Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The inmate, serving a life sentence for first-degree murder and carrying a gun while attempting to commit a felony, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and violations of state law. He claims that defendants improperly rejected his incoming mail and filed two false misconduct reports against him after his success in an earlier retaliation suit. The district court dismissed most of the claims as unexhausted, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to exhaustion, but reversed summary judgment on a retaliation claim because the inmate had not received requested discovery materials. The inmate was required to file individual grievances challenging all but one of the mail rejections; the state was not on notice of an ongoing problem because the rejections were based on different policies. Michigan’s rules provide that the only avenue for challenging major misconduct reports is a hearing, which the inmate did not request.

Defendant, a police officer, noticed a Tahoe that looked like a Michigan State Police vehicle and suspected that it was being used for impersonation of a law-enforcement officer. After state police advised that it was not theirs, defendant parked behind the vehicle, and approached plaintiff. Plaintiff stated that that he was a security guard, had a concealed-carry permit, and owned a handgun that was on the seat. Defendant handcuffed plaintiff. A check disclosed a warrant for plaintiff's arrest. Plaintiff was in custody for two hours before it was determined that the warrant was for another individual. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiff was not seized at the initial encounter or was subjected to a brief, reasonable "Terry" stop. A reasonable person would have felt free to continue walking after defendant's vehicle was parked behind the Tahoe; defendant neither displayed a weapon, nor touched plaintiff and did not use language or a tone of voice compelling compliance. The use of handcuffs and detention were justified because defendant was in a threatening situation. Failure to loosen the cuffs did not constitute excessive force.

The Sixth Circuit remanded the 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus case to the district court for factual development of an Ohio death-row inmate's claim that Ohio’s lethal-injection procedures violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court rejected the warden's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the inmate's claim was cognizable only under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Petitioner was convicted of drug and firearm offenses in Michigan state court based on her presence in a house where the drugs were found. She did not own the house and claimed that she did not know the drugs were there. Her lawyer, high on cocaine for much of the time he represented her, never interviewed any of the other people in the house or called them as witnesses. The district court rejected a habeas corpus petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit remanded. The one-year limitations period on habeas applications by state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. 2244, includes an exception: when a prisoner files an original petition within the one-year deadline, and later presents new claims in an amended petition filed after the deadline passes, the new claims relate back to the date of the original petition if the new claims share a common core of operative facts. Petitioner failed to present the claim in state court and, therefore, has not exhausted remedies, and the district court must decide whether to hold the claim in abeyance.

Sentenced to death for a 1992r aggravated murder, petitioner was denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. First noting that petitioner failed to timely raise the issue in state court, the court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion to suppress the fruits of an illegal stop and arrest. Based on an in-person report of criminal activity, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the petitioner and perform a pat-down. The Ohio Supreme Court found a statement, "I think I need a lawyer," was not an unambiguous request for counsel; even if the holding was incorrect, the evidence showed that the petitioner voluntarily reinitiated communication. The trial court conducted adequate inquiry before denying a motion to substitute counsel after the guilt phase of the trial. Petitioner did not establish ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase. Rejecting a "Brady" claim, the court stated that petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of a different result if the material at issue had been disclosed. The court also rejected a challenge to jury instructions concerning sentencing.

While pursuing a vehicle that fled from the scene of a drug raid, officers saw a 12-year-old, apparently crouched behind a car while walking the dog, and ordered him to stay put. The boy ran into a house, an officer pursued, and "chaos ensued" because the boy's mother did not realize that her son's pursuer was an officer. Officers cuffed and removed mother and son and, subsequently, punched and pepper-sprayed the mother. In a suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, the district court denied the officer qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the denial was based on a finding that material facts were disputed.

Proposal 2, a successful voter-initiated amendment to the Michigan Constitution, became effective in 2006 and prohibited public colleges from granting "preferential treatment to[] any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin." The district court entered summary judgment upholding Proposal 2. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and applying strict scrutiny because the enactment changed the governmental decision-making process for determinations with a racial focus. Proposal 2 targets a program that "inures primarily to the benefit of the minority" and reorders the political process in Michigan in such a way as to place "special burdens" on racial minorities. Admissions committees are political decision-making bodies and the Proposal is more than a mere repeal of desegregation laws. The court noted the procedural obstacles that would be faced by minorities favoring race-based admissions.

Plaintiffs filed suit under the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that personal information, as defined by the DPPA, was disclosed by individual defendants while acting as agents of the Ohio Department of Public Safety or the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV). The BMV apparently made bulk disclosures of personal information from motor vehicle records to a company, for an asserted permissible purpose, and the company resold or redisclosed the information. The district court determined that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal. the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The DPPA is not a strict liability statute and the defendants made the disclosures for a purportedly permitted purpose; they did not violate plaintiffs' "clearly established" rights. The DPPA does not impose a duty to investigate requests for disclosure nor does it clearly prohibit bulk disclosures.

After receiving assurance that her 72-acre farm operation complied with Michigan Agriculture Environmental Assurance Program cropping system requirements and with cost-effective pollution prevention practices and environmental regulations, which provides protection against nuisance suits, plaintiff planned a composting operation. State litigation concerning the plan was pending and a stop-work order was in place when neighbors started to complain about odors. After various inspections and orders, the owner received notice that the MAEAP certification was being withdrawn and filed claims against the township, its supervisor, state officials, and citizens. The district court dismissed claims against state officials, except an equal protection claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the officials were shielded by qualified immunity. An allegation that the plaintiff is a woman and that a man was treated more favorably was insufficient to state an equal protection claim; there was a basis for each of the state's actions with respect to the plaintiff's operation and no evidence that the same facts applied to the man's operation. Nothing suggested that the defendantsâ actions were not taken in good faith and pursuant to applicable statutes.

Officers went to the house at 11:40 p.m. to execute a warrant on the son, who had failed to appear on drunk-driving charges. Waiting in a breezeway, they saw the father in the kitchen and yelled to drop the gun. The father, with poor sight and hearing, asked who the officers were. An officer fired four shots. The father died. Mother and son were cuffed and detained. The district court dismissed several claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that the officers were not shielded by qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity for the officer who fired. If he shot while the man was trying to comply, as claimed by the son, he violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from deadly force. The court reversed with respect to the officer who was not a supervisor and did not shoot. The court properly retained the mother's Fourth Amendment claims; the officers had fair notice of constitutional violations inherent in subjecting a bystander to detention, excessive in duration and manner. The district court erred in not dismissing state-law gross-negligence and intentional tort claims. Although the officers may have been objectively unreasonable, they did not act in bad faith under Michiganâs subjective standard for governmental immunity.