Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (amended in 2006 and 2011) imposed registration requirements, restrictions on living and working in a school zone, and reporting requirements. Michigan retroactively imposed these obligations, including those contained in the amendments, on offenders convicted before 2006 and 2011. In another suit, the Sixth Circuit held, in 2016, that the retroactive application of SORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. While an interim order was in effect, in another suit, Michigan passed a fourth version of SORA, effective on March 24, 2021, removing or modifying provisions that had been declared unconstitutional.In 2021, five Michigan sex offenders filed suit, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the Michigan State Police enforced unconstitutional provisions of SORA from 2006 onwards, including after the previous cases were decided. They alleged that state officials, whom they purported to sue “in their individual capacities,” knew that the invalidated provisions were unconstitutional, but failed to stop their subordinates from enforcing them, noting the governors’ duty under the Michigan Constitution to ensure the faithful execution of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. They do not plausibly allege that the defendants authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. View "Does 1-5 v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gaona fired a gun with the intent to kill a certain individual but accidentally shot and injured a bystander. Gaona pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to assault with intent to murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gaona was sentenced to two years for the firearm conviction, consecutive to a 17-to-50-year sentence for the assault conviction, based on a PSR which reported three prior misdemeanors, including one stemming from a 2009 incident, for which Gaona was (without the assistance of counsel) convicted of possession of marijuana via plea and sentenced to 30 days’ time served. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that state courts may not rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in enhancing a sentence if that conviction resulted in a sentence of actual imprisonment.The district court denied Gaona’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition on the same sentencing argument but stayed his petition so that he could exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court. The state courts rejected those claims. The federal court then rejected his ineffective assistance claims as he had not filed an amended habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that state courts may not, in enhancing a sentence, rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor that resulted in a sentence of time served. View "Gaona v. Brown" on Justia Law

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officers raided 23 stores selling cannabidiol (CBD) products because they falsely believed that such products were illegal under state law. The charges were dropped; the products were legal under both state and federal law. The shop owners sued the responsible law enforcement agencies, asserting violations of their constitutional rights and conspiracy to violate those rights. All but one of the shop owners ultimately settled. The district court then granted summary judgment to the County and Sheriff Fitzhugh.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiff presented evidence to support a claim of 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil conspiracy. Fitzhugh’s alleged behavior reflects interdependent decision-making with the Smyrna Police Department (SPD) and the DA’s office through the planning and execution of the raids, calculated to achieve an unconstitutional outcome. Although SPD’s raid of the plaintiff’s business was the overt act that directly caused the plaintiff’s alleged injury, holding the county defendants liable for their alleged involvement in the overall plan that led to that raid is the kind of conspiratorial behavior at the heart of section 1983 civil conspiracy claims. A jury could reasonably conclude that there was a “single plan” in which Fitzhugh participated. View "Rieves v. Smyrna, Tennessee" on Justia Law

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

Former inmate Morgan, a devout Muslim, sued Michigan prison officials for allegedly violating his free exercise rights by failing to provide him with meals consistent with his religion after he was transferred to a prison that lacked the capacity to produce compliant meals. Morgan filed a grievance with the prison five days after he arrived. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment based on Morgan’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, which requires prisoners to follow a prison’s grievance procedures before challenging prison conditions in court. The district court held that Morgan’s grievance only covered the failure to provide meals up until the date of the grievance, so Morgan should have filed further grievances as to the alleged free exercise violation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Morgan already put the prison officials on notice of unconstitutional conduct; requiring repeat grievances for the same course of conduct would exceed the requirements of the Act. At issue here is Morgan’s free exercise claim, which he raised by prison grievance. The facts Morgan has pled along with this claim, including staff laughing at him, are sufficiently ancillary to require no further exhaustion of his claim. View "Morgan v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law

Howell received medical screenings from nurses employed by NaphCare, which contracts with the Jail to provide medical services. Nurses noted his sickle cell disease diagnosis. Howell returned to the medical unit after he started a fight. Video shows Howell repeatedly falling in the hallway. Officers placed Howell in a wheelchair. At the medical sallyport, Howell complained loudly of pain and stated that he could not feel his legs. Howell slid out of the wheelchair and was eventually left on the floor. Nurse Jordan reviewed Howell’s medical chart. Medical staff had previously sent Howell to a hospital for sickle cell pain. Jordan concluded Howell was in pain but was experiencing a psychiatric issue. Around 5:40 p.m., officers placed Howell in a restraint chair, transported Howell to the mental health unit, and placed him in a cell with a small window on its door. At 6:06 p.m., Nurse Arthur checked on Howell, who was still yelling. but decided that he did not need further medical treatment. No NaphCare employee checked on Howell again. Officers checked Howell approximately every 20 minutes by looking through the window, seeing only a side profile. Officers falsified log entries and failed to comply with regulations concerning removal, rotating Howell’s limbs, or providing water or the restroom. At 9:45 p.m., Officers went to remove Howell and found him dead. The coroner determined that Howell died from sickle cell crisis.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Nurse Jordan and Deputy Erwin on deliberate indifference claims; a reasonable jury could find that they recklessly failed to act to mitigate an unjustifiably high risk of harm to Howell that a reasonable official would have recognized. Erwin was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Howell v. NaphCare, Inc." on Justia Law