Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jerry and Linda’s niece, Whitney, often stayed overnight with them and accompanied them on camping trips. When Whitney was 12 years old, the couple divorced. Linda told Whitney’s parents that Linda’s daughter-in-law had accused Jerry of making sexual advances and that Linda was concerned about Whitney. Questioned, Whitney said that Jerry had done something to her. At retrial, Whitney testified about sexual touching and remembered that Jerry exposed himself in front of her. Linda admitted she had never seen Jerry act inappropriately toward Whitney. Andrea testified that she spent the night at Jerry’s home, that Jerry came into her room at night, and exposed himself and touched her. Andrea acknowledged inconsistencies in her testimony between the two trials but explained that she had tried to forget the experience. Jerry denied the accusations. The prosecutor and defense counsel fought openly, often making side comments. Jerry was convicted of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct but not guilty of assault with intent to commit second-degree criminal sexual conduct. His conviction was affirmed; Michigan courts also rejected his collateral attack. Jerry filed an unsuccessful habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning suppressed evidence consisting of a police report with notes from Andrea’s interview and hand-written notes from Andrea’s therapist that would have demonstrated inconsistencies in Andrea’s testimony. Jerry did not establish that the state court’s resolution of his prosecutorial misconduct claims was an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Bales v. Bell" on Justia Law

McGowan is a Michigan prisoner, serving a sentence of 195-480 months for drug trafficking and firearms offenses, and a 24-month sentence for a felony firearm offense. The district court ordered habeas relief, finding that McGowan received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. The state appealed, arguing that court failed to give required deference to the contrary ruling of the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit agreed and vacated. McGowan said he understood when he rejected the prosecution’s pre-trial offer; the trial court later rejected McGowan’s assertion that he was led to believe the estimated 45-to-93-month range would apply even if the jury found him guilty on all counts, not just if he accepted the offer. McGowan’s supposed misunderstanding is directly contrary to what his counsel told him on the record. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ affirmance was duly explained and has not been shown to be based on an unreasonable determination of facts or on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court erroneously concluded that prejudice was established by the simple fact that McGowan received a more severe sentence as a result of the verdict than he would have received had he pled guilty. View "McGowan v. Burt" on Justia Law

Johnson, a former Metropolitan Nashville Police officer, Department, was twice arrested based on domestic violence complaints by his now-estranged wife, Terri. The second arrest was made, pursuant to warrant, by fellow officers Moseley and Thomas. Johnson was acquitted and filed suit against his estranged wife, Moseley and Thomas, and the Metropolitan Government, alleging civil rights violations based on false arrest and malicious prosecution, and state law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed in part, but denied the officers’ motion as to claims for malicious prosecution. The malicious prosecution claim was based on allegations that Terri’s medical records contained information inconsistent with details in her domestic violence accusations, and cites police department policies that, if heeded by officers conducting a proper investigation, would have disclosed reasons to question the veracity of her accusations and question whether there was probable cause to prosecute Johnson. The Sixth Circuit reversed, referring to an "overly charitable" reading of the complaint. The claim is barred by qualified immunity because plaintiff’s complaint does not include fact allegations of specific conduct plausibly making out a violation of clearly established federal law. View "Johnson v. Moseley" on Justia Law

After King, a Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) inmate, participated in a class-action lawsuit challenging personal property policies at MDOC facilities (Cain litigation), prison officials transferred him to a prison with a higher security classification and more restrictive conditions. King filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that prison officials were liable for retaliating against King for his First Amendment-protected conduct, participating in the Cain litigation and assisting other petitioners to file grievances. On remand, the district court granted compensatory damages and awarded attorney fees, but denied punitive damages and injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief and the award of punitive damages, but otherwise vacated and remanded, first holding that 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e), the Prison Litigation Reform Act, does not foreclose claims that allege violations of First Amendment-protected rights as injuries, even if those violations did not cause physical harm. The district court properly applied the PLRA to calculate the appropriate award of attorney fees, but abused its discretion in denying punitive damages and misapplied the PLRA’s attorney fees provision when it failed to charge a portion of the attorney fees against King’s judgment. View "King v. Zamiara" on Justia Law

Barton’s wife, Vicki, was killed in a 1995 burglary. Detectives determined that Barton was elsewhere at the time of her death. In 1998 Henson was arrested in an unrelated burglary, and stated that his half-brother, Phelps had been involved romantically with Vicki, went to her house to steal, panicked, and shot her. Henson believed that Phelps’ subsequent suicide was related. Phelps’ body was exhumed . There was no DNA match. In a 2003 re-examination of the file, it was discovered that in Barton’s 911 call, he referenced needing to call “Phelp man.” Detectives re-interviewed Henson, who later testified that Barton paid Phelps to go to Vicki’s residence to scare her; that Phelps took unidentified accomplice; and that the accomplice shot and sexually assaulted Vicki. Under cross examination, Henson denied originally telling detectives that Phelps shot Vicki. Barton’s federal habeas petition was rejected. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on the withholding of evidence that would have impeached the sole prosecution witness. Henson testified that he had committed staged burglaries for hire. Before trial, the state provided Barton with a police report documenting the 1993 Kelly burglary, which was suspected to have been staged. The state did not inform him that it had re-opened the Kelly investigation after Henson implicated Barton. Questioned before Barton’s trial, Kelly vehemently denied hiring Henson to stage a burglary. Barton did not learn of Kelly’s statements until after his trial, by means of his own investigation View "Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility" on Justia Law

