Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner on his claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase and that he was denied a fair trial because of jury tampering. The court concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling that petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel's ineffective assistance at the penalty phase by neither investigating nor presenting mitigating evidence was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and was not so obviously wrong as to be beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to provide credible testimony of jury tampering. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner defaulted on his juror bias claim. View "Hodge v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Training Academy hired Smith as a firefighter recruit. If Academy recruits do not pass their practical skills exams after three tries, they are dismissed. The vertical ventilation test requires climbing a ladder, then cutting a hole in the roof of a burning building, wearing full firefighting gear, within 10 minutes. Recruits study this skill in the classroom and then practice on a simulator. Smith and his squad took the test on the same house. Everyone passed on the first attempt, except for Smith and one other recruit, who passed on his second try. Smith failed all three attempts. The evaluating instructors noted that Smith hit the ladder with the running chainsaw, “would not follow directions," and “repeatedly cut towards his body.”Because Toledo was trying to attain a more racially diverse fire department, Smith was given two more opportunities to take the test. No other firefighter was ever given more than the initial three attempts. Contrary to Academy policy, Smith was allowed to complete the course with his squad and to participate in graduation. Before each additional attempt, the Academy provided Smith with individual instruction and practice. On his third attempt, Smith again failed three times. Smith was dismissed from the Academy and filed suit, alleging racial discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII) and deprivation of a liberty interest, section 1983; conspiracy to violate civil rights, sections 1985(3) and 1986. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. View "Smith v. City of Toledo" on Justia Law

While patrolling a known drug house, Sergeant Murch recognized a Buick that he had stopped twice before, each time culminating in a drug-related arrest. Murch ran the plates and discovered that the vehicle’s owner, Shehan, lacked a driver’s license. Murch saw the Buick speed away. Murch stopped the car for speeding and driving without a license. The driver identified himself as Garcia and admitted that he lacked a driver’s license. Because permitting someone without a license to drive a car violates Michigan law, the officers sought to discover whether Shehan was among the vehicle’s passengers. Two passengers gave names. The third refused to identify himself after repeated requests. A patdown of the unidentified man uncovered 11 empty plastic bags and $1033 in cash. Officers took him in for fingerprinting. Jail officials had the man remove his sweater. His arms bore tattoos: “Marc” and “Barrera.” After running the name through a database, officers confirmed that they had detained Barrera, a parole violator with outstanding arrest warrants. A strip search of Barrera revealed marijuana and cocaine. The Michigan trial court denied Barrera's suppression motion. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed his convictions.After leaving state prison, Barrera sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the officers s with respect to qualified immunity. The officers had probable cause to take Barrera to jail; his refusal to identify himself under these circumstances violated Michigan law. View "Barrera v. City of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law

Each of the petitioners obtained habeas relief in the Eastern District of Michigan because they were sentenced under Michigan’s formerly mandatory sentencing guidelines that included enhancements for judicially found facts. The state now agrees that Michigan’s mandatory guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment and concedes that petitioners are entitled to some form of relief but argued that instead of remanding for resentencing, the district court should have remanded the cases for a more limited remedy, a Crosby hearing, where the trial court determines whether it would have issued a materially different sentence had the Michigan guidelines been advisory rather than mandatory at the time of the original sentencing.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district courts acted within their discretion to dispose of these habeas cases as law and justice require. The U.S. Supreme Court has not clearly established whether a defendant sentenced under an unconstitutional sentencing scheme is entitled to a full resentencing or only a Crosby hearing but has a history of ordering resentencing hearings to correct Sixth Amendment violations. The fact that a full resentencing may require more state resources than a Crosby hearing is insufficient to find that ordering a resentencing is an abuse of discretion. View "Morrell v. Warden" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted of six counts of aggravated murder (with capital specifications), three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of kidnapping, and one count of felonious assault, and sentenced to death. His first federal habeas corpus petition was denied in 2012. In 2020, Jackson filed the current federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that: the prosecution withheld material and exculpatory evidence in violation of "Brady," the prosecution presented false and coerced testimony in violation of "Napue," and Ohio’s postconviction scheme violates the Supremacy Clause. Jackson argued that his claims were not previously ripe for review and therefore not subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)’s requirements for permission to file a successive petition.The Sixth Circuit denied Jackson’s motion for remand to the district court but granted permission to file a successive petition. It is unclear precisely how Jackson obtained the witness statements that he claims were suppressed under Brady, which bears on the question of whether “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” However, Jackson’s proposed petition also explains that “the exculpatory evidence was first disclosed by the State in Clemency-related Public Records Act litigation,” which presumably would not have been available until Jackson’s date of execution approached. Jackson has also shown that “but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty.” View "In re Kareem Jackson" on Justia Law

