Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Shelton pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. His conviction became final in 2009, and four years later he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that the 2013 Supreme Court holding, Descamps v. United States, made his sentence invalid. The government did not file a response. Without notifying Shelton or asking him to show cause, the district court on its own initiative dismissed the motion as untimely. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Before acting on its own initiative, a district court “must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” The district court dismissed Shelton’s motion at the Rule 4(b) “screening” stage of the section 2255 proceedings, before the government had filed any response, but the notice requirement applies to section 2254 petitions and section 2255 motions and to sua sponte dismissals that occur during the Rule 4 screening process. View "Shelton v. United States" on Justia Law

Ohio state inmate Jackson continually violated the terms of his parole. Facing up to 26 years behind bars, he filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition in 2013. Jackson filed two more habeas petitions in 2015, but the district court classified them as second or successive and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit. Jackson filed unsuccessful “motion[s] for relief from” the judgments asking the district court to reconsider the transfer orders. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss, noting that Jackson appealed the denial of his motion for relief from the transfer order, not the transfer order itself. .When a district court transfers a second-or-successive habeas petition, the case travels from one court to another, so that the transferring court loses jurisdiction and the other court gains The district court lost jurisdiction over Jackson’s habeas petitions when each petition was physically transferred to the Sixth Circuit, so it lacked jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s motions. View "Jackson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Based on allegations of felonious assault on an officer, Cleveland police arrested plaintiffs at home in the early morning when plaintiffs were wearing only boxer shorts. Police refused to retrieve additional clothing, issuing them jumpsuits after they arrived at the police station. Plaintiffs have repeatedly changed their stories. In their second lawsuit, plaintiffs, who are homosexual, allege that officers repeatedly struck them and violated their equal protection rights by forcing them to remain in their boxer shorts, and that these actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. When the officers moved for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed affidavits based upon “personal knowledge and belief,” identifying, for the first time, which officer allegedly committed each act. The court struck the affidavits, explaining that it did not know which statements were based on personal knowledge, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and which were based only upon belief; without those affidavits, the record did not contain sufficient evidence to permit plaintiffs’ claims to survive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in striking the affidavits and that, construing the remaining record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Ondo v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Henry filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition, without counsel. The Trustee objected to confirmation of his plan, arguing that the repayment period exceeded five years and was too speculative; there was no evidence Henry would be able to meet the required payments. Henry agreed to have his original plan denied and was allowed to remedy errors by filing an amended plan by January 22, 2015. Henry maintains that an amended plan was mailed to the Bankruptcy Court on January 22, 2015. The Court never received an amended plan, nor did the Trustee. The Trustee submitted an order for dismissal, which was entered on February 4. Henry received the order on February 9, and immediately went to the Bankruptcy Court and filed amended schedules and an appeal. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Trustee was extremely thorough in explaining what was expected and what to file; Henry was receiving communications from the Bankruptcy Court through traditional mail. If there was any doubt that the documents would arrive through the mail, he should have made arrangements to present the documents physically to the Court. Filing requirements and deadlines are necessary to an orderly bankruptcy process. View "In re: Henry" on Justia Law

