Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Owens was convicted of five counts of possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)), one carjacking, four counts of bank robbery by force or violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. A single section 924(c) conviction carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Each subsequent 924(c) conviction then (2004) triggered an additional 25 years, even if those convictions were part of a single indictment. If Owens had agreed to cooperate, the government would have allowed him to plead guilty to a single count. After Owens rejected the government’s offers, he was convicted and sentenced to 1260 months.Owens’s co-conspirators pleaded guilty and were sentenced, respectively, to 21 months, 33 months, 39 years, and 25 years of incarceration. In 2019, Owens sought resentencing, noting that he would not be subject to the same lengthy sentence if sentenced today because the First Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. 924(c), so that his sentence would be 25 years. Appointed counsel argued that Owens was punished for going to trial and emphasized his “remarkable” record of rehabilitation. Owens then moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).The district court denied Owens’s motion, concluding that the disparity between Owens's sentence and the sentence that he would receive today was not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. The court did not consider any other factors. The Sixth Circuit reversed, directing the court to consider whether Owens’s rehabilitative efforts and the lengthy sentence he received because of exercising his right to a trial may, in combination with the First Step Act’s changes, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. View "United States v. Owens" on Justia Law

The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s “three-strikes rule,” 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), provides that a prisoner accrues a strike when he brings a frivolous lawsuit. After three strikes, the Act prohibits inmates from filing those lawsuits without paying the initial court fee. Simons, a Michigan prisoner, broke a prison window. Prison officials removed money from his commissary account to make repairs. Simons filed a pro se complaint, targeting this seizure of funds as a violation of state and federal law. The district court allowed Simons to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1), then screened Simons’s lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and rejected Simons’s federal claims on the merits. The court stated the dismissal would count as a “strike.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simon’s challenges to the underlying dismissal lacked merit. The court’s “opinion” calling the dismissal a strike is not a judgment, and will not, alone, prohibit Simons from filing a free lawsuit in the future. Section 1915(g) calls on a later court that has before it a civil action brought by the prisoner to engage in a backward-looking inquiry and determine whether the prisoner “on 3 or more prior occasions” has brought an action or appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that [it was] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.” View "Simons v. Washington" on Justia Law

Memphis previously maintained an email Media Advisory List to alert members of the media about newsworthy events and activities. The List included Thomas, the founder, editor, and publisher of MLK50: Justice Through Journalism, an online news website covering issues at “the intersection of poverty, power, and public policy.” Thomas claims that in 2018, she was excluded from the List in retaliation for her news coverage of Mayor Strickland. Thomas alleges that she made multiple requests to be returned to the List and that, at one point, the City’s Chief Communications Officer (Madden) stated: “You have demonstrated, particularly on social media, that you are not objective when it comes to Mayor Strickland.” Thomas’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserted violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed Thomas’ claims against Strickland and Madden on other grounds, and later dismissed as moot her claims against the city, finding that the city had ceased relying upon the List to disseminate media advisories and that the process that led to the new media relations policy was “not ad hoc or discretionary.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The city demonstrated that there is no reasonable expectation that it will re-implement the List and established that its change in media relations policy completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the challenged conduct. The change in media relations policy was “legislative-like.” View "Thomas v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

In 2016, Harvey pleaded guilty to distributing a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment. Harvey filed an unsuccessful section 2255 motion for habeas corpus relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. On June 12, 2020, Harvey sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that “[t]he ongoing coronavirus pandemic presents extraordinary and compelling reasons where a defendant is susceptible to infection,” he cited his “chronic bronchitis” and the spread of COVID-19 cases at the facility in which he was incarcerated.The district court denied Harvey’s motion without holding a hearing. The one-page form stated that the court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement. A checked box stated: “DENIED after complete review of the motion on the merits.” Weeks later, the court filed a five-page “OPINION." The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The form order was not necessarily procedurally defective; the facts in the record provide a reasonable basis for the denial of Harvey’s motion. Harvey admitted “that he had been selling drugs for over a year”; the prosecutor asserted at sentencing that Harvey’s house contained “a gun” and “ammunition”; Harvey had earlier drug-related convictions and had served only about 25% of his custodial sentence. The record can be read to support the conclusion that section 3553(a) did not favor Harvey’s release. View "United States v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Strickland, an African-American Detroit Police Officer since 2008, claims that he has been subjected to race-based harassment throughout his tenure. He cited several incidents, social media posts, and Department reports and having been denied desired shift assignments and training in favor of white officers. A Committee on Race and Equality report concluded that “the department has a growing racial problem” and that African-American officers who complained were retaliated against. On January 22, 2017, off-duty, Strickland pulled into a gas station that, unbeknownst to him, was the site of an active police investigation of a reported incendiary device. He could not see the firetrucks or police cars. When Strickland saw a uniformed sergeant emerge from the fog, he immediately identified himself as an officer but was handcuffed in a way that was extremely tight. A sergeant led him away, belittling him in front of other officers. Strickland was later diagnosed with a bilateral wrist contusion and was suspended for three days without pay. Strickland complained. After an investigation, Strickland was charged with three code of conduct violations.Strickland sued, alleging hostile workplace and illegal retaliation (Title VII), and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming an unlawful search and seizure and excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the hostile work environment claim but reversed the grant of qualified immunity to one officer on the excessive force claim and summary judgment in favor of the city on the retaliation claim. View "Strickland v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Nian worked as a home healthcare mentor for a family with a special-needs child, “SG.” After one visit, SG’s sister, JCG, claimed that Nian entered her room, tried to kiss her, put his hands on her private areas, and then pulled down her leggings and tried to perform oral sex on her. Her mother called the police and took JCG to the hospital. Nian was found guilty of rape by cunnilingus. Nian later sought a new trial, based on an affidavit from a juror, Cox, stating that another juror had introduced into deliberations facts about Nian being from Sierra Leone and having a prior criminal record, which she felt influenced the verdict. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court excluded Cox’s testimony under Ohio Rule of Evidence 606(B) (aliunde rule) and denied Nian’s request for a new trial. The court stated that it questioned the credibility of the proffered testimony. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of Nian’s petition for habeas relief. it is a constitutional error for a state court to use Ohio’s aliunde rule to exclude evidence of a jury’s consideration of extraneous information. This is not the rare case where the introduction of extraneous information was harmless. View "Nian v. Warden, North Central Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

