Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Edmonson County Sheriff’s Deputy Meredith attempted to initiate a traffic stop on an automobile for an unilluminated license plate and the failure of a passenger to wear a seatbelt. The automobile was being driven by Embry, with M.S. and C.S. (minors), as passengers. Embry attempted to flee. Deputy Jones joined the pursuit, which lasted 12 minutes (18 miles), with the vehicles reaching speeds of almost 130 mph. Jones learned that the initiating offense was an unilluminated license plate, that there were multiple passengers, and that at least one passenger was unbelted. Jones saw Embry’s vehicle fishtail and almost lose control and crash. Jones and Meredith observed objects being thrown out of the car. Another officer radioed that he had found ammunition where objects had been thrown from the vehicle. Embry’s vehicle made an abrupt turn and severely crashed into another vehicle. Jones tased C.S., then unconscious, after C.S. failed to respond to Jones’s order to show his hands. M.S. had to be mechanically extracted from the vehicle.The district court denied Jones’s motion for summary judgment on C.S.’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 and battery claims, and denied both Jones’s and Sheriff Doyle summary judgment on state-law negligence and gross negligence claims, ruling that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, agreed that Jones is not entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 and battery claims. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law on the state-law negligence and gross negligence claims. View "Browning v. Edmonson County" on Justia Law

During an investigation into whether Elmore sexually abused a seven-year-old girl, officers obtained and executed a warrant to remove Elmore’s vehicle from his stepmother’s home and search the vehicle. Elmore’s stepmother gave officers a key fob for Elmore’s car. Searches of the car and of a storage unit revealed no evidence. Weeks later, Elmore’s stepmother found that Elsmore had two more key fobs and notified the officers of her nagging suspicions that Elmore was hiding child pornography on one of the fobs. The officers also had a tip from Elmore’s fellow inmate. Aided by a warrant, a subsequent search of the fobs revealed a memory card containing child pornography. Elmore was indicted for knowingly possessing child pornography. Elmore twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the memory card evidence, then pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the suppression rulings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Elmore’s conviction (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2)) and the revocation of his earlier term of supervised released (based on a prior child pornography conviction). Elmore’s suppression argument rests on his view that his stepmother’s actions were the “tainted consequences of law enforcement’s unlawful searches and seizures” but the search of the key fobs was separated from the earlier searches. The affidavit passes constitutional muster. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Michigan Department of Corrections inmates may hold formal group services or possess certain religious property only if the Department has formally recognized their faith. Though the Department recognizes the Ifa faith, it is one of only three recognized religions that was denied group services. A group is not guaranteed religious services if there are less than five prisoners within the same security level in a facility; the Department may bar group services if they may pose “safety and security” concerns. When an inmate submits a request for group worship or religious property, the warden must forward the request to the Special Activities Coordinator, who must evaluate the request. The deputy director makes the final decision. Discretion is minimal.Between his conversion to the Ifa faith in August 2015 and filing this lawsuit more than two years later, Byrd sent four requests for Ifa group services and nine items that he considers essential to his faith (a straw prayer mat, herbs, and beads). Although Byrd enlisted the chaplain’s assistance, none of his requests received a response. Byrd sued, alleging violations of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The district court erred in viewing the problem as procedural; the long delay is tantamount to a substantive denial. View "Byrd v. Haas" on Justia Law

Wesson was charged with murdering 81-year-old Varhola and attacking (and nearly killing) his 77-year-old wife, after they invited him into their home on February 25, 2008. A three-judge panel convicted Wesson of several charges, including two counts of aggravated murder, and imposed the death penalty. Wesson unsuccessfully sought to suppress his confession to police due to his alleged intoxication and other factors when they questioned him. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court vacated one of Wesson’s aggravated murder convictions but affirmed his remaining convictions and the death sentence; the court rejected Wesson’s claim that his alleged intoxication vitiated his Miranda waiver.Wesson sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, and the government violated his right against self-incrimination when it introduced his post-Miranda statement. The district court found that Wesson made a credible claim of intellectual disability and dismissed that claim and a related ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to allow the state court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on Wesson’s second claim. The state courts did not unreasonably apply the law or facts with respect to his confession, which occurred when he allegedly was intoxicated. View "Wesson v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Sexton reported to Redford Charter Township to begin five days with the work-release program. Cernuto and Dunn were the program supervisors. Sexton was the only woman among approximately five participants. Township policy prohibited supervisors from driving alone with female probationers but Cernuto insisted that Sexton ride with Dunn in the truck. During those rides, Dunn made sexual comments and threats. Dunn later assaulted Sexton. Dunn explained to her that Cernuto had gotten him the supervisor job and that neither “told on” the other. Sexton reported the incidents to the Michigan State Police within weeks. Dunn initially denied the allegations but later told the police that he and Sexton had consensually kissed. Dunn pleaded no contest to criminal sexual conduct. The Township fired both men.Sexton sued Cernuto, Dunn, and the Township, alleging constitutional (42 U.S.C. 1983) and state-law tort claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cernuto’s summary judgment motion for qualified immunity. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Cernuto facilitated the assaults; an active participant in a constitutional violation can be held liable under section 1983. The restrictions on Sexton’s physical movement while in the work program were sufficient to create a special relationship between Cernuto and Sexton, giving him a duty to protect her. Sexton’s right to be free from sexual assault was clearly established. View "Sexton v. Cernuto" on Justia Law

