Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Frieder joined Morehead State University in 2006 as an assistant professor of art history. During his time in probation, Frieder excelled in professional achievement and service but had difficulty teaching. The reviews of his introductory art history class were consistently abysmal. Frieder’s evaluators suggested improvements, asking Frieder to observe other teachers or visit the “Center for Teaching & Learning,” but after four years of renewing Frieder’s contract, the evaluators voted against tenure and the provost and president agreed. Frieder sued, alleging violation of the First Amendment and a Kentucky statute that prohibits disability-based discrimination, KRS 344.040. Frieder argued that his evaluators retaliated against his “idiosyncratic teaching methods,” which allegedly involved context-appropriate uses of the middle finger and that the tenure decision stemmed from his diagnosis of bipolar disorder, which he admitted his evaluators knew nothing about. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No evidence showed that anything other than his poor student ratings and disorganization motivated the tenure decision. View "Frieder v. Morehead St. Univ." on Justia Law

Following the 2004 murder of Mary Stevenson, an Ohio state-court jury convicted Frazier, of aggravated murder (with two death-penalty specifications), aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, and recommended the death penalty. The judge sentenced him to die by lethal injection. After exhausting his state appeals, Frazier unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia (2002), due to his intellectual disability; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and that Ohio’s lethal-injection regime is unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state courts’ decisions were not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as defined by the United States Supreme Court. Frazier’s substantive Atkins claim remains procedurally defaulted because he did not show by clear and convincing evidence that he is mentally retarded. Under applicable law, the Ohio courts were not objectively unreasonable in rejecting his ineffective-assistance claims, and Frazier’s constitutional challenge to Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol requires the accumulation of evidence in another court. View "Frazier v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Memphis’s promotional processes have caused controversy for nearly 40 years, prompting numerous lawsuits alleging racial and gender discrimination by such parties including the U.S. Department of Justice, the Afro-American Police Association, and white and minority officers. The city instituted a process in 1996 designed by an industrial and organizational psychologist, and overseen by a Department of Justice consultant and adjusted the process in 2000. After the city discovered that leaked answers compromised the results, it readjusted and ultimately consented to the invalidation of the 2000 process. The city hired outside consultants to design replacement tests that would become the 2002 process. The district court dismissed a negligence claim concerning the already-invalidated 2000 process under Tennessee’s governmental-immunity statute, Tenn. Code 29-20-205; invalidated the 2002 process for violating Title VII’s disparate-impact prohibition, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1); and awarded back pay and interest to plaintiffs and more than $1 million in fees and expenses to their attorneys. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the immunity-based dismissal, reversed the Title VII judgment invalidating the 2002 process, vacated the fees award and remanded. The court noted that plaintiffs failed to present evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact regarding the availability of equally valid, less discriminatory alternative testing. View "Acosta v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

Roberson was incarcerated at a Michigan correctional facility. Corrections officer Torres went to Roberson’s cell and ordered Roberson to back up to the cell door to be placed in restraints. When Roberson did not comply, Torres sprayed a chemical agent into the cell. Torres issued Roberson a major-misconduct ticket for his failure to comply with the order. At a subsequent hearing, Roberson claimed that he did not understand Torres’s order because he was asleep when it was given and did not awaken until after Torres deployed gas into his cell. Roberson claimed that, although he had been awake and had refused to come out of his cell earlier, he had subsequently fallen asleep. Roberson ceased to reasonably cooperate with the review process and the hearing officer stated that he was “unconvinced” that the sergeant gave the order to a sleeping prisoner. In Roberson’s civil rights suit, the district court denied Torres qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that a genuine issue exists as to whether Roberson was sleeping at the time he was sprayed and, if so, whether Torres’s actions constituted excessive force, given Roberson’s admission that he was covered from head to toe in his blanket. View "Roberson v. Torres" on Justia Law

After a “buy-bust” operation orchestrated by Dayton police, based on information from a confidential informant, Detective House shot and killed Jordan. Jordan, not the intended target of the bullet, sat in the front passenger seat of a vehicle that, moments before the shot was fired, had been driven into two officers in an attempt to escape. Jordan’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that House used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the city failed to train and supervise its employees adequately. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding House’s actions objectively reasonable. The “calculus of reasonableness” allows for the fact that police officers must often “make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” An officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment where, although ultimately wrong in his or her assessment of the circumstances, “a dangerous situation evolved quickly to a safe one before the police officer had a chance to realize the change.” View "Cass v. City of Dayton" on Justia Law

