Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

White. convicted of four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of having a weapon while under disability, was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, White argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney, Armengau, was under indictment in Franklin County, Ohio, for serious criminal offenses and “would have been conflicted over whether to devote time to preparing his own defense or that of his client”; “would have been reluctant to vigorously represent White" for fear of angering the prosecutor; and might have failed to engage in plea-bargaining in White’s case out of a desire to gain a victory over the prosecutor. The Ohio Court of Appeals declined to consider White’s claim because the record lacked necessary facts.In White's federal habeas proceedings, the district court found that Armengau had told White about Armengau’s indictment but White had decided to retain Armengau anyway. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Because White’s claim depends on facts outside the state court record, the Supreme Court’s 2022 "Shinn" decision likely precludes relief. Even considering the new facts introduced in federal habeas court, White’s claim fails. White failed to show that the alleged conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. White and Armengau’s cases were handled by different judges and were prosecuted by different authorities. View "White v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Under the Gun Control Act “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun,” 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The Act incorporates the definition from the National Firearms Act: “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b).The ATF, which administers both statutes, previously maintained that a bump stock, which drastically increases a gun’s rate of fire, is not a machinegun part. In 2018, after a Las Vegas gunman used bump stocks attached to semiautomatic rifles to kill 58 people and injure roughly 500 in approximately 10 minutes, the ATF reversed its position by promulgating the Rule, giving possessors of bump stocks 90 days to destroy or abandon their bump stocks.Hardin challenged the Rule as exceeding the ATF’s statutory authority. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment upholding the Rule, noting the rule of lenity in criminal cases and that Congress could resolve the ambiguity. View "Hardin v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) forwarded to the Knoxville Police a CyberTip from Facebook reporting that a 43-year-old male appeared to be using Facebook private messages to entice a 15-year-old female (M.D.) to produce and send child-exploitation images and engage in sexual activity. The CyberTip suggested that they had already engaged in sexual activity and included information matching Tywan Sykes.Charged with enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, section 2251; committing felony offenses involving a minor while required by Tennessee law to register as a sex offender, section 2260A; and knowingly possessing child pornography section 2252A, Sykes filed unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence retrieved from his Facebook account and cell phone. He argued that NCMEC is a government entity and that Facebook had become NCMEC's agent by searching his account and forwarding messages to NCMEC and that the month-and-a-half delay between the seizure of his phone and the execution of the search warrant was unreasonable. The court also partially denied a motion to exclude evidence of his prior sex offenses.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sykes’s convictions and 45-year sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and erroneously admitted evidence of a past sex-offense conviction; that there was insufficient evidence to convict on all charges; and that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law

In 2017, the County initiated an administrative tax foreclosure against BSI. The County Board of Revision (BOR) issued its final adjudication of foreclosure in June 2019. Because the County had opted for the alternative right of redemption, BSI had 28 days to pay the taxes before the County took title to the property. Days later, BSI filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the BOR’s final judgment and 28-day redemption period. The bankruptcy court granted the County relief from the stay on January 17, 2020. The BOR determined that the statutory redemption period expired on January 21, 2020. On January 30, rather than sell the property, the County transferred it to its land bank (Ohio Rev. Code 323.78.1). When a county sells foreclosed property at auction, it may not keep proceeds beyond the taxes the former owner owed; if the county transfers the property to the land bank, “the land becomes ‘free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.’”BSI filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a significant difference between the appraised value of the property and the amount that the County alleged BSI owed meant that the County’s action violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The limitations period began to run when the redemption period ended on January 21, 2020. If BSI paid its delinquent taxes during that period, the County would have been prohibited from taking the property. View "Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio" on Justia Law

In 2010, Keller and others broke into a Shelby County house occupied by Morrow and Jones and two minor children. Keller threatened the occupants with a gun while demanding money. One assailant repeatedly struck Morrow in the head. All the assailants ransacked the house. One child hid and called 911. After his conviction Keller sought a new trial, raising several challenges to his convictions and sentence; he did not raise a double-jeopardy claim. For the first time, on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, Keller argued his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, in that his convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault of Morrow were for the same offense, and that all of his convictions should have merged into a single conviction for aggravated robbery of Morrow. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal found that Keller waived his double-jeopardy claim by not raising it in his motion for a new trial as required by Tennessee’s procedural rules. Keller had acknowledged the waiver. Considering Keller’s double-jeopardy claim under plain-error review, the court held that the double-jeopardy claim failed.After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Keller filed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition on the double jeopardy claim. Keller, by his own concession, procedurally defaulted his double-jeopardy claim. View "Keller v. Genovese" on Justia Law

