Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hughey, speeding, passed Michigan State Trooper Easlick, who flipped on his dashcam and stopped Hughey. Hughey’s car was uninsured and unregistered and there was an outstanding warrant for Hughey’s failure to appear. Easlick relayed that Hughey needed to pay the $400 bond on her warrant in cash immediately or he would have to take her to the courthouse. Hughey did not resist arrest. Easlick handcuffed Hughey’s hands behind her back and placed her in his car. Hughey expressed suicidal thoughts, so Easlick took her to the hospital.Hughey alleges that Easlick twisted her arm behind her back as he handcuffed her and did not check for tightness, that her shoulder hurt “[a]lmost immediately,” and that after Easlick removed the handcuffs at the hospital, a nurse observed “rings around [Hughey’s] wrists.” No part of the handcuffing is visible in the dashcam footage.Hughey sued Easlick for excessive force and deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Easlick summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hughey created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Easlick violated her clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Her allegations are enough to satisfy the “handcuffing test” at summary judgment. The dashcam audio does not foreclose the possibility that Hughey repeatedly complained about pain. A plethora of excessive-force handcuffing cases put Easlick on notice that the way that he yanked Hughey’s arm, placed overly tight handcuffs, and ignored her complaints violated her right to be free from excessive force. View "Hughey v. Easlick" on Justia Law

On May 13, 1987, William and Juanita Leeman were killed in their Hamilton County home. There was no trace evidence nor fingerprints. In 1997, the defendant’s brother and his father informed police that Hughbanks had murdered the Leemans. Hughbanks admitted breaking into the house with two accomplices. Later, Hughbanks said that a fourth man might have been present. Hughbanks admitted to confronting William but stated that an accomplice had stabbed William, Hughbanks stated that he did not know where Juanita was and said that his accomplice had “probably got her first.” Hughbanks acknowledged telling his father, brother, and uncle, “I killed somebody” and that he was by himself when he broke into the home. A jury convicted Hughbanks. The trial court imposed a death sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Rejecting a “Brady” claim, the court found that Hughbanks was not prejudiced by the state’s failure to disclose information identifying other suspects; documentation concerning the actions of one of the victims’ sons, that implicated him in the murders; the absence of trace evidence at the scene of the crime that implicated Hughbanks; eyewitness statements that did not match a description of Hughbanks; evidence that impeached the prosecution’s theory of the case; and evidence that impeached the prosecution’s witnesses. The court also rejected Hughbanks’ argument that trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing adequately to investigate, prepare, and present mitigation evidence. View "Hughbanks v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Leggett Elementary School principal Vincente called a child’s mother to pick him up. The mother stated that her “boyfriend who is a policeman” (Hendon) would come. Because of another emergency situation, police were at the school. Vincente saw Hendon speaking with Akron officers. Hendon wore all black, with a vest and badge that said “officer,” and his name on his uniform. When Hendon entered the office, the secretaries assumed he was a police officer. Hendon and Vincente talked briefly about Hendon’s efforts to restart the Scared Straight Program.The next morning, Hendon reappeared, uninvited, dressed in what looked like SWAT gear. He and Vincente spoke again about the Scared Straight Program. Later, when a teacher had a problem student, (M.J.) Hendon took M.J. out of the classroom and threw M.J. against a wall, verbally abusing him, then returned M.J. to class, Later another education teacher summoned Hendon, who took two misbehaving students inside and forced them to perform exercises. There were additional incidents, during which school staff, believing Hendon to be a police officer, allowed him to discipline children. Interacting with parents, Hendon stated that he was an officer with the Scared Straight program.Eventually, the Akron police arrested Hendon. Parents and children sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and Title VI. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, rejecting “state-created danger” claims. The actual harm that M.J. experienced because of Vincente’s affirmative action is not the type that Vincente could have inferred from known facts. The plaintiffs had no evidence of discrimination. View "M.J. v. Akron City School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 1994, Jarvis was convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and five counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113, 371, 924(c). The court determined that his first 924(c) firearm conviction generated a statutory minimum sentence of five years and that his other four 924(c) convictions, repeat offenses, were each subject to a statutory minimum of 20 consecutive years and sentenced Jarvis to 85 years plus 11 years on his other convictions. In 2014, the Supreme Court clarified that for aiding-and-abetting liability under 924(c) a defendant must have “advance knowledge” that a firearm would be used. Jarvis successfully moved to have three 924(c) convictions vacated for insufficient evidence of