Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tilley, 59 years old, began working for the Road Commission in 1993. In 2008, Tilley began reporting principally to Bartholomew, the Commission’s general superintendent. After several disputes between the two, Tilley was fired. He sued, alleging termination based on his age in violation of Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. 37.2201, and that the Road Commission interfered with his right to, and retaliated against him for taking, medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted the Road Commission’s motion for summary judgment on all of Tilley’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Tilley’s ELCRA age-discrimination claim, but reversed summary on Tilley’s claims under the FMLA. Tilley presented sufficient evidence to create a material factual dispute on his claim that the Road Commission was equitably estopped from denying that he was covered under the FMLA. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the basis that Tilley was not an “eligible employee,” it did not address the other bases on which the Road Commission sought summary judgment on Tilley’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Tilley v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

Tanner was convicted of a 1995 robbery and stabbing murder. The appeals court reversed for failure to provide DNA and serology experts. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. Tanner’s federal habeas petition was dismissed in 2005. Tanner, who is illiterate, then met with a legal assistant and requested a prison certificate of account, for her motion to file in forma pauperis. The assistant received that document on December 5, while Tanner’s unit was on lockdown. The legal assistant scheduled a “call-out” for December 6, so that Tanner could sign and file within the 30-day appeal period (FRAP 4(a)(1)(A)). Tanner told guards that she needed to pick up legal papers, but they refused. On December 8 Tanner signed the notice and delivered it to the mailroom for expedited handling the following day. Her notice was considered filed on December 9, 31 days after entry of judgment. The district judge granted a certificate of appealability on December 23. Tanner’s habeas appeal was docketed on January 9, beyond the last day on which Tanner could request extension of the 30-day period. On January 20, the Sixth Circuit issued a show-cause order. Tanner explained that guards had prevented timely filing. The Sixth Circuit dismissed. In 2007, Tanner filed a civil rights action against the guards. In 2012, a jury awarded damages. Tanner moved for relief under FRCP 60(b)(6), which permits a district court to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment … for . . . any . . . reason.” The court denied the motion, ruling that Rule 4(a)(1) is jurisdictional. The Sixth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that the court will be granting relief “to revive a lost right of appeal,” not granting an extension under Rule 4(a)(5). View "Tanner v. Yukins" on Justia Law

In 1983, Clifton was convicted of grand larceny, found to be a habitual criminal, and sentenced to life in prison. In 2010, Clifton was paroled. Tennessee’s Court Cost Center sent Clifton an invoice for $124 in outstanding court costs. Clifton attempted to pay and contacted the Center to establish a payment plan. Months later, the Board of Probation and Parole issued an arrest warrant, alleging that Clifton had engaged in “intimidating and threatening behavior.” After a hearing, the board recommended parole revocation. His appeal was denied. Although his certiorari petition was timely, the court clerk refused it because Clifton had unpaid court costs. A notice of appeal was returned unfiled for the same reason, referring to costs totaling $1,449; the decision complied with a chancery court Standing Order, which refers to Tenn. Code 41-21-812. Clifton filed a pro se habeas corpus petition. The district court acknowledged Clifton’s contention that he was unfairly prevented from filing his state appeal, but concluded that the claims were procedurally defaulted and that Clifton had not established “cause” and “prejudice” to overcome that default. The Eighth Circuit held that Tennessee may not constitutionally require that prior expenses be paid in full before permitting a prisoner to file a habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of probation revocation. View "Clifton v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Gumm is mentally retarded, with an IQ of approximately 70. He was convicted of the kidnapping, attempted rape, and murder of a 10-year-old and was sentenced to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, and his post-conviction petition was found to lack merit by the Ohio state courts. After he sought federal habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) that persons who are mentally retarded cannot be executed. In a post-Atkins petition, Ohio courts adjudicated Gumm mentally retarded and reduced his sentence to 30 years to life in prison, but rejected non-Atkins claims. On federal habeas review, the court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus on claims that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland; that Gumm received an unfair trial due to improper admission of incendiary prior bad acts evidence; that admission of a psychiatric report violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause; and that the prosecutor’s elicitation of inflammatory testimony and admission of psychiatric reports constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of the conditional writ of habeas corpus based on Gumm’s Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims. View "Gumm v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Despite the complete absence of physical evidence and Bies’ repeated proclamations of innocence, Bies was convicted and sentenced to death in Ohio state court in 1992 for the kidnapping, assault, and urder of a 10-year-old boy. The case against Bies rested almost entirely upon an unrecorded statement that Bies allegedly made to the police following a prolonged and highly suggestive custodial interrogation. The Ohio courts upheld Bies’ convictions on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, but vacated Bies’ death sentence after determining that he is intellectually disabled, and that his execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Bies challenged his convictions and sought a new trial. He claims that the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady; that the trial court improperly allowed Bies’ custodial statements to be admitted at trial; and that Bies’ attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus based on the Brady violation, and denied relief on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Brady claim, and declined to consider the remaining claims. View "Bies v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Greco drank wine, drove her car into a ditch, and walked to a nearby gas station where she met EMTs refueling their ambulance. They smelled alcohol on her breath and called the police. Greco ran behind the station. Deputy Clayton arrived with his canine, Diago, other officers, and civilian “ride along,” Stuart. Clayton instructed Diago to track Greco. Clayton claims he was concerned about Greco’s well-being because, despite cold and wet weather, Greco was wearing sandals and a short-sleeved shirt. Clayton thought she might be injured. He announced their presence and entered a “swamp area,” slipped and fell, looked up and heard screaming as Diago bit Greco’s leg. Clayton waited for Greco to stop moving so he could ensure she was weaponless. After “10 to 20 seconds,” Clayton released Diago and summoned the EMTs. Greco claims she ran to “bushes” scared, alone, and needing to pee and was squatting when men approached with a dog, shouting “put your hands on your head.” Clayton “sicked the dog.” She dropped to protect herself, but the dog held on. Stuart agrees that the “woods” were slippery and that Greco was belligerent and on her back kicking the dog. Greco had a thigh injury and filed suit. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, holding that a jury could reasonably believe that Clayton intentionally detained Greco with an unconstitutional level of force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the conflicting claims. View "Greco v. Cnty. of Livingston" on Justia Law