The Lemasters run a Lawrence County, Kentucky towing business, which was on the county’s “rotation list” of companies to call when it needed to order a tow. Both as fire chief and in his towing business, Lemaster sparred with Carter, Lawrence County’s “judge-executive,” the elected head of its executive branch. Lemaster criticized Carter on Facebook. Five days later, the 911 Center sent an email to dispatchers; its subject identified Lemaster Towing and the Cherryville Fire Department. Its body stated in all caps: “Per Judge Carter do not tone them out on any fire calls[;] use nearest department[;] . . . Lemaster Towing is no longer on the rotation list[.]”The Lemasters sued Carter and Lawrence County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that Carter violated the First Amendment by removing Lemaster Towing from the rotation list in retaliation for Lemaster’s criticisms. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Monell claims against the county; Lemaster did not tie the actions to any county policy. The court reversed as to Carter. Carter conceded that his communications with dispatch employees could constitute an adverse action. The record would allow a rational jury to find that Lemaster’s Facebook post motivated Carter’s decision to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. View "Lemaster v. Lawrence County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

In 2020, three individuals opposed the Kentucky Governor’s COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings and on interstate travel. They obtained preliminary injunctions against the orders. The case was eventually dismissed as moot. The district court awarded them $272,142.50 in attorney’s fees as prevailing parties, 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the fees award.A preliminary injunction may suffice to establish “prevailing party” status if it mainly turns on the likelihood-of-success inquiry and changes the parties’ relationship in a material and enduring way. These injunctions measure up favorably in terms of the nature of the injunctions, the longevity of the relief, and the irrevocability of the relief. The court also rejected challenges to the amount of the award. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

In 2015, Levine, an African-American woman, applied for the position of supervisor of customer services at the main post office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Levine had then worked for USPS for over 27 years, in a variety of positions. USPS did not select Levine for the position. Instead, it hired a white employee, Peare, whom Levine alleges was significantly less qualified than Levine. USPS disputes Levine’s allegations that the failure to hire her was racially discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting various factual disputes. Levine met her burden of producing enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury that USPS’s proffered reasons for not promoting her may have been a mere pretext for racial discrimination, so USPS was not entitled to summary judgment. The parties dispute the position’s requirements. Levine possesses three post-secondary degrees and has had seven different awards from USPS. Peare’s formal academic training ended with high school and she had worked for USPS for nearly eight years. Levine provided abundant evidence that she is arguably more qualified for the position than Peare. USPS’s reliance on Peare’s purportedly superior interview warrants similar scrutiny as does USPS’s contention that Peare had more relevant experience than Levine. View "Levine v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Gilbert, on parole for a state conviction, was arrested for printing false identifications and credit cards and was returned to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Federal authorities charged Gilbert with identity theft crimes. Wolf was Gilbert's appointed counsel. Gilbert consented to federal detention pending trial. Gilbert pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4) and 1028A(a)(1). After reviewing Gilbert’s PSR, Wolf realized that he had mistakenly led Gilbert to believe that the time Gilbert had spent in federal detention would be credited against his federal sentence. Wolf acknowledged the error. The court offered Gilbert the opportunity to withdraw his plea but Gilbert decided to continue with sentencing. The court sentenced Gilbert to 15 months on Count 1, concurrent to the undischarged Michigan term, and 24 months on Count 2, “consecutive to Count 1 and all other terms of imprisonment.”Gilbert filed a habeas motion. Wolf admitted that he gave Gilbert erroneous advice and that because of his incorrect understanding of the law he did not expedite Gilbert’s guilty plea and sentence; did not seek a downward adjustment under USSG 5G1.3; and did not object when the court ruled that the aggravated identity theft sentence had to run consecutive to all other undischarged sentences. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if Gilbert could demonstrate that counsel’s performance—initial error followed by correction—was deficient, he failed to present evidence of prejudice. Sentences imposed under the aggravated identity theft statute must run consecutive to all other (including state) sentences and are not subject to USSG 5G1.3 adjustments. View "Gilbert v. United States" on Justia Law

Around midnight, Woolridge walked through an Akron neighborhood where police were searching for a fugitive. Officer Collins approached him and asked for his name. Woolridge turned and ran, tossing several items. Officers caught Woolridge, who immediately said, “I got a warrant” and “I got a parole violation.” Collins moved Woolridge to a containment van while, Woolridge tried to speak with Collins, who brushed him off. Eventually, Collins asked Woolridge about the items he threw during the chase. Woolridge ultimately explained that his brother had been murdered and “I had a firearm.” Officers found the gun only after asking Woolridge to specify where he threw the gun. As Collins began reading the Miranda warnings, Woolridge said “I know my rights.” Collins proceeded to give them. Woolridge again explained that he had carried the gun due to his brother’s murder.Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Woolridge moved to suppress the statements he made before receiving the Miranda warnings. The district court suppressed the unwarned statements and permitted the admission of the post-Miranda statements. Woolridge pleaded guilty. The court varied upward by 13 months, imposing a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Woolridge knew he had a choice and decided to speak anyway. The court explained its reasons for the sentence: Woolridge’s numerous offenses, his pattern of illegally possessing firearms, and many prison rule infractions. View "United States v. Woolridge" on Justia Law