In 2011, a group of protesters calling themselves “Occupy Nashville” established an around-the-clock presence on the Nashville War Memorial Plaza, with the aim of bringing attention to disparities in wealth and power in the United States. After several weeks of occupying the Plaza, representatives of the protesters sought a meeting with state officials to discuss safety and health concerns that had developed. The state agreed and adopted a new policy that imposed a curfew for the Plaza. Those policies may have been promulgated in derogation of Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Six protesters were later arrested for violating that curfew and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against state officials, alleging violations of rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Two officials appealed the district court’s ruling that that they were not entitled to qualified immunity and were personally liable for damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state officials are protected by qualified immunity because, regardless of the specifics of Tennessee’s administrative law, the protesters’ claimed First Amendment right to unrestricted 24-hour access to the Plaza is not a clearly established constitutional right. View "Occupy Nashville v. Haslam" on Justia Law

Miller disappeared in 1988. In 1999 interviews of Miller’s associates, Lamp admitted involvement in the disappearance and led police to Miller’s remains, buried in woods near Lamp’s property. Lamp stated that he and Blackston had killed Miller with the help of Simpson. The state charged Blackston with first-degree murder. In exchange for his testimony, the state granted Simpson immunity from prosecution and permitted Lamp to plead guilty to manslaughter. No physical evidence connected Blackston to Miller’s death. The state’s case depended on testimony by Lamp and Simpson and three women friends. Lamp and Simpson described the crime. The defense noted their favorable deals and inconsistencies in their stories. The jury convicted Blackston but the judge reversed because he had misinformed the jury regarding the extent of Simpson’s immunity. Before the second trial, Zantello and Simpson prepared written statements, recanting their testimony. At trial, the judge tired of their erratic behavior, deemed Simpson and Zantello to be “unavailable” and ordered their testimony from the first trial read to the jury. The judge did not allow the recantations to be read to the jury. The testimony of all remaining witnesses was consistent with testimony at the first trial. The second jury convicted Blackston. The Michigan Supreme Court twice reversed the appeals court, finding that it was not error to exclude the recantations or that other evidence rendered any error harmless. A federal district court granted a conditional habeas writ, finding that Blackston’s rights of confrontation and due process were violated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state unreasonably abridged Blackston’s clearly established federal constitutional right. View "Blackston v. Rapelje" on Justia Law

Kathleen was a tenured professor of geology at Central Michigan University (CMU). In 2011, her husband Christopher, a CMU student, sponsored a vote of no confidence in the president and provost of the university. Shortly after, in accordance with the faculty’s collective bargaining agreement, Kathleen took a semester of sabbatical leave, agreeing to return to CMU for at least a full year following sabbatical or return any compensation received during her leave. While Kathleen was on sabbatical, she became eligible for and requested a pay supplement. Her department recommended denial. The reviewing dean agreed. Kathleen appealed, but resigned before a final decision. CMU requested that Kathleen return her sabbatical compensation. When she refused, CMU sued in state court for breach of contract. Because Christopher’s tuition had been remitted for Spring 2012 as part of Kathleen’s benefits and Kathleen was contractually obligated to repay her benefits for that semester, CMU determined that Christopher had an outstanding tuition balance and placed a hold on his transcript. The couple sued in federal court alleging retaliation because of Christopher’s role in the no-confidence resolution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether CMU filed suit against Kathleen and placed a hold on Christopher’s transcript in retaliation for Christopher’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. CMU, as represented by its president in his official capacity, cannot shield itself from liability by invoking qualified immunity.View "Benison v. Ross" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals arrived at Krause’s Redford home on December 12, 2008 with a warrant for Krause’s arrest for felony possession of more than 50 grams of cocaine. When Krause saw the Marshals, he slammed the door shut and ran into a bedroom. The Marshals followed. One entered the bedroom but left when he found Krause standing in the corner pointing a handgun at him. As the others took up positions around the bedroom, they again announced themselves and explained they had a warrant for his arrest. Krause told them he had multiple guns and would kill anyone who tried to enter. A negotiator began talking to Krause from the hallway outside the open bedroom door. They talked for about eight hours. Sometimes Krause yelled and screamed; sometimes he “got very quiet.” Officers brought in Krause’s father and girlfriend to talk to Krause, without success. Eventually, the officers used a “flash bang” device in an effort to stun Krause. In the seconds that followed, Krause fired a shot at the officers; an officer fatally shot Krause in response. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The decisions to use a flash bang and to shoot Krause were reasonable, not “reckless,”View "Krause v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1991 Loza shot and killed four members of his pregnant girlfriend’s family. An Ohio jury convicted him of four counts of aggravated murder and he was sentenced to death. Ohio state courts affirmed Loza’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal and denied him post-conviction relief. Loza filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning: refusal to suppress statements Loza made to a detective shortly after the detective encountered Loza on the day of his arrest; the voluntariness and admissibility of his confession; exclusion of the testimony of a clinical psychologist, at the guilt phase of trial; the court’s charge to the jury concerning inability to reach a decision; and failure to inform Loza, after his arrest, that he had a right to contact the Mexican consulate.View "Loza v. Mitchell" on Justia Law