In 2003, Bass, a Michigan “drug kingpin,” was convicted of conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, and firearms murder during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime 18 U.S.C. 924(j). Bass had murdered a hitman whom Bass had hired to kill Bass’s half-brother. The government sought the death penalty. Bass was ultimately sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. In 2020, Bass moved for compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the pandemic. Bass claimed that as a 51-year-old African-American male suffering from morbid obesity, he faced a higher risk of severe illness.The district court granted Bass’s request in January 2021 and ordered his immediate release. In March, the Sixth Circuit imposed an emergency stay; the court then reversed on the merits. The district court committed legal errors when it compared Bass’s federal sentence to his co-defendant’s state sentence and gave little weight to the concern that Bass’s release might endanger the public. By analogizing its role to that of a parole board, the court framed the legal question in a manner that Congress expressly condemned when it shifted away from the rehabilitation focus of criminal sentencing. On remand, the court must reevaluate the request based on current circumstances, which have materially changed; in April 2021, Bass was offered the COVID-19 vaccine but refused it. View "United States v. Bass" on Justia Law

In 2018, Traylor was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 1347; conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks, 18 U.S.C. 371; and five counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The district court initially sentenced Traylor to 135 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to 120 months at her recent resentencing. In a pro se third motion for a sentence reduction, Traylor argued that, due to her various health ailments (e.g., diabetes, sleep apnea, asthma, obesity, being a recent organ transplant recipient, and use of immunosuppressive therapy), she is susceptible to contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19 in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Traylor did not demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction because she had received two doses of the Pfizer vaccine, significantly reducing her risk of contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19. The district court was not required to address the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by declining to do so. View "United States v. Traylor" on Justia Law

In 2009, Augustin asked Jordan to “find somebody” who sold cocaine. “Hoss,” subsequently sold Augustin six ounces of cocaine for $5,100. The deal went bad and Augustin kidnapped Jordan at gunpoint. Augustin’s associate released Jordan. Augustin was arrested. From prison, Augustin tried to arrange for a hitman to kill Jordan. The district court ultimately sentenced Augustin to a 380-month term for seven counts of conviction plus a consecutive 120-month term under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. After an unsuccessful appeal, Augustin unsuccessfully moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.Later, Augustin filed a second or successive section 2255 motion, arguing that his section 924(c) conviction was unlawful under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. The district court agreed. Rather than resentencing Augustin, the court corrected his sentence by vacating the section 924(c) conviction and its consecutive 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Augustin’s section 924(c) sentence played no role in the district court’s calculation of his other sentences. View "United States v. Augustin" on Justia Law

In 1989, Middlebrooks of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to death. His conviction and death sentence were upheld on direct and collateral review. When Middlebrooks was sentenced to death, electrocution was Tennessee’s only method of execution. In 2000, Tennessee adopted lethal injection as the default method of execution. Under current law, electrocution is an option for execution only if an inmate sentenced to death before 1999 chooses execution by electrocution; lethal injection is declared unconstitutional; or the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) certifies that a necessary lethal-injection ingredient is unavailable. Middlebrooks will not choose execution by electrocution. In 2018, TDOC adopted a three-drug protocol of midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride as an alternative to pentobarbital.Middlebrooks and other death row challenged the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol. Tennessee then eliminated the pentobarbital protocol The state court dismissed their complaint. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that pentobarbital was available as an alternative means of execution, although other states used pentobarbital in executions.The district court dismissed Middlebrooks’ 42 U.S.C. suit, citing res judicata. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Middlebrooks' facial challenge plausibly alleged new facts that allow a reasonable inference that pentobarbital is available to Tennessee for use in executions. Middlebrooks’s as-applied claim does not rest on any newly developed individual condition that would render impermissible the application of res judicata principles. View "Middlebrooks v. Parker" on Justia Law

Canton’s 2006 Tree Ordinance prohibits the unpermitted removal, damage, or destruction of trees of specified sizes, with exceptions for agricultural operations, commercial nurseries, tree farms, and occupied lots smaller than two acres. If Canton issues a permit, the owner must replace removed trees on its own or someone else’s property or pay into Canton’s tree fund. For every landmark tree removed, an owner must replant three trees or pay $450. For every non-landmark tree removed as part of larger-scale tree removal, an owner must replant one tree or pay $300.In 2016, Canton approved the division of F.P.'s undeveloped property, noting the permitting requirement. The parcels were bisected by a county drainage ditch that was clogged with fallen trees and debris. The county refused to clear the ditch. F.P. contracted for the removal of the trees and debris and clearing other trees without a permit. Canton determined that F.P. had removed 14 landmark trees and 145 non-landmark trees. F.P. was required to either replant 187 trees or pay $47,898. F.P. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for F.P. on its as-applied Fifth Amendment claim; although the ordinance, as applied to F.P., was not unconstitutional as a per se physical taking, it was unconstitutional as a regulatory taking and as an unconstitutional condition. Canton has not made the necessary individualized determination; the ordinance fails the “rough proportionality” required by Supreme Court precedent. View "F.P. Development, LLC. v. Charter Township of Canton" on Justia Law