Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Greco drank wine, drove her car into a ditch, and walked to a nearby gas station where she met EMTs refueling their ambulance. They smelled alcohol on her breath and called the police. Greco ran behind the station. Deputy Clayton arrived with his canine, Diago, other officers, and civilian “ride along,” Stuart. Clayton instructed Diago to track Greco. Clayton claims he was concerned about Greco’s well-being because, despite cold and wet weather, Greco was wearing sandals and a short-sleeved shirt. Clayton thought she might be injured. He announced their presence and entered a “swamp area,” slipped and fell, looked up and heard screaming as Diago bit Greco’s leg. Clayton waited for Greco to stop moving so he could ensure she was weaponless. After “10 to 20 seconds,” Clayton released Diago and summoned the EMTs. Greco claims she ran to “bushes” scared, alone, and needing to pee and was squatting when men approached with a dog, shouting “put your hands on your head.” Clayton “sicked the dog.” She dropped to protect herself, but the dog held on. Stuart agrees that the “woods” were slippery and that Greco was belligerent and on her back kicking the dog. Greco had a thigh injury and filed suit. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, holding that a jury could reasonably believe that Clayton intentionally detained Greco with an unconstitutional level of force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the conflicting claims. View "Greco v. Cnty. of Livingston" on Justia Law

Tyler was involuntarily committed to a mental institution, 28 years ago, for less than one month after allegedly undergoing an emotionally devastating divorce. He sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The statute provides: It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Tyler’s complaint validly states a violation of the Second Amendment. The government’s interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is not sufficiently related to depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commitment, of their constitutional rights. The government acknowledged that it currently has no reason to dispute that Tyler is a non-dangerous individual. View "Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Someone murdered Chappelear in February 1992. Sergeant Calhoun of the Hamburg Township police led the investigation. Newman became the primary suspect based. Ballistics showed that Newman’s gun was the murder weapon, which police found in a duffle bag that contained hairs similar to Newman’s. Masters said that he saw two young men with light brown hair drive by Chappelear’s home in a car much like Kulpa’s not long before the murder. Both Newman and his friend Kulpa had light brown hair. In Calhoun’s affidavit supporting his request for a warrant to arrest Newman, he presented this and other evidence. The judge found probable cause, and the police arrested Newman. A jury convicted Newman of murder. In 2008, the Sixth Circuit held that the evidence presented at trial did not suffice to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a free man, Newman filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution action against Calhoun, claiming that Calhoun’s affidavit purposefully distorted Masters’ statement. . The court rejected Calhoun’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that there was ample evidence of probable cause for Newman’s arrest and no evidence of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation by Calhoun. View "Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg" on Justia Law

In 1999, 76-year-old Dorothy Brown was found murdered in her Cleveland apartment, having suffered blunt-trauma injuries to the head. She was partially clothed, and foreign human pubic hairs were collected from her mouth. Ayers spent 12 years in prison based on a state-court murder conviction for Brown’s murder that was later overturned. He was freed in 2011 after the Sixth Circuit granted his habeas corpus petition, finding that the detectives leading the investigation (Cipo and Kovach) had violated Ayers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by using a fellow inmate to induce Ayers to make allegedly incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. Ayers filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Cipo, Kovach, and others, alleging a Brady violation and malicious prosecution. The district court denied Cipo and Kovach’s motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, and a jury found in favor of Ayers and awarded $13 million in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to address the denial of summary judgment, denial of a preverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the evidence, and denial of a motion in limine to exclude certain expert testimony because those arguments were procedurally forfeited. View "Ayers v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Department of Energy hired Vander Boegh in 1992 as landfill manager at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In 1998, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to BJC, which subcontracted with WESKEM for waste management services. Vander Boegh’s employment continued; he engaged in protected activity as landfill manager, including reporting environmental violations. In 2005, after soliciting new bids, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to PRS. EnergySolutions provided waste management services by subcontract. In 2006, Plant operations transitioned to PRS-EnergySolutions. Vander Boegh applied to be the new landfill manager, but EnergySolutions hired another candidate. Vander Boegh’s employment terminated. He filed an employment discrimination complaint, alleging retaliation for protected conduct in violation of: the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1)); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6971. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to EnergySolutions. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Vander Boegh lacked statutory standing because he was an applicant, not an employee. View "Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Pierce Township Officer Homer responded to a call from S.L.’s mother and “smelled smoke.” S.L.’s mother stated that her teenage son had set fires in the house and that she had found smoldering Popsicle sticks in his bedroom. Homer entered S.L.’s bedroom. Popsicle sticks were not visible, but S.L. allegedly admitted that he had the fire. Homer asked whether he was afraid that the house might catch fire. S.L. responded, “I really don’t care.” Homer arrested S.L. for aggravated arson, transported him to the Juvenile Detention Center, and prepared a complaint charging S.L. as delinquent. Bartley, a deputy clerk, signed the complaint, attesting that Homer had taken an oath in his presence, but never administered the oath. S.L. appeared 12 hours later before Judge Wyler, who scheduled the pre-trial hearing and ordered continued detention pending psychological evaluation. S.L. was released a week later; the charge was dismissed. S.L. sued. Concerning claims against Homer under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that a genuine dispute of material fact existed on probable cause for arrest. Concerning Bartley, the court held that there is no duty for a detention clerk to make an independent assessment of probable cause and that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether Bartley had legal authority to administer oaths. The court denied summary judgment for the township because the judge did not make a probable-cause determination. There was insufficient evidence that police training was inadequate. The court denied summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "S.L. v. Pierce Twp. Bd. of Trustees" on Justia Law

