Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Muskegon Detective Schmidt, an undercover agent, asked a suspected drug dealer, Conkle, to buy some cocaine. The two drove to a house that belonged to White. Schmidt watched Conkle walk into White’s house and reemerge, after which Conkle handed Schmidt three grams of cocaine. About 40 days later, Conkle again took Schmidt to White’s house. In a nearby alley. Schmidt handed Conkle pre-marked cash. Conkle drove by himself to White’s house. Another detective watched as Conkle entered the house, reemerged, and traveled back to Schmidt, where he completed the sale, Schmidt applied for a search warrant within 48 hours of Conkle’s second purchase, citing the two purchases, his training and experience of 17 years, and his confirmation that the home belonged to White. A Michigan state judge approved a “no-knock” warrant. The search uncovered over 20 grams of cocaine, over 30 grams of “crack” cocaine, a stolen semi-automatic handgun, an AR-style rifle, and over $2,500 in cash. The government charged White with being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing a firearm to further drug trafficking, possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances, and brandishing a weapon to further drug trafficking.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a motion to suppress. The issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. The key remedy for unjustified no-knock entries is a section 1983 action for money damages, not the exclusion of the evidence. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear’s COVID-19 response included a “Mass Gathering Order” that prevented groups of more than 10 people from assembling for purposes including community, civic, public, leisure, faith-based, or sporting events; parades; concerts; festivals; conventions; fundraisers; and similar activities.” Locations permitted to operate normally included airports, bus and train stations, medical facilities, libraries, shopping centers, or "other spaces where persons may be in transit” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores.” The ban on faith-based gatherings was enjoined in previous litigation.Plaintiffs alleged that the Order, facially and as applied, violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. While Governor Beshear threatened the plaintiffs with prosecution for holding a mass gathering at the state capitol to express their opposition to his COVID-19-related restrictions, he welcomed a large group of Black Lives Matter protestors to the capitol and addressed those protestors, despite their violation of the Order. The district court preliminarily enjoined the Order's enforcement. Governor Beshear withdrew the Order. The Sixth Circuit held that the withdrawal rendered the appeal moot. To the extent that the plaintiffs claim that a threat of prosecution for their past violations keeps the case alive, the court remanded for the district court to determine whether further relief is proper. View "Ramsek v. Beshear" on Justia Law

In 1994, Kendrick fatally shot his wife outside a Chattanooga gas station. He insisted that his rifle had malfunctioned and fired without Kendrick pulling the trigger. Before trial, officer Miller accidentally shot himself in the foot while handling the rifle, A jury convicted Kendrick of first-degree murder. In his petition for state post-conviction relief, Kendrick raised 77 claims alleging either ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) or prosecutorial misconduct. He succeeded in the Court of Criminal Appeals on two IAC claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to both, holding that counsel’s decision not to adduce the testimony of a firearms expert was not constitutionally deficient performance nor was counsel’s failure to introduce Miller's favorable hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception.In federal habeas proceedings, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. Kendrick’s counsel was not constitutionally deficient in failing to admit Miller’s “excited utterance” statements that he did not pull the trigger when he shot himself but “took great pains to inform the jury that the weapon apparently misfired’ for Miller. It was within the bounds of a reasonable judicial determination for the state court to conclude that defense counsel could follow a strategy that did not require the use of firearms experts. View "Kendrick v. Parris" on Justia Law

John Doe was expelled from the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine (CHM) for allegedly sexually assaulting two women, Roe 1 and Roe 2, on the night of the school’s formal dance. An outside consultant had determined that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women. CHM convened a panel, which affirmed those findings without an in-person hearing. While this process was ongoing, the Sixth Circuit held that universities must offer an in-person hearing with cross-examination in cases where the fact-finder’s determination depends on witness credibility.CHM then gave Doe an in-person hearing, conducted over the course of three days before a Resolution Officer selected by the university. Doe was permitted to testify and, through his attorney, to cross-examine Roe 1 and Roe 2. The Resolution Officer did not require Roe 1 to answer every question that Doe’s attorney posed. Both Doe and his attorney were present throughout the entire hearing. After considering the credibility of the witnesses, the Resolution Officer again found that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s suit alleging violations of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title IX. Doe received ample due process throughout the course of his three-day hearing. View "Doe v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law

Bethel is serving a capital sentence at CCI. Following Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy, CCI officials implemented a policy prohibiting “orders for printed material placed by third parties through unapproved vendors.” An inmate’s family or friends could only place orders on their behalf through an approved vendor; orders from unapproved vendors had to “be initiated by the inmate and approved by CCI.” If an inmate received a package from an unapproved source, the inmate could return the package at the inmate’s expense or have it destroyed. Officials withheld books from Bethel that were not ordered by Bethel; he received notices explaining why the books were withheld and offering him the option of having the books returned or destroyed. Bethel later learned that other inmates had received religious books, which were initially withheld for being ordered by a third party but were exempted after being reviewed by the chaplain.Bethel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an Establishment Clause claim but remanded Free Speech and Procedural Due Process claims and later affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The “publisher only” policy was neutral and supported by the legitimate penological interest of preventing the entry of contraband into the prison; there were reasonable alternative means for Bethel to acquire these books. Bethel received sufficient process following the withholding of his books through written notice, the grievance procedure, and the ability to return the book. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because they did not violate Bethel’s clearly established rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. View "Bethel v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2004, Kimball was convicted of multiple drug-trafficking, weapons, money-laundering offenses, soliciting murder, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus 15 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In April 2020, Kimball sought compassionate release, asserting that there were extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release because he is at high risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 based on his age (67) and medical conditions (hypertension, heart problems, high cholesterol, and gout) and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting Kimball’s argument that the time he has already served—approximately 17 years—is sufficient to serve the section 3553(a) goals because his offense did not involve any “actual violence” and he is statistically unlikely to re-offend based on his age. The court noted that when it affirmed his effective life sentence, he was the “undisputed kingpin and mastermind” of a “massive cocaine-trafficking conspiracy.” The district court’s order noted that its decision rested at least in part on the section 3553(a) factors; courts may deny relief under those factors “even if ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons would otherwise justify relief.” Even if the district court “mistakenly limited itself to the commentary’s list of extraordinary and compelling reasons," that would not entitle him to relief. View "United States v. Kimball" on Justia Law

