Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Over several years, Douglas sexually abused the dead bodies of murder victims held at the Hamilton County Morgue. His abuse of a body in 1982 led to a false rape conviction. Douglas’s actions were discovered in 2007 after his DNA was matched to semen found in the bodies. Douglas admitted to the abuse. He was under the influence of alcohol, marijuana, or cocaine every time he abused the bodies. Douglas was supervised by Kersker, the morgue director. Kersker admitted having concerns about Douglas’s tardiness and dependability as early as 1980. A co-worker testified that he often smelled alcohol on Douglas before, during, or after his shift. Douglas testified that his cocaine addiction was so bad by 1992 that he could not perform his duties due to heavy shaking. Douglas’s former wife testified that she called Kersker to complain that Douglas was drinking at work. Kersker hung up on her. Kersker may have known that Douglas was often having sex with live women at the morgue. Kersker knew about a domestic violence charge and DUIs because Douglas requested vacation time for incarceration. Douglas testified that he told Kersker about his suicide attempt, his psychiatric hospital stay, and his alcoholism. Kersker’s supervision of Douglas never changed. Relatives sued Douglas, who was also convicted of gross abuse of a corpse, and his supervisors, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A jury could find that the defendants recklessly and wantonly failed to supervise Douglas despite the known risks he posed to the bodies, so the court properly denied Ohio statutory immunity. The relatives, however, cannot establish a constitutional violation, despite the special nature of their relationship to their deceased relatives.View "Range v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Wershe was 17 years and 10 months old when he was arrested in Detroit and charged with various drug crimes. He was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine, and, in 1988, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At sentencing, Wershe was 18 years and 7 months old. In 1992, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the life-without-parole penalty for simple possession unconstitutional. Wershe’s first opportunity for parole was denied in 2003. In 2012, the Parole Board determined that it had no interest in taking action on his case and scheduled Wershe’s next interview for 2017. Wershe brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Michigan Parole Board members, alleging that the parole consideration process did not afford him a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court sua sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Wershe’s due-process claim, but vacated with respect to the Eight Amendment because the district court failed to consider the impact of Wershe’s youth at the time of the crime and his arrest.View "Wershe v. Combs" on Justia Law

McMullan and Smith, friends of 30 years, were related by marriage. They were addicts. During a drug-related fight, McMullan snatched a revolver from his wife and pointed the gun one foot from Smith’s chest. The gun fired. Smith later died from the gunshot wound to the chest. When witness McDowell testified at trial, he had a pending cocaine charge. Because McDowell had denied ever using crack cocaine at a preliminary hearing, McMullan’s counsel sought to cross-examine him about the charge to impeach McDowell’s credibility. The trial court denied the request. The court instructed the jury on the first-degree murder charge and on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. McMullan's requested involuntary-manslaughter instruction was denied. Convicted of second-degree murder, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, McMullan was determined to be a fourth-felony habitual offender. The court in McDowell’s case granted the government’s motion to downgrade McDowell’s cocaine charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. McMullan’s counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial because of McDowell’s plea deal. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected arguments relating to the involuntary-manslaughter instruction; counsel’s failure to cross-examine McDowell about the plea bargain; and failure to disclose the plea agreement. The Michigan Supreme Court granted affirmed on the sole issue of the jury instruction was warranted. McMullan unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments relating to the jury instruction and the plea agreement.View "McMullan v. Booker" on Justia Law

Crugher, a Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employee working at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF), sued Prelesnik, the warden of the ICF, claiming that Crugher was retaliated against, subjected to harassment and intimidation, and ultimately terminated after he took time off under the self-care provision of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D). Crugher sought reinstatement. The district court dismissed on the grounds that the claim is barred by sovereign immunity or, alternatively, was untimely under the two-year limitations period in the FMLA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that an action by a state employee seeking prospective injunctive relief (reinstatement) against a state official under the FMLA’s self-care provision is subject to the limitations period contained in the FMLA. In addition, Crugher failed to state a willful violation of the FMLA; allowing Crugher to amend his complaint to allege willfulness, to take advantage of an extended three-year limitations period, would be futile. View "Crugher v. Prelesnik" on Justia Law

After his conviction in Ohio state court for two 1999 murders and the aggravated robbery and kidnapping of one victims, Scott was sentenced to death. Scott unsuccessfully appealed and pursued state court post-conviction remedies, then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Ohio’s “course-of-conduct” capital specification was unconstitutional as applied; that the trial court erroneously failed to merge two other aggravating specifications, for robbery and kidnapping; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, by giving erroneous advice about the risks of making an unsworn statement, and by failing to present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial; and that Ohio’s method of execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional. Scott did not present his first argument in state court, so it was procedurally defaulted. AEDPA’s stringent standard of review applies to Scott’s second and third claims, and Scott cannot show that the Ohio courts reached a decision that contravened or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. Scott is currently challenging Ohio’s execution procedures in federal district court, in a separate action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and consideration of this issue is properly confined to that forum. View "Scott v. Houk" on Justia Law

