Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On Christmas night 2011, Coil and Starcher were walking home in Brilliant, Ohio. They stopped to rest along the road. Officer Kamerer approached in his cruiser and asked if anything was wrong. According to Starcher, the two stated that nothing was wrong. Kamerer asked for their names, but Coil got up and walked away. That caused Kamerer to “go[] off on [them] like a crazy person.” The parties disagree about the details, but ultimately both Coil and Kamerer were struck by a car. The crash caused Coil severe traumatic brain injury, requiring around-the-clock care. Kamerer broke his shoulder and leg and spent 30 days in a hospital. Coil’s legal guardian filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The district court denied Kamerer’s motion for qualified immunity, stating that a reasonable jury could find that Kamerer seized Coil without reasonable suspicion and was deliberately indifferent to Coil’s safety, based on Starcher’s account and the length of time Kamerer left Coil handcuffed, face-down in the road. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Kamerer exposed himself to danger when he raced into the road to try to save Coil from the approaching car, it is possible that he behaved recklessly, rather than negligently, in handcuffing Coil in the street. That is a jury question. View "Family Serv. Ass'n v. Wells Twp" on Justia Law

The Wenks have a 17-year-old daughter, M, who has an IQ of 70 or below, and requires special education services. M attended high school in Grandview Heights, under an Individualized Education Program (IEP), as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. In 2011, teachers expressed “concerns” about M’s father’s treatment of M. An administrator’s report to Franklin County Children Services (FCCS) included statements and behaviors by M that were thought to indicate sexual abuse and many comments about father’s physical appearance and demeanor. FCCS concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated; the police department dropped its criminal investigation. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Wenks claimed that the report was filed in retaliation for their advocacy to change M’s educational plan, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied the school administrator qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but denied the Wenks‘s motion for fees and costs for defending the appeal. The right to be free from retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights was clearly established at the time of the report and a reasonable official would have understood that filing a child abuse report in bad faith violated those rights. View "Wenk v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

Stafford was convicted of conspiring with four others to bomb a bridge near Cleveland in connection with their membership in a spinoff of Occupy Wall Street. Stafford had a history of mental illness, but, after a competency hearing, the district court found him competent to stand trial and granted his motion, supported by his appointed counsel, to represent himself at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the district court could likely have exercised its discretion, recognized by the Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, to impose counsel under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of that discretion in this case to grant Stafford’s motion and permit Stafford to defend himself. The court carefully examined Stafford’s ability to represent himself, and standby counsel was provided. The court upheld application of a Guidelines enhancement for crimes of terrorism. View "United States v. Stafford" on Justia Law

Henricks, an Ohio prisoner, had symptoms of acute appendicitis. The following day, upon the recommendation of Dr. Gonzalez, the prison medical director, Henricks was sent to an emergency room. Officer Maynard, who had accompanied Henricks, initially refused to remove Henricks’s restraints, causing a 45-minute delay. The surgery caused nerve damage to Henricks’s leg. Gonzalez refused to prescribe a medication (Neurontin) for the pain caused by that nerve damage, although other doctors indicated that Neurontin was necessary. Henricks filed a pro se complaint (42 U.S.C. 1983) regarding his medical care, naming Maynard and Gonzalez, who invoked qualified immunity. A magistrate concluded that Henricks had stated a colorable claim, but did not address qualified immunity. The defendants did not file an answer, but litigated discovery requests in the ensuing years. The district court subsequently granted Henricks’s motion to strike affirmative defenses of qualified immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act , finding that defendants had waived them by not asserting them in an answer and that permitting them to assert the defenses at so late would unduly prejudice Henricks. The Sixth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the exhaustion requirement ruling and upheld the holding that defendants waived their qualified immunity defense. View "Henricks v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

An officer stopped a rental car, in which Winters was the passenger, for speeding. The occupants’ nervous behavior, inconsistent, implausible travel plans, and suspicious rental arrangement led the officer to believe that they might be trafficking contraband. After he issued a warning ticket, the officer extended the stop for four minutes to retrieve his drug-detection dog from his cruiser, deploying his dog 24 minutes after the stop was initiated. The dog alerted to narcotics. Searching the vehicle, the officer discovered heroin in Winters’s bag on the seat. Winters was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin. He entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal denial of his suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the officer unreasonably extended the stop and that the 2013 Supreme Court decision, Florida v. Jardines established that a dog sniff must be justified by probable cause, not mere reasonable suspicion. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified extending the stop. The Jardines decision is premised on special protections accorded to the home and does not alter the analysis for traffic stops. The officer was entitled to reasonably rely on binding precedent, that the use of a drug-detection dog during a lawful traffic stop does not require probable cause. View "United States v. Winters" on Justia Law

