Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Mackinac Center for Public Policy and the Cato Institute (Plaintiffs) who sued the U.S. Department of Education and its officials (Defendants) over a one-time account adjustment announced by the Department. The adjustment was intended to count months or years that student-loan borrowers spent in excessive forbearance status towards debt forgiveness. The Plaintiffs, being nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations and qualified public service employers under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, argued that this adjustment would harm their ability to recruit and retain employees.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, where the court dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Plaintiffs lacked standing. The Plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they suffered an injury in fact, a requirement for establishing standing. The court rejected the Plaintiffs' arguments that they had competitor standing and that they were deprived of a procedural right. The court found that the Plaintiffs' claims were speculative and unsupported by specific facts. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Mackinac Center for Public Policy v. Cardona" on Justia Law

Eight men convicted of sexual offenses between 1982 and 1994 challenged the constitutionality of the 2004 Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act (“the Act”) and its subsequent amendments. The Act required them to comply with various reporting requirements and geographical restrictions imposed on all sex offenders. The plaintiffs argued that the laws violated the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee agreed with the plaintiffs and issued an injunction prohibiting Governor Lee and Director Rausch from enforcing the entire Tennessee code against the plaintiffs. The court also issued a declaratory judgment against unnamed parties who might also enforce the Act.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Governor Lee and ordered the lower court to dismiss him from the suit. The court also found that the district court's injunction was overly broad and unjustified. The appellate court reversed in part the district court’s judgment that the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and remanded the case with orders to vacate the declaratory judgment, dissolve the injunction against Governor Lee, dismiss Governor Lee from the suit based on a lack of standing, and to modify the injunction against Director Rausch consistent with its opinion. View "John Doe #1 v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves StarLink Logistics, Inc. ("StarLink") and ACC, LLC ("ACC"). StarLink owns land adjacent to and downstream from ACC's land, where ACC used to operate a landfill for byproducts of aluminum recycling. StarLink alleged that ACC's improperly closed landfill was polluting StarLink’s land. After StarLink initiated its suit, ACC and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (“Department”) finalized a consent order requiring ACC to abate the landfill’s pollution. The district court dismissed StarLink’s claims for lack of jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to ACC as to its remaining claims.The district court dismissed StarLink’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot and granted summary judgment to ACC as to StarLink’s claims for civil penalties. The court also dismissed StarLink’s claims for failure to meet the Clean Water Act’s and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s jurisdictional notice requirements.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment. The court held that StarLink can proceed with Count 2 and to seek remediation of its property for Count 5 of its complaint. As to Counts 1, 3, and 4, the court agreed with the district court’s claim preclusion and notice rulings. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "StarLink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Karen Frohn, who applied for and received a life insurance policy from Globe Life and Accident Insurance Company on behalf of her husband, Greg Frohn. After Greg's death, Karen submitted a claim for death benefits, which Globe denied. Karen then sued Globe, both individually and on behalf of a putative class of beneficiaries, challenging the denial of her claim.Globe moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to rescind the life insurance policy because Karen was not truthful in her application for insurance. The district court granted Globe’s motion, barring Karen from recovery on her claims against Globe. Karen also asked the court to redact certain portions of that order, but the district court published it without any redactions. Karen appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Karen had voluntarily waived her husband's physician-patient privilege by signing an Authorization for Release, allowing Globe to access Greg's medical records. The court also found that Globe was entitled to rescind the policy under Ohio law because Karen had made material misrepresentations in the insurance application. The court concluded that Globe's defense barred Karen's breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims. View "Frohn v. Globe Life and Accident Ins Co" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Euna McGruder, who was terminated from her position as the Executive Officer of Priority Schools for the Nashville public school system, operated by Metro Nashville, after she investigated allegations of racial discrimination at a Nashville middle school. McGruder sued Metro Nashville in 2017, alleging that her termination constituted illegal retaliation in violation of Title VII. In 2021, a jury awarded McGruder $260,000 for her claim, and the district court ordered Metro Nashville to reinstate her to her previous position.After the trial, Metro Nashville discovered that McGruder had failed to disclose the existence of her Title VII claim to the bankruptcy court when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2018. Metro Nashville argued that McGruder's claims should be barred by judicial estoppel due to her failure to disclose her cause of action against Metro Nashville in her bankruptcy filing. The district court concluded that it could not exercise jurisdiction over Metro Nashville’s judicial estoppel claim, given that Metro Nashville’s earlier notice of appeal had divested the court of jurisdiction over the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's reinstatement order and dismissed Metro Nashville's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that judicial estoppel does not bar McGruder's reinstatement. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering McGruder's reinstatement. The court did not have jurisdiction to apply judicial estoppel to the non-final and therefore non-appealable jury award, forthcoming back pay trial, or award of attorneys’ fees. View "McGruder v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Firexo Group Limited (FGL), a British company that manufactures fire extinguishers, and Firexo, Inc., a Florida-based company that was created to sell FGL's products in the United States. Scot Smith, a resident of Ohio, purchased 70% of Firexo, Inc. from FGL under a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA). The JVA included a forum-selection clause designating England or Wales as the exclusive jurisdiction for any disputes arising from the agreement. Firexo, Inc., which was not a signatory to the JVA, later sued FGL in an Ohio court over issues with the fire extinguishers. FGL sought to dismiss the case based on the forum-selection clause in the JVA.The district court granted FGL's motion to dismiss, applying the "closely related" doctrine. This doctrine allows a non-signatory to a contract to be bound by a forum-selection clause if the non-signatory is sufficiently closely related to the contract. The district court found that Firexo, Inc. was closely related to the JVA and therefore subject to the forum-selection clause. Firexo, Inc. appealed this decision, arguing that the district court applied the wrong law and analytical approach in determining the applicability of the contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed with Firexo, Inc. that the district court had applied the wrong law. The court held that the "closely related" doctrine, a federal common law rule, should not have been used to interpret the JVA's forum-selection clause. Instead, the court should have applied the law specified in the JVA, which was English law. Under English law, contracts do not apply to non-signatories unless certain exceptions apply, none of which were present in this case. Therefore, the forum-selection clause in the JVA did not apply to Firexo, Inc., and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Firexo, Inc. v. Firexo Group Limited" on Justia Law