Tyler was involuntarily committed to a mental institution, 28 years ago, for less than one month after allegedly undergoing an emotionally devastating divorce. He sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The statute provides: It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Tyler’s complaint validly states a violation of the Second Amendment. The government’s interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is not sufficiently related to depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commitment, of their constitutional rights. The government acknowledged that it currently has no reason to dispute that Tyler is a non-dangerous individual. View "Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Someone murdered Chappelear in February 1992. Sergeant Calhoun of the Hamburg Township police led the investigation. Newman became the primary suspect based. Ballistics showed that Newman’s gun was the murder weapon, which police found in a duffle bag that contained hairs similar to Newman’s. Masters said that he saw two young men with light brown hair drive by Chappelear’s home in a car much like Kulpa’s not long before the murder. Both Newman and his friend Kulpa had light brown hair. In Calhoun’s affidavit supporting his request for a warrant to arrest Newman, he presented this and other evidence. The judge found probable cause, and the police arrested Newman. A jury convicted Newman of murder. In 2008, the Sixth Circuit held that the evidence presented at trial did not suffice to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a free man, Newman filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution action against Calhoun, claiming that Calhoun’s affidavit purposefully distorted Masters’ statement. . The court rejected Calhoun’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that there was ample evidence of probable cause for Newman’s arrest and no evidence of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation by Calhoun. View "Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg" on Justia Law

In 1999, 76-year-old Dorothy Brown was found murdered in her Cleveland apartment, having suffered blunt-trauma injuries to the head. She was partially clothed, and foreign human pubic hairs were collected from her mouth. Ayers spent 12 years in prison based on a state-court murder conviction for Brown’s murder that was later overturned. He was freed in 2011 after the Sixth Circuit granted his habeas corpus petition, finding that the detectives leading the investigation (Cipo and Kovach) had violated Ayers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by using a fellow inmate to induce Ayers to make allegedly incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. Ayers filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Cipo, Kovach, and others, alleging a Brady violation and malicious prosecution. The district court denied Cipo and Kovach’s motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, and a jury found in favor of Ayers and awarded $13 million in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to address the denial of summary judgment, denial of a preverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the evidence, and denial of a motion in limine to exclude certain expert testimony because those arguments were procedurally forfeited. View "Ayers v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Department of Energy hired Vander Boegh in 1992 as landfill manager at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In 1998, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to BJC, which subcontracted with WESKEM for waste management services. Vander Boegh’s employment continued; he engaged in protected activity as landfill manager, including reporting environmental violations. In 2005, after soliciting new bids, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to PRS. EnergySolutions provided waste management services by subcontract. In 2006, Plant operations transitioned to PRS-EnergySolutions. Vander Boegh applied to be the new landfill manager, but EnergySolutions hired another candidate. Vander Boegh’s employment terminated. He filed an employment discrimination complaint, alleging retaliation for protected conduct in violation of: the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1)); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6971. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to EnergySolutions. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Vander Boegh lacked statutory standing because he was an applicant, not an employee. View "Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc." on Justia Law