Shawn and Denise were walking with their daughter, grandson, and dog. Shawn carried a cell phone, holstered on his hip, next to a semiautomatic handgun. A motorcyclist, Rose, stopped to complain about Shawn’s visible firearm. After a heated exchange, Rose called 911. The dispatcher stated that the weapon was legal with a concealed-carry weapon permit. Rose stated: “I’m not going to call a crew out if it’s legal.” The department nonetheless dispatched Officer Bright, who claims that Shawn pulled out his cell phone, then “moved his hands back toward his weapon.” Bright told Shawn to put his hands over his head. Rather than comply, Shawn asked why Bright was there. Bright took possession of Shawn’s firearm. Shawn claims that Bright walked up, “his hand on his firearm,” announced that if Shawn “go[es] for the weapon, he’s going to shoot,” and refused to answer questions. Bright demanded Shawn’s driver’s license and concealed-carry permit. Shawn gave Bright his license, but Denise told Bright to look up the permit. Bright threatened to arrest Shawn for inducing panic and placed Shawn in handcuffs. Bright discovered that Shawn had a permit and released Shawn with a citation for “failure to disclose personal information,” a charge later dropped. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Bright partial summary judgment, rejecting First and Second Amendment claims, but permitted Fourth Amendment and state-law claims to go to trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; Bright could not reasonably suspect that Northrup needed to be disarmed. View "Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Wade was tried for rape, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and firearm specifications, stemming from his attack on a woman in her apartment. The conviction was overturned. Wade was retried for rape and kidnapping. Over defense objections, the state reintroduced testimony suggesting that Wade possessed a firearm during the attack. The court denied Wade’s request for a limiting instruction. Wade was again convicted of rape and kidnapping. The Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the kidnapping conviction because Wade only requested a limiting instruction regarding the element of force for rape and it could not say that the outcome of Wade’s kidnapping conviction clearly would have been different had there been a limiting instruction. The district court denied a habeas petition, rejecting arguments that Double Jeopardy Clause principles of collateral estoppel barred prosecutors in the second trial from reintroducing the firearm evidence that did not convince the first jury, and that, even if that evidence were otherwise admissible, the absence of a limiting instruction on the kidnapping count resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the firearm evidence was not an issue of ultimate fact in Wade’s second trial such that collateral estoppel required its exclusion. The lack of a limiting instruction did not “so infec[t] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” View "Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper" on Justia Law

Wheat, an African-American male, began working at the bank in 2001. By 2010, he was a payment processor in the wholesale-lockbox department and functioned as an “auditor” who “double-check[ed] [other] payment processor[s’] work.” In February 2010, Wheat was involved in a verbal altercation with a Caucasian worker, whose work Wheat had checked. Wheat’s employment was terminated because he “violated workplace violence policy … made a threat of physical violence … violated anti-harassment policy and … was in violation of [the bank’s] core values.” The other worker was given only a written disciplinary action, having been deemed a “nonaggressor.” Wheat contacted the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found reasonable cause to believe that violations of the statutes occurred but could not obtain a settlement. The district court rejected Wheat’s claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Stat. 4112.02(A). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Wheat met his less-than-onerous burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination and identified genuine disputes of material fact that preclude a finding that the bank’s stated reasons for firing Wheat were not pretextual. View "Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law

Ohio law required criminal defendants to submit a DNA sample after a felony conviction, Ohio Rev. Code 2901.07(B); new law, applicable July 1, 2011, requires county sheriffs to collect DNA after a felony arrest. Crabbs was initially arrested before July 1, 2011, but rearrested after that date. Crabbs sued the Franklin County Sheriff under the Fourth Amendment for requiring him to submit to a DNA cheek swab after a jury acquitted him of voluntary manslaughter. The sheriff responded that Ohio’s sovereign immunity insulated him from the lawsuit because state law required him to take the sample. The district court and the Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, finding that the statute does not require a DNA sample for a felony defendant rearrested after the effective date for violating bond and does not require a sample after an acquittal if the sheriff was unable to collect one during the intake process. Sovereign immunity does not bar Crabbs’ civil rights action. View "Crabbs v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation action against New Breed Logistics, alleging that Calhoun, a New Breed supervisor, sexually harassed three women and retaliated against the women after they objected to his sexual advances. The EEOC also alleged that Calhoun retaliated against Partee, a male employee, who verbally opposed Calhoun’s sexual harassment and supported the women’s complaints. All four employees had been terminated from New Breed. A jury found New Breed liable under Title VII for Calhoun’s sexual harassment and retaliation and awarded the four employees compensatory and punitive damages totaling more than $1.5 million dollars. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as to liability and punitive damages and to the instructions submitted to the jury concerning employer knowledge with respect to retaliation. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. New Breed Logistics" on Justia Law