Johnson, a 56-year-old African American woman, was hired by Ford in 2018, as a production supervisor. While Johnson was shadowing him to learn the job, Rowan was in a position to evaluate Johnson’s performance. Rowan was known to have engaged in consensual sexual relationships with some of the female hourly employees. Rowan started making unwanted and sexually inappropriate comments to Johnson and to the female hourly employees under his supervision. Rowan constantly made comments and sent text messages and pictures to Johnson that were both sexual and racial in nature. Johnson testified first reported Rowan’s inappropriate and sexual comments and conduct in August 2018. In November, Rowan sexually assaulted Johnson by “put[ting] his hand down [her] blouse and grab[bing] [her] breast.” Human Resources eventually investigated. Johnson took unpaid medical leave and never returned to Ford. Rowan was terminated.Johnson sued, alleging racial harassment/racially hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court struck paragraphs in Johnson’s declaration, filed after her deposition was taken and Ford’s motion for summary judgment was filed and determined that Johnson had failed to satisfy the objective prong of the hostile work environment test. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the declaration did not directly contradict her deposition testimony and was not an attempt to create a sham issue of fact, the district court abused its discretion. There is sufficient evidence that Rowan’s racial harassment was severe or pervasive enough for a reasonable person to find the work environment hostile. View "Johnson v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, DeCrane became the director of training at Cleveland's Fire Training Academy and applied to be the chief. The mayor chose McGinnis to be the next chief. DeCrane said he was surprised because McGinnis had fallen behind in his required continuing education hours. When confronted, McGinnis lied. Someone tipped off the media. McGinnis resigned. The ensuing media coverage reflected poorly on the city. DeCrane did not leak the tip about McGinnis’s deficient training, which was an open secret in the department. According to DeCrane, Eckart mistakenly believed that he was the leak’s source. DeCrane contends that Eckart (among others) subjected him to three years of retaliation. DeCrane was not disciplined or demoted but he received no promotions, allegedly faced unfounded misconduct charges, had his Training Academy work undermined, and suffered a retirement-related slight. DeCrane sued Eckart, Cleveland, and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the individuals retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the other individuals and the city but denied Eckart summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Eckart’s claim of qualified immunity. While the First Amendment does not protect speech made as part of an employee’s government job, DeCrane would have tipped off the media as a private citizen rather than a public employee. View "DeCrane v. Eckart" on Justia Law

Cartwright is serving a 24-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). When Cartwright was sentenced in 2005, seven of his past convictions qualified as violent felonies. In 2015, the Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision invalidated ACCA’s residual clause. Johnson removed at least four of Cartwright’s offenses from the category of violent felonies. Cartwright brought a habeas petition challenging his ACCA status by arguing that his remaining convictions for burglary and aggravated assault do not support his ACCA sentence. The district court held that, even after Johnson, Cartwright still had at least three ACCA predicates because his Tennessee first- and second-degree burglaries qualified as violent felonies.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The government acknowledged that Cartwright’s claim is based on Johnson, a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” All three degrees of Tennessee burglary include entering lawfully and then opening a “receptacle” inside, with no unlawful entry or remaining required, which extends the offense beyond generic burglary, which requires unlawful entry into or remaining in. A “receptacle” in the Tennessee burglary statute need not be attached to the house. View "United States v. Cartwright" on Justia Law

In 1992, Hunter, a 23-year-old hitman for a Detroit drug enterprise, escaped from a parole camp and killed 23-year-old Johnson, to prevent her from testifying. Hunter was convicted of intentionally killing Johnson in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A), and using or carrying a firearm in relation to that killing, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Hunter, acquitted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, four other intentional killings, and three related firearm counts, was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, the minimum under the Sentencing Guidelines then in existence. Hunter unsuccessfully sought to vacate his conviction in federal habeas proceedings and unsuccessfully sought to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based upon retroactive Guidelines changes. After serving 21 years in prison, Hunter sought “compassionate release,” citing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court found that the risk from COVID-19 and Hunter’s asserted health conditions were not “extraordinary and compelling” because Hunter refused the vaccine but concluded that other factors together amounted to “extraordinary and compelling circumstances”: Hunter was sentenced before the Guidelines changed from mandatory to advisory; Hunter’s “relative youth”; sentencing disparities between Hunter and co-defendants who cooperated; and Hunter’s rehabilitation. The district court weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, noting Hunter’s “difficult childhood,” and letters submitted by Hunter’s family and friends, and discounted Hunter’s prison discipline record. The court reduced Hunter’s sentence to time served. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal and reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

In 2010, Gibbs (then 16) and Henderson, robbed a Flint, Michigan store. Henderson struck the owner in the head with a gun, severing part of his ear. Gibbs was not armed but took property. Before jury selection began, the trial judge commented in open court, "get the jury to come upstairs now and so we’re going to have an order of sequestration for witnesses only. And if any spectators would like to come in they’re welcome but they do have to sit over here by the law clerk, not in the middle of the pool." Three of Gibbs’s relatives supplied sworn affidavits that they and others were prevented from entering the courtroom during jury selection. Gibbs did not object to the closure of the courtroom during voir dire. He represents that he did not learn that his family was excluded from voir dire until after trial.The Michigan Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing; the trial court did not hold such a hearing but denied any relief. The Michigan Court of Appeals then found the claim defaulted because Gibbs did not contemporaneously object to the courtroom closure. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of his petition for federal habeas relief. The application of the ordinarily adequate contemporaneous-objection rule would, in these unique circumstances, be an inadequate bar to federal review. View "Gibbs v. Huss" on Justia Law