Chambers purchased a condominium in Novi, Michigan for $608,294.00, with a mortgage loan of $583,294.00, and a second mortgage of $166,635.00. The mortgages were assigned to HSBC. Chambers defaulted on the first mortgage, in 2008. The second mortgage was discharged in 2009. HSBC began non-judicial foreclosure proceedings by publishing a notice. In January, 2013, the Oakland County Deputy Sheriff sold Chambers’ condo to HSBC for $744,734.33. In September 2013, Chambers sued, demanding that the sale be voided because HSBC did not comply with Michigan law governing foreclosure by advertisement in failing to mail her written notices containing information specified in the statute including notification of her right to request loan modification; that all defendants “acting in concert … willfully, knowingly and purposefully failed to comply with the mandatory notice provisions” in Michigan law, and committed fraud in doing so; and that multiple conveyances of the mortgage were flawed, rendering HSBC legally incapable of foreclosing on the property. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Chambers had the opportunity during the redemption period following the foreclosure sale to request that a court convert the foreclosure by advertisement into a judicial foreclosure. She failed to act during the requisite time period and to request the exclusive remedy the court could grant. View "Chambers v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Utica’s subsidiary, Republic, hired Sheppard’s law firm to pursue a subrogation action. Settlement proceeds totaling $145,000.00 were entrusted to the law firm; Sheppard was the managing partner. Republic was entitled to $130,740.03; that award was not distributed. Republic retained the Lewis, law firm to recover the money. The parties reached a settlement agreement; $60,000.00, was due in November 2013 and $70,740.03, was to be paid in December 2013. Payments were to be made to the Utica Atlanta regional office, which had originally worked with Sheppard and handles claims relating to member companies, including Republic. Sheppard’s portion, $30,000.00, was not received. In February 2014, Sheppard filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. UTICA is listed as a creditor,with the address of its New York home office. The Bankruptcy Court mailed notice to all creditors of the May 30, 2014 date by which creditors had to file a complaint or challenge the dischargeability of certain debts. No notice was sent to Lewis or Republic. On May 21, 2014 Lewis sued Sheppard in Tennessee State Court, unaware of the pending bankruptcy. Lewis received notice of the bankruptcy on May 28, and, on May 29, filed a timely motion to extend the deadline. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed denial of the motion, finding sufficient “cause” to justify extension under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004 and 4007(c). View "In re: Sheppard" on Justia Law

Avio claimed that Alfoccino violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3), by hiring B2B to send unsolicited facsimile advertisements to Avio and a class of similarly situated persons. The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and found that Avio could not prove Alfoccino was vicariously liable for B2B’s transmission of the faxes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Avio demonstrated standing. Though the TCPA does not expressly state who has a cause of action to sue under its provisions, its descriptions of prohibited conduct repeatedly refer to the “recipient” of the unsolicited fax, and in enacting the TCPA, Congress noted that such fax advertising “is problematic” because it “shifts some of the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient” and “occupies the recipient’s facsimile machine so that it is unavailable for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax.” FCC regulations define “sender” with respect to the TCPA’s prohibition of unsolicited fax advertisements as being “the person or entity on whose behalf a facsimile unsolicited advertisement is sent or whose goods or services are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement,” indicating that primary, not vicarious liability attaches to Alfoccino. View "Imhoff Inv., LLC v. Alfoccino, Inc." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint on behalf of two estates, claiming that financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed on the ground that a non-attorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though plaintiffs claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. Each signed the notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 1654. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors may represent the estate pro se. The purpose of protecting third parties is not implicated when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the nonattorney herself. The tradition that “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” has not been extended to estates. View "Bass v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

Defendants own and operate Auto Pro repair shops in Warren and Troy, Michigan. Plaintiff was employed as a mechanic at the Warren shop in 2011-2013. Syed manages that shop. The parties disagree about the beginning date of Plaintiff’s employment and his compensation. Plaintiff claimed that he worked 65-68 hours per week and was never paid overtime. He admitted to receiving “a little extra” money on occasion. Defendants claim that Plaintiff never worked more than 30 hours per week. They put forward paystubs and timesheets, indicating that he was paid $300 per week, (30 hours at $10 per hour). Syed stated that he security footage to determine employees’ arrival and departure times, from which he created timesheets. Defendants also submitted an affidavit from a manager, Blue. Blue stated that he did not permit Plaintiff to work after the shop closd to the public. Blue stated that “Plaintiff … never worked over 30 hours per week. The district court granted Defendants summary judgment in a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201. The Sixth Circuit reversed; a plaintiff’s testimony alone may be sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff put forward testimony that contradicted that of Defendants, describing his typical work schedule with some specificity. View "Moran v. Al Basit, LLC" on Justia Law