Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Kares was convicted of raping a 16-year-old girl. The judge found five “Offense Variables” that increased Kares’ sentencing range. While Kares’ case was on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Alleyne) that the Constitution requires any fact that increases the mandatory minimum penalty for a crime to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Kares’ counsel failed to raise an Alleyne claim on appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Kares’ conviction and sentence. Kares then began collateral review proceedings in Michigan state court. Seeking leave to appeal the denial of his motion for relief from judgment, Kares first cited Alleyne. Michigan courts rejected his arguments. In 2018, Kares unsuccessfully sought additional DNA testing under MCL 770.16.Kares filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in December 2018. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Kares’ application for leave to appeal the denial of his motion for biological testing in April 2019. The district court permitted Kares to amend his petition to include claims related to that request; he filed his amended petition in May 2019.The Sixth Circuit reversed an order denying as untimely Kares’s motion to vacate his sentence. Kares’ petition for DNA testing under MCL 770.16 tolls the limitations period; it was properly filed and calls for “postconviction or other collateral review” under 2244(d)(2). The court denied Kares’ motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include his merits “Alleyne” claim, which was procedurally defaulted. View "Kares v. Morrison" on Justia Law

In 2015, McBride was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. After two trials, a jury convicted McBride on all charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the court erred in failing to admit his full police interview, that the evidence could not support his convictions, and that his counsel was ineffective. While his appeal was pending, McBride filed unsuccessful motions requesting a “Ginther” hearing to present evidence of his counsel’s ineffectiveness.In a brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, McBride first alleged that his due process rights were violated during his pretrial detention. That court returned this brief because McBride was represented by counsel. In a federal habeas claim, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), McBride alleged his due process and Miranda rights were violated during his arrest and detention; his trial counsel was ineffective; and the Michigan courts erred in various evidentiary rulings. The district court dismissed claims without prejudice, citing the unexhausted first claim. A year later, McBride moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that his exhausted claims should be allowed to proceed under the Supreme Court’s “Rhines” decision which gives courts facing both exhausted and unexhausted claims two options besides dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting McBride’s argument that the district court should have sua sponte considered alternatives to dismissal. View "McBride v. Skipper" on Justia Law

The district court preliminarily enjoined Kentucky’s ban on sex-transition care for minors. The court later stayed its injunction in light of a recent Sixth Circuit decision in which the court balanced the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest and held that those factors favored allowing Tennessee to enforce its law. Kentucky bans the same conduct as in that case; the plaintiffs bring the same Equal Protection and Due Process claims that the Sixth Circuit held were unlikely to succeed. The Sixth Circuit declined to lift the stay. As a sovereign state, Kentucky has an interest in creating and enforcing its own laws. The people of Kentucky enacted the ban through their legislature. View "Doe v. Thornbury" on Justia Law

Michigan State Police (MSP) detectives, assigned to investigate the 2011 Bates killing, learned that on the night of her murder, Bates was in her home with Jones and both of their boyfriends. Reed, Jones’s boyfriend, was charged. Jones said she did not want to testify and that “they” would kill her if she did. An assistant prosecutor saw Brown (Reed’s mother) following Jones as Jones cried, yelling that she “couldn’t go testify and she better not go in there.” Brown was arrested for witness intimidation. Brown was in jail for approximately 96 hours and was not brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing. MSP never requested a warrant for her arrest or took any other action relating to her detention.Brown sued the MSP defendants for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but, because of the “complicated factual scenario” did not determine at the summary judgment stage which defendants bore legal responsibility for violating her rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Brown. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. It was clearly established at the time of Brown’s arrest that her arresting officers had a duty to take her before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing; they are not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Brown v. Knapp" on Justia Law

Beauchamp had cerebral palsy. Her mother found Beauchamp unresponsive and called 911. Minutes later, four “First Responders” arrived and attempted CPR and ventilation. After about 30 minutes, they discontinued those efforts and declared her dead. They also called a doctor to obtain permission to stop trying resuscitation, although they had stopped resuscitative efforts five minutes earlier. Numerous medical indicators showed that Beauchamp was not dead—her capnography indicated continued respiration, her cardiac monitor showed electrical activity, and her breathing and pulse were perceptible to her family members. Despite inquiries by Beauchamp’s family members, police officers, and a funeral home employee, the First Responders repeated that Beauchamp was dead, explaining the signs of life as reactions to medication. The funeral home employee placed Beauchamp in a body bag and went to the funeral home. An embalmer saw Beauchamp gasping for air with her eyes open and her chest moving and called 911. At the hospital, doctors determined that Beauchamp was alive but had suffered an anoxic brain injury. Beauchamp remained on a ventilator in a vegetative state and died weeks later.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Beauchamp’s serious medical need. The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the city is not liable for any constitutional violation. View "Linden v. City of Southfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