Painesville Police Department Officers, initially responding to a noise issue, entered the Nall apartment and tasered Mr. Nall for a total of 26 seconds. During the tasering, Nall began foaming at the mouth, stopped breathing, and went into cardiac arrest. He was rushed to a hospital, where he remained for two weeks. As a result of his cardiac arrest, Nall suffers from anoxic brain injury—injury to the brain due to lack of oxygen—and his mental functioning remains greatly impaired. Both Nalls were charged with disorderly conduct as a result of the incident, though charges were later dropped. The Nalls sued, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and several state law claims against the Officers. The Officers unsuccessfully sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for the federal claims and immunity under Ohio state law for the state law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Warrantless entries based on the emergency aid exception require both the potential for injury to the officers or others and the need for swift action. Whether the facts of this case meet those criteria cannot be answered on summary judgment because the pertinent facts are in dispute. View "Goodwin v. City of Painesville" on Justia Law

In 2009, a rape suspect (Bynum) led Columbus, Ohio police officers on a highway car chase before crossing the median, accelerating the wrong way, and ramming head-on into a semitrailer. Officers surrounded his car and fatally shot Bynum after he reached down into the car, despite police commands to “show his hands,” and then clasped his hands into a shooting posture, pointing them at the officers. The officers fired 80 shots and did not recover a gun from Bynum’s car. Bynum’s mother sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Bynum’s conduct gave the officers probable cause to believe that he had a gun and posed a threat of serious physical harm. The officers knew from police radio that Bynum was wanted on serious charges and was potentially armed; they were told he had a concealed-carry permit. That Bynum was actually unarmed and did not have a permit is irrelevant; what matters is the reasonableness of the officers’ belief as they “did not and could not have known” otherwise. The officers also knew Bynum was determined to avoid arrest, even at the expense of others’ safety and his own life. View "Pollard v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

Wesley, an elementary school counselor and behavioral specialist, was accused of sexual abuse of a seven-year-old boy. The child had a history of psychiatric problems. A social worker contacted her friend, Rigney, a Covington Police Officer, rather than going through normal channels. They extensively interviewed other children, but none corroborated the allegations; a medical examination did not corroborate the allegations. Wesley was terminated. Wesley had unsuccessfully attempted to talk with Rigney. Nor was he interviewed by the social worker, who decided that the allegations had been substantiated and sent that finding to the school and the teacher licensing board. Wesley appealed; 84 days after the initial allegations and 10 days after learning of the negative medical examination, Rigney sought a warrant. Deputies arrested Wesley. The child and his mother refused to cooperate. Charges were dismissed. A hearing officer reversed the finding of substantiated abuse. Wesley filed a civil rights lawsuit against Rigney. The district court dismissed false arrest, outrage, and negligent investigation claims, finding that probable cause supported the arrest and that Rigney was qualifiedly immune, and granted Rigney summary judgment on Wesley’s retaliatory arrest claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rigney waited almost three months before seeking a warrant and omitted from her application material facts demonstrating the unreliability of the allegations, undermining the existence of probable cause. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Based on confusing statements overheard by a 911 operator, officers pulled over Brown, ordered her out of her car at gunpoint, threw her to the ground, handcuffed her, and detained her in handcuffs for approximately 10 minutes. Brown sued three officers who seized her, and others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment for unreasonable seizure and excessive force and under Michigan state law for assault and battery. The district court denied qualified and governmental immunity to the officers, concluding that, while the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown, the stop ripened into an unlawful arrest. The court held that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Brown’s testimony reflects a degree of force against a compliant subject that was clearly established as excessive well before the officers seized her. Taking Brown’s version of events as true, the officers threw her onto the ground, despite the fact that she was clearly afraid and cooperating with their orders. A jury could find that this behavior “shows such indifference to whether harm w[ould] result as to be equal to a willingness that harm w[ould] result.” View "Brown v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of two people in their apartment. The male victim had nine stab wounds. The pregnant female victim died as a result of manual strangulation and was stabbed after she was dead. Wheeler, ultimately convicted of the murders, changed his story several times. He eventually admitted being in the apartment on that night, after the male victim was stabbed, but claimed that the assailant was inside the apartment and that he and that person fought, resulting in his wounds. The Sixth Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus must issue as to the death sentence because the trial court erroneously struck from the jury Kovatch, an eligible juror who may have been in favor of sparing Wheeler’s life. The court, after examination of Kovatch, found him not to be “problematic” as a juror but one who “could consider the entire range” of penalties. The next day the court excused him because the judge mistakenly remembered him saying he would not consider the death penalty. As a matter of procedural fairness in administering the death penalty, the Supreme Court has observed, the for-cause exclusion of an otherwise-eligible juror unnecessarily narrows the cross-section of venire members required under the Sixth Amendment. View "Wheeler v. Simpson" on Justia Law