Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Herr bought waterfront property on Crooked Lake in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan and planned to use their gas-powered motorboat on it. The U.S. Forest Service threatened to enforce a regulation (36 C.F.R. 293.6) that bans non-electric motorboats from the 95 percent of the lake that falls within the Sylvania National Wilderness Area. Herr sought and injunction on the ground that the Forest Service’s authority over Crooked Lake is “[s]ubject to valid existing rights,” Michigan Wilderness Act, 101 Stat. 1274, 1275. The district court held that a six-year time bar on the action was jurisdictional and that Herr had waited too long to file this lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing a 2015 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, and stating that the statute contains no language suggesting that the limitations period starts when a plaintiff’s predecessor in interest could first file a lawsuit. When a party first becomes aggrieved by a regulation that exceeds an agency’s statutory authority more than six years after the regulation was promulgated, that party may challenge the regulation without waiting for enforcement proceedings. View "Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv." on Justia Law

The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated challenges, by 18 states, to the 2015 Clean Water Rule adopted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency, which clarifies the definition of “waters of the United States,” as used in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251., “through increased use of bright-line boundaries.” The Sixth Circuit granted a stay of enforcement. The court noted a pending jurisdictional issue, concluded that the states acted without undue delay, and held that the status quo is the pre-Rule regime of federal-state collaboration that has been in place since the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision, Rapanos v. United States. The states have demonstrated a substantial possibility of success on the merits; the rulemaking process by which the Rule’s distance limitations were adopted is “facially suspect.” While there is no compelling showing that any state would suffer immediate irreparable harm of interference with state sovereignty, or unrecoverable expenditure of resources, in endeavoring to comply with the new regime, absent a stay, there is also no indication that the integrity of the nation’s waters will suffer imminent injury if the new scheme is not immediately implemented. The “sheer breadth of the ripple effects caused by the Rule’s definitional changes counsels strongly in favor of maintaining the status quo for the time being.” View "State of Ohio v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Kitchen filed a pro se lawsuit against 22 Michigan Corrections Officers, alleging constitutional violations at two different prisons. Because Civil Rule 20(a)(2) does not allow such joinder, the district court dismissed (without prejudice) 15 defendants, invoking Civil Rule 21, which allows the court to correct the improper joinder of parties. The Sixth CIrcuit dismissed, stating that appellate jurisdiction does not exist over an appeal from a Civil Rule 21 order dismissing some but not all of the defendants in a lawsuit. The district court dropped defendants. It did not sever the claims and enter final judgment. It idid not enter judgment at all as to any of the defendants. View "Kitchen v. Heyns" on Justia Law

Sunrise operates group homes, places children in foster care, and provides related services for the State of Kentucky, which provides 65% of Sunrise’s revenue. Sunrise describes its mission as “to extend the grace and hope of our loving God to the young people in our care by meeting their physical, emotional and spiritual needs.” Some young people alleged that Sunrise pressured them to become practicing Christians. In 2000, plaintiffs sued, alleging that Kentucky had violated the Establishment Clause by paying Sunrise for services provided to children in state custody. In 2013, the plaintiffs and Kentucky—but not Sunrise—agreed to a settlement that singled out Sunrise for monitoring by the ACLU and the Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Sunrise objected, arguing that it was entitled to a merits adjudication. Over Sunrise’s objection, the district court dismissed the Establishment Clause claim, incorporated the settlement into its dismissal order, and retained jurisdiction to enforce that order. The court held that its dismissal was not a consent decree, notwithstanding its incorporation of the settlement agreement, so that Sunrise could not object to the entry. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of whether the settlement agreement is fair to Sunrise. View "Pedreira v. Sunrise Children's Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

During the course of their marriage, Caroline, a citizen of Canada, made more than $75,000 in loans to Kimberly, of Ohio, which were never repaid. A federal district court dismissed Caroline’s contract and tort lawsuit. While appeal was pending, Kimberly died and Caroline substituted the Estate as the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, finding that neither the domestic relations exception nor the probate exception to federal diversity under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) applied. Because a court in Canada had dismissed divorce proceedings upon notice of Caroline’s death, there was no risk of a decision incompatible with a divorce decree, and, at the time Caroline filed the federal complaint, the property that she sought was not “in the custody of a state probate court.” View "Chevalier v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Fans of the musical group Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informational center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-mandated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subsets. Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identification of Juggalos as a criminal gang. They filed suit against the Department of Justice and FBI under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SIxth Circuit reversed dismissal for lack of standing. The Juggalos sufficiently alleged that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 Report and, where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exists. View "Parsons v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

In 2006, Shelton pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. His conviction became final in 2009, and four years later he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that the 2013 Supreme Court holding, Descamps v. United States, made his sentence invalid. The government did not file a response. Without notifying Shelton or asking him to show cause, the district court on its own initiative dismissed the motion as untimely. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Before acting on its own initiative, a district court “must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” The district court dismissed Shelton’s motion at the Rule 4(b) “screening” stage of the section 2255 proceedings, before the government had filed any response, but the notice requirement applies to section 2254 petitions and section 2255 motions and to sua sponte dismissals that occur during the Rule 4 screening process. View "Shelton v. United States" on Justia Law

Ohio state inmate Jackson continually violated the terms of his parole. Facing up to 26 years behind bars, he filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition in 2013. Jackson filed two more habeas petitions in 2015, but the district court classified them as second or successive and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit. Jackson filed unsuccessful “motion[s] for relief from” the judgments asking the district court to reconsider the transfer orders. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss, noting that Jackson appealed the denial of his motion for relief from the transfer order, not the transfer order itself. .When a district court transfers a second-or-successive habeas petition, the case travels from one court to another, so that the transferring court loses jurisdiction and the other court gains The district court lost jurisdiction over Jackson’s habeas petitions when each petition was physically transferred to the Sixth Circuit, so it lacked jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s motions. View "Jackson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Based on allegations of felonious assault on an officer, Cleveland police arrested plaintiffs at home in the early morning when plaintiffs were wearing only boxer shorts. Police refused to retrieve additional clothing, issuing them jumpsuits after they arrived at the police station. Plaintiffs have repeatedly changed their stories. In their second lawsuit, plaintiffs, who are homosexual, allege that officers repeatedly struck them and violated their equal protection rights by forcing them to remain in their boxer shorts, and that these actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. When the officers moved for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed affidavits based upon “personal knowledge and belief,” identifying, for the first time, which officer allegedly committed each act. The court struck the affidavits, explaining that it did not know which statements were based on personal knowledge, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and which were based only upon belief; without those affidavits, the record did not contain sufficient evidence to permit plaintiffs’ claims to survive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in striking the affidavits and that, construing the remaining record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Ondo v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Henry filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition, without counsel. The Trustee objected to confirmation of his plan, arguing that the repayment period exceeded five years and was too speculative; there was no evidence Henry would be able to meet the required payments. Henry agreed to have his original plan denied and was allowed to remedy errors by filing an amended plan by January 22, 2015. Henry maintains that an amended plan was mailed to the Bankruptcy Court on January 22, 2015. The Court never received an amended plan, nor did the Trustee. The Trustee submitted an order for dismissal, which was entered on February 4. Henry received the order on February 9, and immediately went to the Bankruptcy Court and filed amended schedules and an appeal. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Trustee was extremely thorough in explaining what was expected and what to file; Henry was receiving communications from the Bankruptcy Court through traditional mail. If there was any doubt that the documents would arrive through the mail, he should have made arrangements to present the documents physically to the Court. Filing requirements and deadlines are necessary to an orderly bankruptcy process. View "In re: Henry" on Justia Law