Coopwood has bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. She was institutionalized several times from 2010-2017. On August 13, 2017, Coopwood (six months pregnant) stopped taking her antipsychotic medications because of concerns about potential effects on the fetus. Coopwood fatally stabbed her mother and was ultimately found “guilty but mentally ill.”In pretrial custody, Coopwood, not taking her antipsychotic medications, was repeatedly screened and denied any history of mental health treatment. Employees, aware of Coopwood’s history of inpatient psychiatric care, did not raise concerns. Coopwood alleges that, in August 2017, Jailer Watts dragged her to her cell and kicked Coopwood in the stomach, after which she suffered cramping with a bloody discharge from her vagina. She was hospitalized several times in August and September. On October 19, she was seen by a psychiatrist, Haddad, who determined that Coopwood had been psychotic for an unknown period and seemed unaware of her circumstances. On October 22, Coopwood, exhibiting bizarre behavior, was forcibly given antipsychotic medications. She was readmitted on November 8, reporting contractions. Labor was induced. Coopwood’s baby was stillborn. Coopwood contends that she attempted to file a grievance but that her verbal requests were ignored.Coopwood’s suit, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her medical needs, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants failed to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Jail’s staff thwarted Coopwood’s attempts to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Coopwood v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

Miller, who describes himself as “an active wine consumer,” asserts that he wants to order wine from out-of-state retailers and would like to be able to buy wine in other states and transport that wine back into Ohio for his personal use. House of Glunz is an Illinois wine retailer and alleges that it wishes to ship wine directly to Ohio consumers but cannot. Miller and Glunz challenged the constitutionality of Ohio liquor laws preventing out-of-state wine retailers from shipping wine directly to Ohio consumers and prohibiting individuals from transporting more than 4.5 liters of wine into Ohio during any 30-day period.The district court held that the Direct Ship Restriction is constitutional under binding Sixth Circuit precedent; the Director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the claims; and the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Transportation Limit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, reversed with respect to the Direct Ship Restriction and the plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the Transportation Limit. On remand, the district court shall determine whether the challenged statutes “can be justified as a public health or safety measure or on some other legitimate nonprotectionist ground,” and whether their “predominant effect” is “the protection of public health or safety,” rather than “protectionism.” View "Block v. Canepa" on Justia Law

Michigan State University's “COVID directives,” included a requirement that all employees receive a vaccine by August 31, 2021, even those who worked remotely. The policy included religious and medical exemptions. Medical exemptions were limited to “CDC-recognized contraindications and for individuals with disabilities.” It did not provide an exemption based on immunity acquired from a COVID-19 infection. The plaintiffs all tested positive for COVID-10 and claimed that, based on their natural immunity, it was medically unnecessary for them to be vaccinated. They did not comply with the policy; one was terminated, one was placed on unpaid leave, and one received a religious exemption.Their suit claimed violations of their constitutional rights to bodily autonomy and to decline medical treatment, alleging that MSU cannot establish a compelling governmental interest in overriding those constitutional rights; the policy constitutes an unconstitutional condition on continued state employment; and the policy contradicts the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) statute, 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-3. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. It is sufficient that MSU could rationally believe that requiring the vaccine for naturally immune individuals would further combat COVID-19 on its campus. The plaintiffs did not adequately explain how receiving a vaccine violates a fundamental right, which would invoke a higher level of scrutiny. The EUA is meant to ensure patients’ consent to the pharmaceutical they are receiving and does not mean that MSU cannot require vaccination as a term of employment. View "Norris v. Stanleys" on Justia Law

Tennessee enacted the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity, citing concerns that gender dysphoria treatments “can lead to the minor becoming irreversibly sterile, having increased risk of disease and illness, or suffering adverse and sometimes fatal psychological consequences” while less risky, non-irreversible treatments remain available. Prohibited procedures include surgically removing, modifying, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs and prescribing or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone with exceptions for treating congenital defects, precocious puberty, disease, physical injury, and continuation of ongoing treatment. It provides for professional discipline of healthcare providers and creates a private right of action.The district court entered a preliminary injunction, finding that the challengers lacked standing to contest the surgery ban but that the ban on hormones and puberty blockers infringes the parents’ “fundamental right” to direct their children’s medical care, improperly discriminates on the basis of sex, that transgender persons constitute a quasi-suspect class, and that the state could not satisfy the necessary justifications.The Sixth Circuit stayed the injunction, finding that Tennessee is likely to succeed on appeal. The district court erred in its facial invalidation of the law, as opposed to an as-applied invalidation. “Life-tenured federal judges should be wary of removing a vexing and novel topic of medical debate from the ebbs and flows of democracy by construing a largely unamendable federal constitution to occupy the field.” A right to new medical treatments is not “deeply rooted" in history and traditions. Tennessee could rationally exercise caution before permitting irreversible medical treatments of children. View "L. W. v. Skrmetti" on Justia Law

Officers discovered Brewer’s naked body tied to his bed frame; he had been shot twice. The case went cold for several years before an inmate told officers that Miller and Hall and two women had set up a threesome with Brewer in order to rob him. DNA found at the scene did not implicate either woman. The women implicated Martin. Officers knew the story was false but nonetheless interviewed Martin; the interview was not recorded. Martin, who claimed to have been "very high" on the night of the murder, waffled between denying any involvement and other stories. Officers falsely told her that her DNA was found at the scene and implied her children could be taken away. Martin failed a polygraph examination. Martin was told that “she’[d] walk” if she revealed the killer but that if she did not implicate anybody else, she would “go down.” Eventually, with a plea agreement, she implicated Miller. Martin repeatedly attempted to recant. Kentucky indicted Miller but eventually dropped the charges.Miller filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, destruction of exculpatory evidence, due process violations, and conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Because the conduct at issue was in furtherance of genuine prosecutorial interests, the prosecutor has absolute immunity for his actions, including ordering the destruction of evidence and purported thwarting of a court order. The other defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Price v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law