When the state called Blackwell to testify at Miller's trial for the 1995 murder of Rice, she claimed that she could not remember anything about the day in question. Out of the jury’s presence, the judge sent Blackwell to jail to read statements that she had given to police shortly after the murder and notes that Miller’s investigator took when speaking with her. Blackwell returned to court and testified, consistently with her police statement, that the morning after the murder, she saw Miller in a car that looked like Rice’s and that Miller told her that Rice was dead before anyone else could have known. During cross-examination, Miller’s attorney asked Blackwell how she had regained her memory. Blackwell replied: “I don’t want to go to jail.”The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ordered a new trial. Blackwell was unavailable. Rather than allow all of Blackwell’s testimony to be read to the jury, the court carved “any reference of incarceration or intimidation.” The jury never heard Blackwell’s statement that she did not want to go to jail. The rest of the prosecution’s case relied heavily on the testimony of a single eyewitness, who had credibility problems. Convicted, Miller received a life sentence. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Miller’s claim that the court erred in admitting Blackwell’s redacted testimony.The Sixth Circuit reversed a denial of habeas corpus relief. Confrontation of an adverse witness necessarily entails that the trier of fact be allowed to learn the material results of that confrontation. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals' application of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was objectively unreasonable. View "Miller v. Genovese" on Justia Law

The Shelby County Sheriff’s Department dispatcher alerted three deputies that a 911 caller, Nancy Lewellyn, had told the dispatcher that she was suicidal, that she had a gun (possibly a .45 caliber pistol), and that she would kill anyone who came to her residence. Each squad car was equipped with a dashboard camera, which recorded video, sound, and the time of day. At 12:14 p.m., Lewellyn walked outside and turned toward her driveway, carrying in her right hand a BB handgun that resembled a .45 caliber pistol. She began to raise that handgun. The deputies yelled to her then fired shots. Lewellyn continued walking with her right arm extended and the pistol pointing toward her car, Lewellyn leaned on its hood briefly, then turned back toward the house. The shooting continued. Llewellyn collapsed; 11 seconds had elapsed since she exited her house. Ten shots were fired. Lewellyn had deposited the handgun on the sedan’s hood before turning back. The deputies approached and discovered that she was unarmed. Lewellyn died at the scene.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court rejected the deputies’ claims of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than in hindsight. The “facts and circumstances” support the deputies’ contention that reasonable officers would perceive that Lewellyn posed an immediate threat to their safety. View "Cunningham v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

Ohio H.B. 214, signed into law in 2017, prohibits any person from purposefully performing or inducing or attempting to perform or induce an abortion if the person has knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part, because of a test result indicating or a prenatal diagnosis of Down Syndrome in an unborn child or “any other reason to believe” that an unborn child has Down Syndrome, Ohio Rev. Code 2919.10(B). Violations constitute fourth-degree felonies. The law requires the state medical board to revoke the license of a physician who violates it and makes that physician liable for damages. The performing physician must attest in writing that he is not aware that fetal Down Syndrome is a reason for the woman’s decision to terminate.The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction but, on rehearing, en banc, reversed, reasoning that the restrictions imposed, or burdens created, by H.B. 214 do not create a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to choose or obtain an abortion. The restrictions are reasonably related to, and further, Ohio’s legitimate interests. The right to an abortion, even before viability, is not absolute. The “right” actually implicated or affected here is not the woman’s right merely to obtain an abortion; the court focused on the doctor’s “knowing” participation in the Down-syndrome stigmatic decision-making. View "Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud" on Justia Law

At 1:20 a.m., Harden, an African-American, went to buy beer at a Thornton store, where a uniformed Heritage Creek police officer, Hillman, provided security. The clerk told Harden, “I think you’ve had too much to drink already.” Harden left but returned. Hillman allegedly slammed him down onto the floor. Harden requested medical attention and was transported to the hospital, where he was cited for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and public intoxication, then released. The charges were dismissed after Hillman failed to appear.Harden's claims against Thornton and Heritage Creek were dismissed. Harden’s excessive force claim against Hillman was rejected by a jury. Harden first unsuccessfully sought a new trial based on the court’s refusal to order the Marshals Service to serve his subpoenas and on Hillman’s counsel allegedly making improper arguments to the jury.Harden’s counsel obtained permission to contact a juror post-trial. That juror claimed that Harden did not get a fair trial because of his race and that another juror concealed from the judge that he was related to a police officer. The court denied Harden’s second motion for a new trial.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Harden’s claim that he was arrested without probable cause and the order denying Harden’s first motion for a new trial but vacated the denial of the second motion. The juror’s affidavit showed that jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict. View "Harden v. Hillman" on Justia Law