Catholic nuns volunteered with the American Red Cross and the Ross County Emergency Management Agency for an extended time, but did not receive compensation or benefits, complete employment-related tax documentation, restrict their schedules, or submit to the control of either organization by other incidents of an agency relationship. They were not promoted by the Red Cross and were terminated as Agency volunteers. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission rejected their complaint for lack of jurisdiction; the EEOC does not provide a Right to Sue Letter following a jurisdictional dismissal. The nuns sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act for religious discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their rights of free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. Finding that the Sisters had not sufficiently alleged state action, the district court dismissed the section 1983 claims, then held that, because they were not employees of either organization, the Sisters could not maintain a claim against them under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A volunteer relationship does not fairly approximate employment and is not covered by Title VII, nor were constitutional rights violated. View "Sister Michael Marie v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law

Williams was arrested on non-felony charges of driving with a license suspended for failure to pay a traffic ticket. After Williams paid her ticket and fines, she was instructed to undress and shower in the presence of a corrections officer and two other female detainees, where she was also subjected to a visual body cavity search, and was instructed to bend at the waist and spread her buttocks. While she was bent over, an officer sprayed her with delousing solution all over her naked body, including into her anus. There was no indication that Williams had lice. Williams was released the same day. While her putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether pretrial detainees could be strip searched as a matter of course upon entry into a correctional facility absent individualized suspicion. The district court stayed Williams’s action. In 2012 the Court upheld a blanket strip-search policy. The district court denied a motion to file an amended complaint clarifying that plaintiffs “not only complain about the use of delousing on all detainees, but also about the manner,” particularly spraying delousing agent all over their naked bodies, “specifically aim[ing]” at their genitals,” instead of using less invasive methods, such as permitting detainees to apply the solution. According to the district court, the question was resolved by Florence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations plausibly allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "Williams v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Waters, a former Michigan state legislator, became involved in a corruption probe involving her then-live-in companion, political consultant Riddle. With a negotiated plea agreement, Waters pleaded guilty to filing a fraudulent tax return (26 U.S.C. 7207). The district court sentenced her to a year’s probation on the misdemeanor charge. Eight days later, Waters moved pro se to withdraw her guilty plea. The district court denied that motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and later affirmed Waters’s conviction and sentence. More than three years later, Waters petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that her attorney was constitutionally ineffective in promising that her misdemeanor conviction could “easily” be expunged and in failing to represent her vigorously at sentencing because he had a conflict of interest arising from his simultaneous representation of Riddle. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Waters did not establish an ongoing civil disability. At most she has alleged an injury to reputation, but this is not enough to warrant coram nobis. Although Waters claimed that her ability to travel outside the United States has been impaired, she did not show how this is the case. View "United States v. Waters" on Justia Law

Ohio voters can cast a ballot in person on Election Day, or by using absent voter’s ballot procedures, Ohio Rev. Code 3509.01. One can vote by mail or early, in person, at a designated location if a request is timely received. Overseas uniformed military, those subject to disability or confinement, those in unforeseen hospitalization and those confined for a misdemeanor or awaiting trial can submit ballot applications up to 90 days before an election. Boards of elections send teams to obtain the ballots from confined voters. While teams visit nursing homes up to a month before the election, they wait until Election Day to visit the jails: persons jailed after 6:00 P.M. on the Friday before Election Day who are not released in time to vote on Election Day and who have not already voted are unable to vote. If a voter or the voter’s minor child is “confined in a hospital as a result of an accident or unforeseeable medical emergency” an absentee ballot application can be delivered to the board by 3:00 P.M. on Election Day and the ballot can be entrusted to a family member or to a team for delivery. No corresponding provision exists for persons in jail on Election Day. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Voting Rights Act, and the Seventeenth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to dismiss. The organizational plaintiff did not establish concrete and particularized injury to itself or its members. Even if it could demonstrate Article III standing, it asserts the rights of third parties. Its relationship with the persons whom it seeks to help—unidentified, future late-jailed voters—does not resemble the close relationship of the lawyer-client or doctor-patient relationships recognized by the Supreme Court. View "Fair Elections OH v. Husted" on Justia Law