The case involves Dennis Neate, a former employee of the James B. Oswald Company (Oswald), an insurance firm. Neate left Oswald to work for Hylant Group, Inc., another insurance firm, and some of his clients followed him. Oswald accused Neate of violating his non-solicitation agreement and sued in federal district court. The court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Neate and others to comply with Oswald’s non-solicitation agreement. Neate appealed.Previously, the district court granted a preliminary injunction after an evidentiary hearing. The injunction prohibited Neate and others from violating their agreements with Oswald, retaining or using Oswald's confidential information, and soliciting or accepting business from Oswald's clients. The injunction also required all defendants to return all of Oswald's property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the case. The court found that the district court failed to properly apply Ohio law in determining the reasonableness of the non-solicitation agreement. The court also found that the injunction did not meet the specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1), as it incorporated the non-solicitation agreement by reference. However, the court agreed with the district court that Oswald had shown a likelihood of success on its trade-secrets claims. View "James B. Oswald Co. v. Neate" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Reverend Kenneth Simon, Reverend Lewis W. Macklin, II, and Helen Youngblood, collectively known as the "Simon Parties," filed a lawsuit against the Ohio Redistricting Commission and several of its members. They alleged that Ohio's congressional districts violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. The Simon Parties requested a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, which the Ohio Redistricting Commission opposed, and moved to dismiss the complaint.The district court denied the motion to convene a three-judge court and granted the motions to dismiss. The court also denied all other pending motions. The Simon Parties appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court incorrectly determined that the Simon Parties' Fourteenth Amendment claim did not raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes. The court stated that the Simon Parties' allegations on this claim were sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction as a single judge to adjudicate any other pending motion because it was required to convene a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284.The court reversed the district court's order denying the motion for a three-judge court, vacated the district court's orders granting the motions to dismiss and denying the motion for temporary restraining order and motion for class certification, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for it immediately to initiate the procedures to convene a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284. View "Simon v. DeWine" on Justia Law

This case pertains to an alleged copyright infringement involving software code used in an industrial control system. The plaintiffs, RJ Control Consultants, Inc. and its sole shareholder, Paul Rogers, appealed the district court’s exclusion of their proposed expert and the granting of summary judgment to the defendants, Multiject, LLC; its sole owner, Jack Elder; and RSW Technologies, LLC. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiffs’ proposed expert or in granting summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs had failed to properly disclose their expert as required and did not produce an expert report. Consequently, they could not offer expert evidence to rebut the defendants' evidence. Furthermore, they could not create a genuine dispute of fact about the protectability of the software code, a crucial factor in their copyright infringement claim. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed. The court also vacated its prior decision in RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC, 981 F.3d 446 (2020), due to lack of appellate jurisdiction at the time of that decision. View "R.J. Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, a taxi driver, Lufti Said Saalim, sued Walmart and several individuals, including deputy sheriffs, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law claims following an incident at a Walmart in Toledo, Ohio. Saalim claimed that while waiting for his passengers at a loading zone, he was approached by a Walmart employee and subsequently by Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Bretzloff, who was working as a private security guard for Walmart. Saalim alleged that Bretzloff used excessive force during the encounter, including pulling him out of his cab and using a taser on him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision that granted Bretzloff qualified immunity on Saalim's Fourth Amendment claim. The court held that Saalim plausibly alleged that Bretzloff's use of force was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that this right was clearly established at the time of the incident.However, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Saalim's Fourteenth Amendment claim, agreeing that it was identical to his Fourth Amendment claim. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Saalim's state law claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as they were barred by the statute of limitations.The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Saalim's Fourth Amendment claim against Bretzloff; his § 1983 municipal liability claim against Sheriff Navarre; and his state law claims of negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention and vicarious liability against the Walmart Defendants and McNett. View "Saalim v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law