Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The city disbanded its dive team because of budget cuts, after which two children drowned. Plaintiff, a fire department employee and member of the disbanded dive team, spoke at a city council meeting, indicating that the budget cuts caused the deaths and would cause more deaths. Plaintiff was ordered to serve unpaid suspension, equivalent to three 24 hour shifts, on grounds of insubordination, malfeasance, misfeasance, dishonesty, failure of good behavior, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. After a grievance hearing the mayor affirmed the suspension, finding that plaintiff’s statements had been false. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether the statements were false; whether any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; whether a reasonable official would have believed any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; and, if necessary, whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighed the city’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

Secret Service agents staked out plaintiff's home to execute an arrest warrant for her boyfriend. After seeing the boyfriend outside the house, officer knocked. When he answered the door he was cuffed and taken to a vehicle. At roughly the same time, five agents entered the house and conducted a protective search, without a warrant, in the presence of plaintiff, who was visibly pregnant, and her sister. They seized a shotgun, ammunition, and (according to plaintiff) $9,600 in cash. Plaintiff alleges that the officers refused to let her use the bathroom during their search, forcing her to urinate on herself, that they pushed and pulled her from room to room, that they used racial epithets, and that they threatened to arrest her. She filed several "Bivens" claims and a civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court rejected some claims, but awarded $3,000 in damages for the search and property seizure. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not establish a civil conspiracy.

Defendant, convicted of several felony offenses in state court and sentenced to a maximum term of 27 years, exhausted state court appeals and filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court five days after the one-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. 2254) had run. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of equitable tolling. Although defendant proceeded pro se after his appellate attorney withdrew and did not turn over documents related to the case, and was limited to one law library visit per week, he was not diligent. His lack of access to the trial transcript and lack of notice of the nearly two-month gap between when he submitted his motion for a delayed appeal to the prison mailroom and when that motion was ultimately filed with the Ohio Supreme Court were "unfortunate" but did not excuse the delays.

Defendant was convicted of intentional murder and of possession of a firearm at the time of the commission of a felony. At sentencing, counsel expressed that defendant, due to long term mental illness, was not responsible for his actions and needed extensive psychiatric treatment. The trial court imposed a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and a two-year sentence for the firearm conviction. The court noted that a clinical report classified defendant as suffering from schizophrenia paranoid type in remission in an individual who displays passive-aggressive tendencies, mal-depression and non-compliance with medical treatment, but concluded that his mental issues did not rise to the level of useable defense. After exhausting state appeals, defendant petitioned for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed, denying a motion for equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether the extraordinary circumstances of his mental illness prevented defendant from diligently pursuing his rights.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. After Ohio courts denied appellate and post-conviction relief, the federal district court denied all 47 claims of error in a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that petitioner was denied a fair trial due to wrongful suppression of Brady material (inconsistent prior statements by witnesses); that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial by virtue of defense counsel's undisclosed conflict of interest and, in the penalty phase, because counsel failed to object to hearsay evidence and failed to adequately prepare and present mitigation evidence; and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal, because counsel failed to assert claims based on trial counsel's conflict of interest and wrongful admission of hearsay evidence at trial. The court found some claims procedurally defaulted and others not material.

Plaintiff was arrested for resisting arrest and was held overnight. Charges were later dropped. Plaintiff's account of the incident is very different from the description given by police. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims and on all constitutional claims against the city. The court denied summary judgment on a claim for excessive force under federal law and claims for assault and battery and gross negligence under state law and denied summary judgment motion on a claim under Michigan's Freedom of Information Act.. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants' arguments regarding qualified immunity, which were based on contested facts. With respect to a claim of governmental immunity, the district court properly decided that there were issues of material fact on whether defendants' actions were objectively reasonable.

Convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1983, petitioner exhausted Ohio state appeals and collateral attack. After dismissing his first habeas corpus petition, the federal district court granted conditional relief, was overturned by the Sixth Circuit, reopened the petition, and granted relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. At sentencing, counsel's mitigation strategy was to portray petitioner as a good person who lost his temper under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Counsel pursued this strategy despite having available the reports of several court-appointed mental health experts, which hinted at petitioner's difficult upbringing but did not provide specific details about his severely impoverished and abusive childhood. Despite these reports, counsel did not conduct an investigation into petitioner's background or interview any of his family members. Had they done so, there is a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence would have led at least one of the panel judges to vote against the death penalty.

Petitioner murdered his three sons as they slept in their home, two days after his wife served him with divorce papers. An Ohio court sentenced him to death. His appeals and collateral challenges in state court were unsuccessful and federal courts denied. habeas corpus. His execution for November 15, 2011. The district court denied his Rule 60(b) motion to reopen his habeas petition and a motion to stay his execution. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay of execution. Petitioner waited too long to file his Rule 60(b) motion and offered no justification for the delay. He has known about the factual underpinnings of his conflict-of-interest and ineffective assistance of counsel arguments since 2006. Those arguments have already been addressed and are barred from further review. Petitioner also cannot overcome the bar on second or successive habeas petitions.

Plaintiffs bred their dogs to each other and advertised 11 puppies for sale. Undercover animal services officers visited on the pretense of interest in the puppies. Without a warrant or consent, officers re-entered the home and took all the dogs, stating that they could confiscate the dogs because plaintiffs did not have a breeder's license and that if more than one dog were unlicensed, they could seize all the animals. Neither adult dog was licensed. Before the dogs were released, the adult dogs were neutered, all had identification microchips inserted, and plaintiffs purchased a breeder's license and paid $1,020.95. Plaintiffs were never provided written notice of alleged ordinance violations. The dogs contracted infections that required expensive veterinary treatment. The district court rejected plaintiffs' state law and constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs were not operating a kennel and were not required to obtain a license for a single litter. The court rejected an argument that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using subterfuge, but found that plaintiffs stated a claim with respect to the second, warrantless entry. Characterizing the release of the dogs as having elements of a shakedown, the court found that plaintiffs stated a claim for procedural due process claims. The court rejected substantive due process and equal protection claims.

During an investigation of home invasions, officers were told that plaintiff's boyfriend was a participant and that property had been taken to plaintiff's apartment. Officers executed a no-knock search. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that an officer had violated the Fourth Amendment, but was entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Even if a disparity between the warrant affidavit and the warrant led to the inclusion of items without the requisite probable cause, a reasonable officer would not have recognized the discrepancy and would have believed that probable cause for the warrant existed. The warrant established probable cause to search and the officer could seize any items that constituted evidence of home invasions. The district court erred in granting qualified immunity on a claim that the warrant was constitutionally deficient because it failed to describe with particularity some of the items to be seized. The warrant listed broad categories of stolen property, providing no basis to distinguish stolen items from plaintiff's personal property, although the officers had additional information about the stolen items that they could have included in the warrant.