of business. When Debtor returned the artifacts, an emerald pendant and musket balls were missing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty, common law conversion, and statutory conversion or negligence. A Michigan state court found that Debtor’s failure to respond to any written discovery requests, file a response to the Motion for Summary Disposition, and appear at the hearing were sufficient basis for entry of summary disposition and awarded $42,706.10. The judgment did not specify the claim upon which it was based. Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Plaintiffs filed an adversary complaint seeking to have the debt declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4), stating that Debtor’s actions constituted “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” The bankruptcy court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The bankruptcy court erred when it held that the issue of fraud was “necessarily determined” by the state court; the state court judgment cannot have issue preclusive effect as to this element for nondischargeability under the embezzlement portion of section 523(a)(4). View "In re: Dantone" on Justia Law

GTI went bankrupt after it purchased OAI, a subsidiary of Onkyo for $13 million in cash and $12 million in three-year promissory notes. Onkyo filed a proof of claim for $12 million. GTI responded by suing Onkyo under the theory that the OAI purchase was a fraudulent, voidable transaction. The bankruptcy court agreed, finding that OAI was worth $6.9 million at the time of the transaction, not $25 million. The court voided GTI’s obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price and ordered Onkyo to repay GTI $6.1 million. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court’s determination that the indirect benefits were insubstantial was valid without the necessity of providing calculations; its adoption of GTI’s expert’s value based on the comparable transactions method was not clearly erroneous. Once the bankruptcy court determined that the sale of OAI had been a fraudulent transfer and Onkyo was a good-faith transferee, awarding GTI relief was a simple matter of subtraction. View "Onkyo Europe Elec., GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc." on Justia Law