The district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting Ohio from enforcing and implementing SB 238’s amendments to section 3509.01 of the Ohio Revised Code reducing the EIP [early in person] voting period from 35 days before an election to the period beginning the day following the close of voter registration. The court ordered that, for purposes of the 2014 general election: the EIP voting period shall consist of the 35 days prior to the election; all Ohio county Boards of Election must set uniform and suitable EIP voting hours, in addition to those currently established on specific dates. In setting such hours, the Secretary of State must, in good faith, take into consideration findings and legal conclusions regarding the impact of a lack of evening voting hours on the protected classes of voters. The Sixth Circuit declined to enter a stay pending appeal. Plaintiffs convincingly argued that informally, the Order’s contents already were disseminated to the public. Staying the Order would add to confusion and adversely affect voter turnout during EIP voting if the Order is ultimately affirmed. View "OH State Conference of the NAACP v. DeWine" on Justia Law

McKelvey served in Iraq. In 2004, he attempted to defuse a roadside bomb, and it exploded. He lost his right hand, among other injuries. McKelvey moved back to Michigan and accepted a civilian position with the Army as an operations specialist. At the new job, he received only menial assignments and was constantly taunted by colleagues, often about his war-related injuries. He eventually reached the breaking point and resigned in 2007. McKelvey sued the Army for disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The Army offered to reinstate him in a new position at a new location that was otherwise equivalent to his old job and later offered $300,000 to settle the whole dispute. He rejected both offers. His claims of hostile work environment and constructive discharge, went to trial. The jury ruled in his favor, awarding him nearly $4.4 million in front pay. The district court vacated that award, however, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, precluding front pay and holding that reinstatement was the proper remedy under the statute. A year after the remand, McKelvey and the Army settled. The district court awarded attorney’s fees to McKelvey as a prevailing party. View "McKelvey v. Sec'y of U.S. Army" on Justia Law

McKamey, a private non-profit corporation that contracted with Chattanooga to provide animal-welfare services, received complaints about conditions at United pet store. McKamey employees Walsh and Nicholson discovered animals without water, and with no working air conditioning. Aided by Hurn, they removed animals and business records from the store and proceeded to revoke its pet-dealer permit. United filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the city; McKamey; and the employees, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that removal of its animals and revocation of its permit without a prior hearing violated procedural due process and that the warrantless seizures violated the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit held that Hurn, acting as a private animal-welfare officer, may not assert qualified immunity as a defense in the personal capacity suit. Walsh and Nicholson, however, acted as both private animal-welfare officers and specially-commissioned city police officers; they are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on the procedural due-process claims based on the seizure of the animals and of the permit. Regarding the Fourth Amendment claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on claims based on the seizure of the animals. Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on seizure of the business records. Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of business records. Qualified immunity is not an available defense to an official-capacity suit. View "United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

Loyd, an African-American woman, began working as a hospital security guard in 1986. In 2001 Loyd had a written warning for failing to help restrain a patient because she questioned the authority of the medical staff to have the patient restrained. Loyd received a warning in 2004 for refusing to work overtime. In 2010 Loyd left work due to illness without first obtaining permission, and, another time, was found on the porch of a nearby house while on duty. The hospital placed Loyd on final-written-warning status. Loyd was dispatched on June 16, 2011 to a room containing a combative female psychiatric patient. Instead of helping to restrain the patient, according to the hospital, Loyd told the patient that she could leave if she had been admitted for a drug-related or alcohol-related (not psychiatric) reason and demanded to see the admissions paperwork. Loyd’s actions agitated the patient, who tried to pull an IV out of her arm. Other guards restrained the patient. Loyd admits much of the incident, but denies that she failed to assist. The hospital conducted an internal investigation, after which it terminated Loyd’s employment. Loyd filed a union grievance, which was denied. The union declined to seek arbitration. The hospital hired a 39-year-old African-American woman for the position. After filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC and Michigan Department of Civil Rights, Loyd filed suit. The district court granted the hospital summary judgment on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland" on Justia Law

In 2010, federal prisoner Himmelreich filed a complaint against several defendants, alleging multiple causes of action. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of most of the claims and defendants, but vacated and remanded a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment based on Himmelreich’s placement in administrative detention for 60 days in 2009, allegedly in retaliation for filing a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and a claim of failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on an assault on Himmelreich by another inmate in 2008. Based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a),and a finding that the Eighth Amendment claim was barred because he had elected to file a claim under the FTCA regarding the assault incident, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that Himmelreich’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been excused and that the FTCA’s judgment bar does not apply to this case. View "Himmelreich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law