Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

LG Chem manufactured the LG HG2 18650 lithium-ion batteries that exploded in Sullivan’s pocket and caused him severe second- and third-degree burns. Sullivan obtained the batteries from a vape store in Michigan to use for his e-cigarette device. In Sullivan’s suit, LG Chem, a South Korean company, opposed personal jurisdiction, arguing that exercising personal jurisdiction over it in Michigan would be improper under Michigan’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. Limited discovery revealed that LG sent at least two shipments of 18650 batteries directly into Michigan and had executed “two supplier agreements . . . with Michigan companies relating to 18650 batteries.” Neither party addressed whether any of the 18650 batteries that LG shipped into Michigan was ultimately one of the batteries that injured Sullivan.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. LG urged too narrow a view of personal jurisdiction. The Michigan district court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over LG because it directly shipped its 18650 batteries into the state and entered into two supplier contracts with Michigan companies for 18650 batteries. The court noted that other courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over LG when LG conducts business related to its 18650 batteries in or ships its 18650 batteries into the forum state. View "Sullivan v. LG Chem Ltd." on Justia Law

Sterling Hotels sued a state elevator inspector (Defendant), asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Sterling first argued that Defendant violated its right to due process when he sealed Wyndham’s elevators without giving Sterling notice or an opportunity to object. Further, Sterling argued that Defendant engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory taking when he sealed the elevators. Defendant moved to dismiss, in part on qualified immunity grounds. The district court declined to address Defendant’s entitlement to immunity, and Defendant appealed.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that when a deprivation of property “occurs pursuant to an established state procedure”—as Defendant acknowledges it did here—the state must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Here, Defendant sealed the elevators without providing any advance notice that the elevators should descend to the basement. Thus, Sterling alleged, Defendant failed to provide it with any opportunity to respond to that requirement. That is sufficient to state a due-process claim against Defendant. Further, Defendant’s potential individual liability for a regulatory takings claim was not clearly established when he sealed the elevators. That means Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. View "Sterling Hotels, LLC v. Scott McKay" on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a judgment against his employer after the employer made also accusations that Appellant committed embezzlement and forgery. Shortly thereafter, Appellant's employer filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, both individually and on behalf of his business. Appellant appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling, arguing that he received an insufficient amount as an unsecured creditor.The court explained that "the doctrine of equitable mootness has no place in Chapter 7 liquidations." View "Said Taleb v. Wendy Lewis" on Justia Law

After extensive litigation, the United States, Michigan, and five federally recognized tribes entered the Great Lakes Consent Decree of 1985, governing the regulation of Great Lakes fisheries. The subsequent Consent Decree of 2000 had a 20-year term. The district court extended that Decree indefinitely “until all objections to a proposed successor decree have been adjudicated” and granted amicus status to the Coalition, which represents numerous private “sport fishing, boating, and conservancy groups” interested in protecting the Great Lakes. The Coalition has represented its own interests during negotiation sessions.As the parties were concluding their negotiations on a new decree the Coalition moved to intervene, stating that Michigan is no longer “willing or able to adequately represent the Coalition’s interests” and intends to abandon key provisions of the 2000 Decree that promote biological conservation and diversity, allocate fishery resources between sovereigns, and establish commercial and recreational fishing zones. The district court denied the Coalition’s most recent motion to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In finding the motion untimely, the district court properly considered “all relevant circumstances” including the stage of the proceedings; the purpose for the intervention; the length of time that the movant knew or should have known of its interest in the case; the prejudice to the original parties; and any unusual circumstances militating for or against intervention. View "United States v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs, former home-health aides, sued A&L under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), claiming that A&L had paid them less than the correct overtime rate and under-reimbursed their expenses. Plaintiffs may bring such claims on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The plaintiffs sought to facilitate notice of their action to three groups of other employees who had worked for A&L. The court adopted a two-step procedure under which it would facilitate such notice following “conditional certification,” which required a “modest factual showing” that the other employees are “similarly situated” to the original plaintiffs. When merits discovery is complete, the court must grant “final certification” for the case to proceed as a collective action. The court applied that “fairly lenient” standard, and “conditionally certified” two groups for receiving notice. The court declined to facilitate notice to employees who had left A&L more than two years before or who had signed a “valid arbitration agreement” with A&L.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the lenient standard, vacated the notice determination, and remanded for redetermination of that issue under the strong-likelihood standard. The court noted that the decision to send notice of an FLSA suit to other employees is often dispositive, in the sense of forcing a settlement. As a practical matter, it is not possible to conclusively make “similarly situated” determinations as to employees who are not present in the case. View "Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Hohenberg and Hanson failed to maintain their Memphis homes. The Environmental Court, a local court that hears cases involving alleged violations of county ordinances, including environmental ordinances, declared Hohenberg’s home a public nuisance and ordered remediation. Hohenberg eventually declared bankruptcy. Her house was auctioned off, mooting the enforcement action. The court found Hanson guilty of code violations and ordered remediations. The violations recurred; Hanson went to jail. The city bulldozed his house. The court dismissed his case as moot.Each homeowner filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the court and the county. They claimed that the court’s procedures, including failures to use Tennessee’s Civil and Evidence Rules, to keep complete records, and to consider constitutional claims or defenses, violated their due process rights. The county created, funded, and “fail[ed] to oversee” the court. The district court dismissed their complaint as amounting to improper appeals of state court judgments (28 U.S.C. 1257(a)).The Sixth Circuit reversed the jurisdictional ruling but affirmed in part. The injuries do not stem from state-court “judgments.” The plaintiffs mainly argued that the Environmental Court dragged out the proceedings and complicated them, targeting ancillary litigation expenses rather than the application of law to fact, outside section 1257(a)’s limited orbit. Damages would not amount to the “review and rejection” of any judgments binding the plaintiffs. Because the Environmental Court is not a “person” but an arm of the state, the Section 1983 action against it fails. View "Hohenberg v. Shelby County, Tennessee" on Justia Law