Reedy, a Michigan prisoner, was a 47-year-old African American, serving a DUI sentence. His cellmate, Hensley was a 53-year-old much larger Caucasian, convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a child. Reedy claims that in June 2016, he told Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Wade about Hensley's threats against his life. In July, Reedy told prison counselor West “that [his] bunkie had threatened [him] and we needed to move.” West allegedly responded, “I’ll get back with you,” but never did. Days later, Reedy and Hensley went together to West’s office. Reedy claims he “reiterate[d] [his] fear” West allegedly replied, Hensley "ain’t going to do nothing.” West claims Reedy remained silent, while Hensley stated, “You guys got to move this motherfucker” or “whatever happens . . . is going to be onto [you].” West claims that he told the men to work it out and that Reedy returned later and said that “everything was good.” The next morning, Hensley used a softball-sized rock in a laundry bag to beat Reedy while he was sleeping.In Reedy’s Eighth Amendment “failure to protect" lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court dismissed the other prison officials and, with respect to West, concluded that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Reedy as to both an objective, substantial risk of serious harm to Reedy before the assault and that West was deliberately indifferent to that risk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Reedy, he has not created a triable issue of fact to support an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. View "Reedy v. West" on Justia Law

In March 2005, Miles was indicted for murder, wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and being a persistent felony offender. Eight months later, law enforcement sent a hat recovered at the crime scene to a lab for DNA testing. The court granted the prosecutor several continuances, waiting for the DNA results for the hat. Miles himself filed an unsuccessful speedy-trial motion, arguing that the DNA testing was a “stall tactic.” The hat was negative for Miles’ DNA. Miles’s trial began 21 months after he was indicted.On appeal, the issues concerned a gun, found under Miles’s mattress but not linked to the shootings, and Miles’s nicknames. Miles appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, arguing that the 21-month delay between his indictment and trial violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. Applying the four-factor test established by the U.S. Supreme Court, that court affirmed his convictions.In Kentucky habeas proceedings, Miles argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s references to the gun and to the prosecutor’s use of his nicknames. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that there was not a reasonable probability that the verdicts would have been different if his counsel had objected to the gun or nickname references. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Miles’s petition for federal habeas relief; the district court appropriately deferred to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reasonable resolutions of Miles’s claims. View "Miles v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Tennessee Code 39-15- 202(a)–(h) requires the woman be informed, orally and in-person by the attending physician or by the referring physician that she is pregnant; of the probable gestational age of the fetus; whether the fetus may be viable; of the “services ... available to assist her during her pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have the abortion”; and of “[t]he normal and reasonably foreseeable medical benefits, risks, or both of undergoing an abortion or continuing the pregnancy to term.” The law establishes a 48-hour waiting period that begins when the woman receives the mandated information, which is reduced to 24 hours in the event of a court order. The effect of the waiting period is that a woman seeking an abortion in Tennessee must make at least two visits to the clinic, except in the case of a medical emergency that prevents compliance.The district court declared the waiting period unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement but declined to rule on the equal protection claim. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal. The district court’s factual findings compel the conclusion that Tennessee’s waiting period unduly burdens women’s abortion rights, under any of the cited precedents. Defendants—who bear the burden of persuading the court that a stay is warranted—did not challenge those factual findings. View "Bristol Regional Women's Center v. Slatery" on Justia Law

At a Michigan gun show, Turaani attempted to buy a gun. When the dealer ran Turaani’s name through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, he received a “delay” response, requiring the dealer to wait three days before completing the sale. The next day, FBI agent Chambers visited the dealer to see what information Turaani had provided and explained that “we have a problem with the company” Turaani “keeps.”. He showed photographs of Turaani with another person of apparent Middle Eastern descent, whom the dealer did not recognize. Days later, Turaani contacted the dealer, who reported the visit from the FBI. While he “technically could sell the gun,” the dealer stated that he was “no longer comfortable doing so.” Turaani sued the FBI's Director, Chambers, and the director of the Terrorist Screening Database, citing the Privacy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the stigma-plus doctrine, and 42 U.S.C. 1981.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of standing. Turaani focused on his “right to obtain a weapon” and the direct and indirect injuries that flowed from the dealer’s decision not to sell him one but the dealer’s decision not to sell the gun was an independent choice that the government did not require. Turaani failed to show that his injury was traceable to the FBI’s actions. There was no coercion; making an inquiry, and passing along ambiguous information, “is a distant cry from forcing action.” View "Turaani v. Wray" on Justia Law