Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint on behalf of two estates, claiming that financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed on the ground that a non-attorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though plaintiffs claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. Each signed the notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 1654. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors may represent the estate pro se. The purpose of protecting third parties is not implicated when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the nonattorney herself. The tradition that “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” has not been extended to estates. View "Bass v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

Defendants own and operate Auto Pro repair shops in Warren and Troy, Michigan. Plaintiff was employed as a mechanic at the Warren shop in 2011-2013. Syed manages that shop. The parties disagree about the beginning date of Plaintiff’s employment and his compensation. Plaintiff claimed that he worked 65-68 hours per week and was never paid overtime. He admitted to receiving “a little extra” money on occasion. Defendants claim that Plaintiff never worked more than 30 hours per week. They put forward paystubs and timesheets, indicating that he was paid $300 per week, (30 hours at $10 per hour). Syed stated that he security footage to determine employees’ arrival and departure times, from which he created timesheets. Defendants also submitted an affidavit from a manager, Blue. Blue stated that he did not permit Plaintiff to work after the shop closd to the public. Blue stated that “Plaintiff … never worked over 30 hours per week. The district court granted Defendants summary judgment in a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201. The Sixth Circuit reversed; a plaintiff’s testimony alone may be sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff put forward testimony that contradicted that of Defendants, describing his typical work schedule with some specificity. View "Moran v. Al Basit, LLC" on Justia Law

GE manufactures Omniscan, an FDA-approved gadolinium-based contrast agent that has been associated in some patients with development of nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF), a rare and deadly condition that leads to the hardening (fibrosis) of the kidneys. Omniscan was administered to Wahl for two MRIs she received in Nashville in 2006. About one year later, she displayed the first symptoms of NSF. She was officially diagnosed with NSF in 2010. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all pre-trial litigation of Omniscan-related cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In 2011, Wahl filed a complaint in that court. With the agreement of Wahl and GE, the MDL judge transferred the case, in 2013, to the Middle District of Tennessee, the “proper venue.” GE then moved for summary judgment, arguing that all Omniscan doses produced from 2004 to 2006 were marked with expiration dates two years after manufacture, so the Omniscan administered to Wahl must have expired no later than 2008; the Tennessee Products Liability Act’s statute of repose requires suits to be instituted within one year of the expiration date appearing on a product’s packaging. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, favoring GE, applying Tennessee choice-of-law rules. View "Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Henricks, an Ohio prisoner, had symptoms of acute appendicitis. The following day, upon the recommendation of Dr. Gonzalez, the prison medical director, Henricks was sent to an emergency room. Officer Maynard, who had accompanied Henricks, initially refused to remove Henricks’s restraints, causing a 45-minute delay. The surgery caused nerve damage to Henricks’s leg. Gonzalez refused to prescribe a medication (Neurontin) for the pain caused by that nerve damage, although other doctors indicated that Neurontin was necessary. Henricks filed a pro se complaint (42 U.S.C. 1983) regarding his medical care, naming Maynard and Gonzalez, who invoked qualified immunity. A magistrate concluded that Henricks had stated a colorable claim, but did not address qualified immunity. The defendants did not file an answer, but litigated discovery requests in the ensuing years. The district court subsequently granted Henricks’s motion to strike affirmative defenses of qualified immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act , finding that defendants had waived them by not asserting them in an answer and that permitting them to assert the defenses at so late would unduly prejudice Henricks. The Sixth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the exhaustion requirement ruling and upheld the holding that defendants waived their qualified immunity defense. View "Henricks v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Slep-Tone Entertainment sued Karaoke Kandy and Polidori under federal and state law for unlawfully selling hard drives bearing Slep-Tone’s registered trademarks without authorization. After trial, the jury answered a single interrogatory finding that the defendants had not infringed Slep-Tone’s trademarks. The district court entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. The Sixth Circuit stayed a separate appeal and remanded to the district court because Slep-Tone’s timely post-judgment motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 was pending before the district court. In a separate appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for further proceedings regarding defendants’ a motion for attorney fees under 15 U.S.C. 1117(a) based on the judgment in their favor. The motion was not untimely; the FRCP 52 motion remained pending. The court must determine whether it is necessary to reassess if this case qualifies as “extraordinary.” View "Slep-Tone Entm't Corp. v. Karaoke Kandy Store, Inc." on Justia Law

Colosi lost a wrongful termination suit against her former employer, JLL. As the prevailing party, JLL filed a $6,369.55 bill of costs that the court clerk approved without modification, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Colosi objected to most of the charges and moved to reduce the bill to $253.50. The district court denied the motion, finding each cost reasonable, necessary to the litigation, and properly taxable under statute, 28 U.S.C. 1920. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Most of the costs Colosi challenged related to witness depositions. Necessity is determined as of the time of taking, and the fact that a deposition is not actually used at trial is not controlling. View "Colosi v. Jones Lang LaSalle Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1988 Sutherland received breast implants in North Carolina. She filed suit in North Carolina five years later, after learning that the silicone in her implants could be causing a variety of serious medical problems. The Silicone’s manufacturer, Dow Corning, filed for bankruptcy in Michigan, and Sutherland’s suit was transferred there. In 2012, 24 years after Sutherland received the implants, the district court concluded that Sutherland’s claim was barred by Michigan’s statute of limitations and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the district court should have applied North Carolina’s law instead of Michigan’s, and should have concluded that there was a genuine factual issue as to whether Sutherland’s claim was timely-filed under North Carolina law. View "Sutherland v. DCC Litig. Facility, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson, a long-time city employee (garbage collectors) was denied utility services by Memphis Light, Gas & Water, a division of the city, in February 2010 because he did not possess a state-issued photo identification card. Johnson, born in rural Mississippi, lacked a birth certificate, was illiterate and had intellectual disabilities that made it difficult for him to navigate the process of obtaining the necessary state identification. He lived without utilities for more than 18 months and died of heat stroke in August 2011. His wife and sister sued MLGW under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), Tenn. Code 29-20-205.; and Tennessee’s wrongful death statute, Tenn. Code 20-5-106. The court granted summary judgment for MLGW on the grounds that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statutes of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient evidence that Johnson was of unsound mind to apply the state's earlier tolling statute. View "Johnson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div." on Justia Law

Plaintiff offered to sell 3 million pounds of scrap copper to the defendant. The defendant negotiated the core terms of the sale but did not object to a fee-shifting provision: “In the event purchaser shall default in his obligations hereunder, purchaser shall be liable for [the plaintiff]’s costs of collection, including attorney’s fees.” The contract was negotiated between two experienced and sophisticated commercial entities. There was no duress. In a suit between the two, the otherwise victorious plaintiff appealed the district court’s ruling that the unilateral fee-shifting clause for attorney’s fees was unenforceable under Ohio law as a matter of public policy. The district court relied on Sixth Circuit precedent, holding that the Ohio Supreme Court would not enforce similar fee-shifting clauses. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the Ohio Supreme Court has since clarified that it would enforce such unilateral or one-sided fee-shifting contract provisions. View "Allied Indus. Scrap, Inc. v. OmniSource Corp." on Justia Law