Appalachian runs Whitesburg Hospital. In 2007, Hospital nurses went on strike. Appalachian entered into an agreement, under which Nursing provided nurses and agreed to indemnify and defend Appalachian for the negligence of any of its employees assigned to the Hospital.Profitt, injured at work, was taken by fellow employees to the Hospital. Profitt alleged that his injuries were exacerbated by a nurse who moved him from the car without stabilizing and immobilizing him. Nurses Hurt and Parsons, Appalachian's employees, were dismissed from the suit, based on the lack of evidence that either was the nurse in question. Nurse Foote, a Nursing employee, remained. In a settlement, Appalachian paid Profitt $2 million and incurred $823,522.71 in legal fees and costs.In an ensuing indemnity lawsuit, Appalachian requested that the court preclude testimony that Hurt or Parsons transported Profitt into the ER. Nursing did not address Appalachian’s issue preclusion argument but argued that the alleged conduct of the unknown female, was not a breach of the standard of care nor did it cause an injury. The court granted the motion. A jury ruled in favor of Appalachian.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the state court’s ruling; Nursing did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue at the state court level. However, the relevant evidence was not “closely balanced” but clearly identified Nurse Foote. View "Appalachian Regional Healthcare v. U.S. Nursing Corp." on Justia Law

In 1973, the brothers’ father, Marvin, purchased property in Sequatchie County. In 1997, he obtained a $200,000 home equity line of credit. A Deed of Trust was recorded. The terms of the loan required monthly interest payments until the maturity date—May 2007—when a final balloon payment of the entire outstanding balance would become due. The loan’s maturity date passed but Regions did not demand payment of the entire balance, refinance the loan, or foreclose on the property, but continued to accept monthly interest payments. After Marvin’s death, the brothers used the property for their trucking business and made payments on the loan through the business account. Regions learned of Marvin’s death in 2011 but continued to accept payments. In 2017, the brothers realized that Regions was sending statements demanding payment of the entire debt. A Regions representative informed them that the property would be foreclosed on with “no further discussion.” In 2018, Regions filed a foreclosure action, requesting a declaration that the loan’s maturity date had been extended. Based on an apparent tax lien, the IRS removed the case to federal court.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the brothers. Tennessee law provides a 10-year statute of limitations for the enforcement of liens. The maturity date of the loan was never extended; Tennessee law requires a written instrument, “duly executed and acknowledged,” and “filed for record with the register of the county.” View "Regions Bank v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

When a Michigan county forecloses on a property because its owner has failed to pay property taxes, Michigan law permits the county to obtain ownership of the property outright—even if its value exceeds the taxes owed. Fox owed about $3,000 in unpaid taxes, Gratiot County took his land. He valued the property at over $50,000. The county treasurer sold it for over $25,000. Fox did not receive any of the surplus. The Sixth Circuit has previously held that similar conduct was an unconstitutional “taking.”Fox filed a class action against Gratiot County on behalf of himself and similar landowners and sued 26 other counties, arguing that they engaged in the same conduct against other delinquent taxpayers. The district court certified a class, holding that Fox had standing to sue these other counties under the “juridical link doctrine,” under which a named plaintiff in a putative class action can sue defendants who have not injured the plaintiff if these defendants have injured absent class members.The Sixth Circuit vacated. The judicial link doctrine conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent holding that a class-action request “adds nothing to the question of standing.” Fox lacks standing to sue the 26 other counties. In individual litigation, a plaintiff lacks standing to sue a defendant if the plaintiff’s injuries are not “fairly traceable” to that defendant. Expediency concerns cannot supplant Article III’s separation-of-powers protections. View "Fox v. Saginaw County, Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2017, the County initiated an administrative tax foreclosure against BSI. The County Board of Revision (BOR) issued its final adjudication of foreclosure in June 2019. Because the County had opted for the alternative right of redemption, BSI had 28 days to pay the taxes before the County took title to the property. Days later, BSI filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the BOR’s final judgment and 28-day redemption period. The bankruptcy court granted the County relief from the stay on January 17, 2020. The BOR determined that the statutory redemption period expired on January 21, 2020. On January 30, rather than sell the property, the County transferred it to its land bank (Ohio Rev. Code 323.78.1). When a county sells foreclosed property at auction, it may not keep proceeds beyond the taxes the former owner owed; if the county transfers the property to the land bank, “the land becomes ‘free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.’”BSI filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a significant difference between the appraised value of the property and the amount that the County alleged BSI owed meant that the County’s action violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The limitations period began to run when the redemption period ended on January 21, 2020. If BSI paid its delinquent taxes during that period, the County would have been prohibited from taking the property. View "Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio" on Justia Law