advance knowledge. The district court resentenced Jarvis to five years for his first 924(c) conviction, 20 for his second, and 15 for his other convictions.The 2018 First Step Act amended 924(c), limiting the firearm convictions that count as repeat offenses. Were Jarvis sentenced today, his second 924(c) conviction would generate a statutory minimum of five years. Congress expressly chose not to apply this change to defendants sentenced before the Act's passage, Jarvis moved for a sentence reduction under the “compassionate release” statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” the COVID-19 pandemic and the amendments, The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The statute excludes non-retroactive First Step Act amendments from the category of extraordinary or compelling reasons, whether a defendant relies on the amendments alone or in combination with other factors. View "United States v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 allocated $29 billion for grants to help restaurant owners. The Small Business Administration (SBA) processed applications and distributed funds on a first-come, first-served basis. During the first 21 days, it gave grants only to priority applicants--restaurants at least 51% owned and controlled by women, veterans, or the “socially and economically disadvantaged,” defined by reference to the Small Business Act, which refers to those who have been “subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice” or “cultural bias” based solely on immutable characteristics, 15 U.S.C. 637(a)(5). A person is considered “economically disadvantaged” if he is socially disadvantaged and he faces “diminished capital and credit opportunities” compared to non-socially disadvantaged people who operate in the same industry. Under a pre-pandemic regulation, the SBA presumes certain applicants are socially disadvantaged including: “Black Americans,” “Hispanic Americans,” “Asian Pacific Americans,” “Native Americans,” and “Subcontinent Asian Americans.” After reviewing evidence, the SBA will consider an applicant a victim of “individual social disadvantage” based on specific findings.Vitolo (white) and his wife (Hispanic) own a restaurant and submitted an application. Vitolo sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit the government from disbursing grants based on race or sex. The Sixth Circuit ordered the government to fund the plaintiffs’ application, if approved, before all later-filed applications, without regard to processing time or the applicants’ race or sex. The government failed to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification that would allow the classification to stand. The government may continue the preference for veteran-owned restaurants. View "Vitolo v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declared the issue of partisan gerrymandering a nonjusticiable political question in “Rucho,” in 2019. Michigan had already established its Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission by ballot initiative in the state’s 2018 general election. The Commission is composed of 13 registered voters: eight who affiliate with the state’s two major political parties (four per party) and five who are unaffiliated with those parties, who must satisfy various eligibility criteria designed to ensure that they lack certain political ties. Plaintiffs are Michigan citizens who allege that they are unconstitutionally excluded from serving on the Commission by its eligibility criteria, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their complaint. Plaintiffs do not have a federal constitutional right to be considered for the Commission. While at least some of the partisan activities enumerated by the eligibility criteria involve the exercise of constitutionally protected interests, Michigan’s compelling interest in cleansing its redistricting process of partisan influence justifies the limited burden imposed by the eligibility criteria. Although claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering may be nonjusticiable, Michigan is free to employ its political process to address the issue head-on. View "Daunt v. Benson" on Justia Law

Jackson, an African American woman, was GCRC's Human Resources Director. Daly, GCRC’s chief administrative officer, was Jackson’s supervisor. There were pending internal discrimination complaints when Jackson started, including a complaint by African American employees about Bennett. Jackson ultimately negotiated a severance agreement with Bennett. A second issue involved McClane’s complaints about Williams, GCRC’s finance director, who subsequently resigned. Jackson was also responsible for approving Equal Employment Opportunity Plans submitted by vendors and contractors. Jackson realized that several vendors’ EEOPs had expired and became concerned that some GCRC directors were conducting business with vendors before their EEOPs were approved. Jackson implemented several changes in GCRC’s EEOP approval process. Several employees, vendors, board members, and union representatives complained to Daly about Jackson’s “abrasiveness” and communication style. Other employees reported having good experiences with Jackson. Daly fired Jackson without giving a reason other than she was an at-will employee. Jackson filed a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court granted GCRC summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jackson engaged in protected activity and there remains a genuine factual dispute as to causation. Jackson’s actions could reasonably be viewed as steps to ensure there was no discrimination in hiring both within GCRC and among its vendors, and were protected activity under Title VII. A reasonable juror could find that Jackson has established a prima facie case of causation through circumstantial evidence including the temporal proximity between Jackson’s protected activity and termination. View "Jackson v. Genesee County Road Commission" on Justia Law

In April 2017, a tax foreclosure action was commenced against the then-owner of the Cincinnati property, Davis. The city was named as a defendant. Notice of a May 2018 order for a sheriff’s sale was served on the city on June 1, 2018. During 2017-2018, a building on the property was also the subject of administrative condemnation proceedings. The condemnation decision, dated July 16, 2018, was sent by certified mail to the then-owner, Davis. After the public hearing, but before the decision to demolish the building was made, Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the July 5 sheriff’s sale. A decree confirming the sale entered on July 17. A sheriff’s deed was issued and was recorded in August.Plaintiff was not aware of the demolition decision. On November 14, 2018, the city sent letters to Plaintiff summarizing the public nuisance proceedings and the decision to raze the building, requesting that Plaintiff respond within 10 days The letters were sent via certified mail but were never delivered to Plaintiff. The city made no subsequent efforts to provide notice to Plaintiff.The building was demolished on April 8, 2019. The city demanded $10,515.00 from Plaintiff for the costs of the demolition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for trespass. Plaintiff was provided with “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” of the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. The city did not need to obtain a warrant to demolish a vacant building that had been condemned by administrative proceedings which met due process requirements. View "Keene Group, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Jacob and Genetta Clark, fundamentalist Christians, believe that their religion requires them to use corporal punishment with their children, ages 16, 14, and 12. Their son went to school with marks from being hit with a belt and reported being abused. Social workers from the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) investigated. The children confirmed the use of corporal punishment but stated that they were not abused and felt safe at home.The Clarks allege that they were not timely informed of the first hearing, at which the judge issued an order: “no physical discipline, parents to cooperate w/ CHFS” without making findings of abuse. A judge later told Jacob that he did not have a Fourth Amendment right to stop the CHFS visits and that if he failed to cooperate, the children could be removed. Jacob alleges that the abuse charges continued as retaliation for his videotaping of a home visit. After several months the abuse cases were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Clarks's Substantive Due Process, Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and Free Exercise claims. They failed to demonstrate false prosecution. Social workers have absolute immunity for initiating judicial proceedings. While there is a general right to use reasonable corporal punishment at home and in schools, the Clarks offered no authority that imposing corporal punishment that leaves marks is reasonable. Given the existence of a court order, a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would not have understood that he was violating the Clarks’ Fourth Amendment rights. The Clarks failed to state plausible First Amendment retaliation or Free Exercise claims. View "Clark v. Stone" on Justia Law

Cuyahoga County planned for CCCC to house detainees and prisoners from nearby communities in exchange for significant payments. CCCC was already severely overcrowded and understaffed. In March 2018, Cleveland transferred inmates to CCCC. In May, the County Council agreed that CCCC’s issues were “mission-critical” but no action was taken.On June 20, 2018, Johnson was detained at CCCC, awaiting trial for petty theft. During intake, a nurse noted that he was “likely a suicide risk" having previously attempted self-harm. No protective action was taken. Days later, Johnson told a nurse that he was “suicidal.” No action was taken. CCCC correctional officers were aware that Johnson was a suicide risk. On June 29, Officers placed Johnson in solitary confinement for allegedly trying to steal food; no one checked on him. That evening, Johnson was found hanging in the cell. CCCC lacked a device for cutting him down. On July 1, Johnson died.The Department of Justice reviewed and reported CCCC's “appalling conditions,” including medical staff lacking proper licenses, mental health appraisals not being conducted in a timely manner, and deliberate use of food deprivation as punishment. CCCC housed 2,420 individuals; its capacity was 1,765. There were 96 correctional officer vacancies.Moderwell sued corrections officers and executives under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants judgment on Eighth Amendment claims and dismissed an excessive force claim against the executives but concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged excessive force against the officers and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against the executives. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against the officers rely on the same facts as the excessive force claims, so denying qualified immunity did not impose additional discovery burdens. Whether precedent clearly established a right that was violated by the executives requires factual development. View "Moderwell v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law